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Summary 
In this thesis, I present a novel compatibilist solution to the problem of free will. The presented 
solution rests on three strategic pillars.  
The first pillar: It is widely accepted that the justifiability of our common practice of holding 
others morally responsible is seriously undermined should it turn out that free will is 
impossible. This threat to the practice is what motivates the discussion of the problem of free 
will. However, the motivation is not, I will argue, theoretically innocent. It comes part and 
parcel with certain deeply misleading constraints. In Chapter 1, I challenge the widely accepted  
background motivation and the associated constraints. The insight generated by the discussion 
in Chapter 1 allows me to approach the problem of free will from a different angle. 
The second pillar: The vast majority of philosophers agree that free will can be attributed only 
to agents that are, in some suitably robust sense, rational; that is, they see rationality as a 
necessary condition of attributability of free will. In Chapter 2, I formulate an original 
argument in support of this view. In Chapter 3, I present a thought experiment designed to 
show that, and how, rationality can be understood as not only a necessary condition but a 
condition that is, in fact, sufficient for the attributability. I conclude that acting rationally is all 
there is to acting freely.  
The third pillar: The logic of my account of how rationality can be understood as a sufficient 
condition of the attributability of free will is such that it won`t help neutralize the threat that 
universal causal determinism poses to the justifiability of our practice of holding others 
morally responsible. This theoretical impotence will be perceived as a weakness of the 
account. The last two chapters of the thesis are meant to neutralize the perceived weakness.  
It is generally, and mostly implicitly, assumed that once it has been established that we 
have free will, there won`t be any other principle reason that undermines the justifiability of 
our practice of holding others morally responsible. I challenge the assumption. I argue that 
there is another such principal reason in virtue of which the practice is irremediably 
unjustifiable. To be able to argue so, I first identify the kind of holding morally responsible 
that calls for the free will assumption. This is done in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, I argue that the 
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kind of holding morally responsible that calls for the free will assumption is in principle 
unjustifiable due to the morally corrupted essence of man. I conclude that the theoretical 
impotence of my account of free will regarding the issue of the justifiability of our practice of 
holding others morally responsible cannot be taken as a weakness of the account because the 
practice is, for a separate reason, irremediably unjustifiable anyway. 
In Appendix, I offer a separate argument for the claim that man`s moral standing is 
essentially corrupted. The argument relies on an interpretation of a passage from the New 
Testament and as such its appeal is somewhat limited. The target audience of the argument is 
a broadly Christian reader. Because of the limited appeal of the argument, it hasn`t been 
included in the main body of the thesis.  
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Introduction 
 
It's only by thinking even more crazily than philosophers do 
that you can solve their problems. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein1 
 
The problem of free will is one of the most discussed problems in the history of philosophy. It 
is so because much about who we are as moral and socially interacting agents seems to turn 
on the answer provided.  
Humans care about the justifications of their actions. Among the actions where they seem to 
care most about justifications is holding others morally responsible. The practice of holding 
others morally responsible is constitutive of our everyday social interactions. It is generally 
agreed that the moral justifiability of holding another responsible is severely compromised in 
cases where the person held responsible lacks free will. Thus, should it turn out that there is 
some issue of principle with free will and agency, then the socially constitutive practise of 
holding others responsible would be seriously undermined. And, it is a widely shared worry 
that, indeed, there is at least one such issue of principle with free will and agency.  
The issue with free will and agency I have in mind here and will address in this thesis has the 
form of a dilemma constituted by two apparently and mutually contradictory assumptions:2 
People possess free will. 
The world is such that there are no alternative futures. 
The assumptions are understood, at least on the face of it, as mutually contradictory because 
the possession of free will is taken to involve an availability of alternative future actions that 
an agent possessing free will is choosing from, which, at the same time, is something that is 
explicitly ruled out by the second assumption. 
 
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. G.H. von Wright, trans. Peter Winch (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1980) p. 75e. 
2 This is not to say that this is the only understanding of what constitutes the problem. Depending on 
their other theoretical commitments, some philosophers see the problem as being about the tension 
between the divine foreknowledge and human free will, or (if they are libertarians) about figuring out 
how an indeterminate causation could be embedded in autonomous agency, or they might simply take 
it to be about answering the question whether or not determinism is true.  
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The majority of philosophers working on the problem of free will as understood here are 
unwilling to `dissolve` the dilemma by giving up one of the assumptions. The first assumption 
is deeply grounded in the phenomenology of our everyday experience with our own agency. 
The second assumption is entailed in the thesis of universal causal determinism which is, in 
contemporary discussions, taken as foundational for the highly respected project of natural 
sciences to explain the world in terms of causes and laws of nature. Thus, giving up either of 
the assumptions would incur unacceptable theoretical costs. Most philosophers will, therefore, 
accept the assumptions and attempt to show how the apparent contradiction could be 
removed.3 In this thesis I shall attempt to do the same. 
The apparent contradiction between the two assumptions has been a very resilient one. None 
of the proposed resolutions seems to have been particularly successful, as evidenced by the 
undying interest of both philosophers and the general public in the problem. When a theoretical 
problem has resisted a solution for a long time, one can do worse than re-examine the 
conceptual framework within which the problem is typically tackled. Such a re-examination 
can, with a bit of luck, yield a conceptual framework that is more solution-friendly.   
I engage in such a re-examination in Chapter 1. More specifically, I scrutinize an assumption 
that seems to be implicit (or explicit) in vast majority of the contemporary attempts to solve  
the problem of free will. The assumption could be put as follows: Any successful solution to 
the problem of free will has to be such that it neutralizes the threat that the second horn of the 
dilemma (The world is such that there are no alternative futures) poses regarding the 
justifiability of our practice of holding others (morally) responsible.  
In philosophical discussions of the problem of free will, the assumption manifests itself 
through philosophers` using, in many contexts, the notions of free will and moral responsibility 
interchangeably. This interchangeability is often seen as innocuous because it is accepted that 
there is a robust conceptual dependency between the two notions. A proposed account of free 
will is, typically, tested in thought experiments that are designed to elicit intuitions regarding 
 
3 There are philosophers who reject the dilemma as they see no tension between determinism and 
alternative possibilities. Daniel Dennett, for instance, cleverly equivocates between ontological and 
epistemological readings of determinism to be able to claim that, for all practical purposes, there are 
options to choose from despite the truth of determinism. Another good example of a philosopher 
rejecting the dilemma is David Lewis who argues that the dilemma collapses once we disambiguate the 
notion of `could have done otherwise`. Once disambiguated, it can be seen that there is a robust sense 
in which one can be understood as having alternatives in a determined world. For details see Daniel 
Dennett, Elbow room: the varieties of free will worth wanting (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press: 1984), 
especially the last chapter, and David Lewis, `Are we free to break the laws?`, Theoria, 47 (1981), 113-
121. It is worth noticing that although these philosophers formally reject the dilemma, it's not 
implausible to interpret them as providing an analysis which avoids it, precisely because they take the 
dilemma seriously; and if they are understood like that, they too can be seen as starting from the same 
position.  
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the justifiability of holding, in a particular scenario, a person morally responsible. The moral 
intuitions appealed to in those thought experiments are – for reasons discussed in Chapter 1 - 
extremely difficult (perhaps impossible) to satisfy.  
Now, what if it turned out that, not only, we don`t have to approach the problem of free 
will constrained by the need to satisfy the moral intuitions, we even shouldn`t do so, as such a 
constrained approach is intrinsically deeply misleading? Surely, it is not unreasonable to 
expect that once this constraint is removed, new, hitherto neglected, theoretical avenues 
towards the solution of the problem of free will might open. Chapter 1 is dedicated to a removal 
of the constraint.  
Chapters 2 and 3 capitalize on the theoretical gains generated by the discussion in the first 
chapter. Having disconnected the discussion of free will from moral theory allows me to focus 
exclusively on the conceptual architecture of free will and how it relates to the logic of causal 
determinism; that is, put simply: I don`t have to worry about answering the (relatively more 
difficult) question of how moral responsibility is possible in a causally determined world. 
In Chapter 2, I argue towards the claim that an exercise of practical reasoning is a 
necessary condition of attributability of freedom to an agent. The claim, or a version of it, is 
not terribly controversial as the majority of philosophers working on freedom and agency will 
agree that only some suitably rational agency is describable as free. They will, however, agree 
so for reasons (that I will touch upon in Chapter 2) that I find unsatisfactory. Therefore, I offer 
an argument of my own towards the claim.  
In Chapter 3, I argue that an exercise of practical reasoning is not merely a necessary 
but, in fact, a sufficient condition of attributability of freedom to an agent. A crucial role in the 
argument is played by an original thought experiment designed to show that whenever an 
action is rational, it is also free. The thought experiment explicitly assumes that the world is 
causally determined thus the conclusion of the argument constitutes a novel compatibilist 
solution to the problem of free will.  
A conspicuous feature of the compatibilist solution to the problem of free will presented in 
Chapter 3 is its theoretical impotence regarding the problem of grounding our practice of 
holding others morally responsible in the causally determined world. I explain, in Chapter 1, 
why it is confused and misleading to approach the problem of free will under the assumption 
that a solution to the problem will be recognized as successful only if it does the grounding. 
Still, it will be, I suspect, seen by many as a weakness that the solution to the problem of free 
will proposed here is of no use to a moral theorist. Surely, most philosophers working on the 
problem of free will are motivated by the issue of the grounding. The last two chapters of the 
thesis are dedicated to neutralizing this apparent weakness.  
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As mentioned above, most philosophers working on the problem of free will are motivated by 
worries about grounding our practice of holding others morally responsible in the world that 
is fully causally determined. The motivation comes part and parcel with an implicit assumption 
that once it is shown how an agent can be free in such a causally determined world, there is no 
other serious theoretical obstacle to taking the practice of holding others morally responsible 
as safely grounded.4 My strategy in Chapters 4 and 5 will be to show that the problem of free 
will is not the only serious threat to the justifiability of the practice. There is another serious 
threat, and this other threat cannot, I shall argue, be neutralized. The implication of this claim 
regarding the apparent weakness of my compatibilist solution to the problem of free will is 
this. My compatibilist solution won`t help with the grounding of the practice. The practise is, 
however, ungroundable anyway because of a separate threat that cannot be neutralized. This 
means that all solutions to the problem of free will are going to suffer from the same weakness. 
This particular weakness thus cannot be selectively pointed out as a relative disadvantage of 
my solution.  
Most of Chapter 4 is devoted to disambiguating the notion of holding morally 
responsible. The idea behind this here is that there are different kinds of holding morally 
responsible and that not all of them call for the free will assumption, that is, require grounding 
in the assumption that we are free agents. Only after we have disambiguated the notion of 
holding morally responsible can we identify the kind of holding so that calls for the free will 
assumption. The path towards this identification will reveal that in our practice (of the kind 
that calls for the free will assumption) of holding others morally responsible, we are motivated 
by an urge to restore fairness disrupted by a wrongdoing. This motivation by fairness is, it will 
turn out, what lies behind philosophers` interest in the problem of free will. Philosophers 
working on the problem, typically and as mentioned above, see the problem of free will as 
being about explaining how moral responsibility is possible in the causally determined world. 
They see it so because they agree that it would be unfair to engage in holding others morally 
responsible in a world where free will is impossible.  
The discovery that holding others morally responsible has essentially something to do 
with fairness and its restoration (and/or preservation) gives us a conceptual tool to examine 
whether the kind of holding morally responsible that calls for the free will assumption can, in 
fact, ever be fair even if it can be somehow shown that we are free agents. The conceptual tool 
will be deployed in Chapter 5 to argue that our practice (of the kind that calls for the free will 
assumption) of holding others morally responsible is, indeed, essentially and irremediably 
unfair.  
 
4 That is: to take it as, in principle, justifiable.  
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 In Chapter 5, I make use of the uncontroversial claim that the appropriateness of 
blaming others for their wrongdoing depends, among other things, on the moral standing of 
the blamer. Against this background, I draw an analogy between the practice of blaming and 
that of holding morally responsible and claim – again, fairly uncontroversially – that the 
fairness of holding another morally responsible depends, among others, on the moral standing 
of the holder. It depends so in the following sense: an act of holding another morally 
responsible is not fair if the moral standing of the holder is compromised. I proceed to 
formulate an argument designed to convince the reader that as moral beings we are such that 
our moral standing is essentially and irremediably compromised and that, consequently, our 
practice (of the kind that calls for the free will assumption) of holding others morally 
responsible is essentially and irremediably unfair. I conclude that it is no weakness of my 
account of free action that it won`t ground the practice of holding others moral responsible  
because the practice is – for a separate reason – ungroundable anyway.  
The idea that man`s moral standing is essentially compromised is – at least in the 
Christian tradition – an old one. In the Appendix, I offer an alternative argument for the idea. 
The argument relies, crucially, on a philosophical interpretation of a passage from the New 
Testament. Nowadays, the vast majority of philosophers will see religious texts as largely 
irrelevant in the context of solving philosophical problems. Thus a substantial part of the 
chapter is devoted to showing why at least those philosophers who are moral realists should 
take religious texts as relevant to their theoretical research in ethics. I formulate two sub-
arguments to show that. The first sub-argument is rather controversial as in one of its steps I 
argue that moral realism implies the existence of God. The second sub-argument will be 
considerably more convincing as it doesn`t rely on any assumption that a moral realist should 
find particularly problematic.  
After the two sub-arguments have been presented and discussed, I proceed to the central 
task of the Appendix, which is the extraction of philosophical reasons from a passage in the 
New Testament. I show how the passage can plausibly be understood as entailing that it is 
essential to all men that their moral standing is compromised. This fact then makes the practice 
(of the kind that calls for the free will assumption) of holding others morally responsible 
essentially and irremediably unfair. 
Within the thesis, the alternative argument is presented in the Appendix because its 
dependency on a canonical Christian text limits its potential appeal to broadly Christian 
philosophers only. 
 
The compatibilist picture of free agency presented in the thesis rests on three pillars. The first 
pillar gets erected in Chapter 1 and is about exposing the misleading conceptual dependency 
of the discussion of the problem of free will on moral theory. The exposition liberates the 
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discussion and opens new avenues towards a solution of the problem. The second pillar gets 
erected in Chapters 2 and 3 and gives us the core compatibilist argument that allows us to see 
how free agency is possible in a causally determined world. Chapters 4 and 5 constitute the 
third pillar, a pillar whose role in the overall picture is to neutralize a strategic weakness that 
most philosophers will perceive the proposed solution to suffer from.  
The three pillars are independent of each other. This means that accepting or rejecting 
any one of the pillars is inconsequential regarding accepting or rejecting the other ones. 
 
In Appendix, I offer a separate argument for the claim that man`s moral standing is essentially 
corrupted. The argument relies on an interpretation of a passage from the New Testament and 
as such its appeal is somewhat limited. The target audience of the argument is a broadly 
Christian reader. Because of the limited appeal of the argument, it hasn`t been included in the 
main body of the thesis.  
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Chapter 1: Freedom and morality: severing the connection 
1.1   Introduction 
The central claim of the chapter is that the concept and discussion of free will/agency5 can and 
should be separated from the concept and discussion of moral responsibility.  
Ted Honderich claims that both compatibilists and incompatibilists typically understand 
the problem of free will/agency as a problem that can be settled linguistically: 
 
Both sides agree that what we have to do is just to see clearly, not get confused, get a good 
definition of the idea we all share, not get led astray by other philosophers with a doctrinal ax to 
grind…The question is importantly a linguistic one. What we have to do is analyse `free` in 
ordinary English and similar words in other languages.6 
I agree with Honderich that the problem of free will/agency is a linguistic (or conceptual) one. 
Thus, it would be philosophically relevant if we were to discover that our grasp of the key 
concept(s) is somehow incorrect or misleading. In this chapter I will, first, argue that 
connecting the concept of free will/agency with that of moral responsibility in the way it is 
often done in contemporary literature is unwarranted and as such should be severed and, 
second, show how this unwarranted connection necessarily leads to some truly puzzling issues 
that could be avoided once the relationship between free will/agency and moral responsibility 
is clarified and, ultimately, severed. The first step provides a-priori considerations. The second 
one provides a-posteriori considerations that should motivate us to sever the connection. 
1.2  The first step 
There seems to be a general and rarely disputed consensus that the concept of free will is 
fundamentally connected with the issue of moral responsibility. Claims and assumptions (both 
explicit and implicit) of the following kind are very common in the relevant literature:  
`Free will is thought of as the capacity to be genuinely responsible for actions and genuinely 
deserving of praise or blame for the choices that are made.7 
 
5 I shall often use `free will/agency` or `freedom in agency` instead of just `free will` throughout the 
thesis. The reason for using this somewhat cumbersome replacement is the following: The notion of 
(free) will is a power notion; i.e. a notion that constrains our conceptual imagination and locks our 
theorizing about the problem of free will within the assumption that being free in the causally 
deterministic world must involve some kind of power that the agent possesses. I see this as an 
unwarranted constraint which, possibly, hinders progress in solving the problem. A neutral and not 
misleading alternative to (free) `will` is (free) `agency`. At the same time, I don`t want the reader to 
forget for a moment that we are discussing what is known as the problem of free will. The expression 
`free will/agency` or `freedom in agency` is meant to capture both points. 
6 Ted Honderich, How Free Are You? (Oxford: OUP, 1993), p.101. 
7 Janet Radcliffe Richards, Human Nature after Darwin (New York: Routledge, 2000), p.136. 
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`Free will is just the capacity that gives persons the relevant sort of control required for morally 
responsible agency`.8 
`[A] central aspect of the free-will problem is the problem of explaining how it can even make 
sense to hold people responsible for what they do. To this extent, in this context, the most 
important sense of `free` is perhaps just this: someone is free insofar as they satisfy whatever 
conditions needs to be satisfied for this to make sense with respect to them`.9 
`If we do know that moral responsibility exists, then we should have no doubt about whether we 
have good reason to believe we have free will…It is as adequate a defence of the free-will thesis 
as has ever been given for any philosophical position to say,  ‘ Without free will, we should never 
be morally responsible for anything, and we are sometimes morally responsible``.10 
However, I claim, tying free will/agency with moral responsibility in the spirit of the 
quotes above is ambiguous: in one sense it is warranted and in the other it isn`t. It is correct to 
take the concept of moral responsibility as – in a certain robust sense – depending on (and in 
this way tied to) the concept of free will/agency but it is incorrect to take the concept of free 
will/agency as depending on the concept of moral responsibility. In other words: there is a 
relationship of dependency between the concept of moral responsibility and the concept of 
free will/agency. The dependency, however, is not mutual but runs in one direction only. 
Often, this point goes unnoticed in the contemporary literature on free will, which, I claim, 
leads to a deep confusion that seriously affects the whole discourse.11  
Before I proceed to discussing the deep confusion, a caveat needs to be lodged: I don`t 
wish to claim that all philosophers working on the problem of free will conflate or tie the 
notions of freedom and moral responsibility together in the way that will be criticised below. 
There are some who not only don`t conflate the notions in any illegitimate way but who 
explicitly criticize any such conflation. Kadri Vihvelin, for instance, says about the assumption 
that `to be a free agent is, […], to have what it takes to be morally responsible for our actions`, 
that `this way of approaching the free will/determinism problem is a mistake`.12 And some 
other philosophers, although not explicit about the conflation, stay clearly consistent in their 
approaching the problem as independent of moral theory. A good example is David Lewis`s 
 
8 Michael McKenna, `Ultimacy and Sweet Jane` in Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen (eds), Essays on 
free will and moral responsibility (New Castle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008), 
pp.187-188. 
9 James Lenman, `Compatibilism and contractualism: The possibility of moral responsibility`, Ethics, 
117, no.1 (2006), pp.7–31, (p.8). 
10 Peter van Inwagen, An essay on free will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p.209. 
11 Philip Pettit notices something very similar to this point of mine here – in his A Theory of Freedom 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), p.32 – `[W]e ordinary folk think of freedom in purely functional terms. We 
conceive of it as that capacity, whatever it involves in itself, in virtue of which an agent is fit to be held 
responsible, satisfying the various constraints that that involves. Freedom is identified for us, then by 
reference to the function it plays in making agents fit to be held responsible and its essential character 
– what it is in itself – is left in the dark. This functional characterization immediately opens up the 
question as to what the capacity involves in itself. And that is the question that theories of freedom, as 
I think of them, should address`. 
12 Kadri Vihvelin, `How to Think about the Free Will/Determinism Problem` in Joseph Keim Campbell, 
Michael O`Rourke and Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at Its Joints: Natural Kinds in 
Metaphysics and Science (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2011), pp. 313-340, (p.315). 
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compatibilism which is grounded solely in his ingenious treatment of the semantic behaviour 
of the phrase `could have done otherwise`.13 Despite the existence of a minority of 
philosophers who don`t tie the notions of freedom and moral responsibility together in some 
illegitimate way, it seems to be a fact that most of the contemporary discourse on the problem 
of free will is guilty of discussing the problem as constrained by conceptual ties to moral 
responsibility. Kadri Vihvelin agrees:  
In the contemporary literature, the free will/determinism problem is almost invariably viewed 
through the lens of moral responsibility. It is, of course, widely agreed that having free will is a  
necessary condition of being a morally responsible agent. But most contemporary discussions of 
the free will/determinism problem forge a much stronger link between questions about moral 
responsibility and questions about free will.14 
Thus, there remains the task of showing what exactly is wrong with viewing the problem of 
free will `through the lens of moral responsibility`. 
So, what is meant by saying, above, that the concept of moral responsibility depends (in 
some sense) on the concept of free will/agency but not vice versa? It seems to be a fairly 
uncontroversial fact about moral responsibility that it can be justifiably attributed to an agent 
only if the agent has free will/agency. There is a strong modal (perhaps not necessary but close 
to it) connection between moral responsibility and free will such that the former is attributable 
only if the former too is. The modal strength of the connection becomes quite obvious once 
we try to inspect the concept of moral responsibility as theoretically projected in a possible 
world where free will as a concept doesn`t exist. In such a world the concept of moral 
responsibility becomes rather unintelligible. How or in what sense do you hold those around 
you morally responsible for their actions if it never even occurs to you that they could have 
chosen otherwise? Is it even as much as conceivable that you would possess a concept of moral 
responsibility in such a world? I am unable to see how one could happen to arrive at a 
possession of such a concept at all. In a world where no one possesses the concept of free 
will/agency, no one possesses a concept of moral responsibility either. This is the sense in 
which the concept of moral responsibility depends fundamentally on the concept of free 
will/agency. As noted above this is not a controversial claim. I believe that considerations 
running along similar lines would explain why philosophers – in many contexts - use the two 
concepts interchangeably when theorizing on free will and moral responsibility.  
1.2.1  The perfect people scenario 
While it seems to be clear that the concept of moral responsibility depends on the concept of 
free will/agency, it is far from clear that the latter depends on the former  in some such similar 
 
13 David Lewis, `Are we free to break the laws?`, Theoria 47 (1981), pp.113-121. 
14 Kadri Vihvelin, `How to Think about the Free Will/Determinism Problem`, p.314. 
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way; i.e., it is not – not immediately, at least – obvious that we cannot have a  grasp of a rich 
and coherent concept of free will/agency in a possible world in which moral distinctions do 
not exist and in which, consequently, there is no concept of moral responsibility. Consider a 
hypothetical case of a community of morally and spiritually perfect people. Most of the 
descriptive details of such a community will be, more or less, irrelevant and can vary 
considerably. However, two things need to stay fixed across varying descriptions: (i) the 
members of the community – the perfect people – must lack any intentions that could be 
described as morally wrong or evil, and (ii) the perfect people must be beings that are rational 
in the way that is – for all or most practical purposes – indistinguishable from our rationality. 
Now, the absence of morally charged intentions means that in the community there is a general 
lack of awareness of any moral properties.15 Consequently there is no moral language to 
describe those properties and no discourse on moral responsibility. Yet there seems to be no 
difficulty in conceiving that some of the perfect people - those with philosophical leaning 
perhaps - might be intrigued by and discuss the theoretical tension between the apparent 
nomological character of the world and the intimate acquaintance they have with willing 
freely. They might wonder whether perhaps that intimate acquaintance is just an illusion of a 
sort and generally find the whole issue extremely intriguing despite their lack of the concept 
of moral responsibility. They might – perfectly meaningfully - ask: are the world and humans 
such that humans are capable of acting in the world in some such way that it would be correct 
to describe them as free agents? 
Although I find the perfect people scenario well within our normal capacity to conceive 
hypothetically, others might find it helpful here to be reminded of a well-known and 
entertaining precedent. The main character of Jonathan Swifts` famous prose satire Gulliver`s 
Travels Lemuel Gulliver ends up – after mutiny against him – left and abandoned by his crew 
on the first piece of land they come across. Here Gulliver comes upon Houyhnhnms, a race of 
talking horses. The horses `are purely rational beings that face no conflict between moral 
principles and impulses`.16 The absence of such a conflict between moral principles and 
impulses gets reflected in their language. Houyhnhnms `have no Word in their Language to 
express any thing that is evil`.17 I take it that having no concept of evil entails having no 
concept of good either. The fact that millions of readers of Gulliver`s Travels seem to have no 
 
15 The relation between the lack of morally charged intentions and the lack of awareness of moral 
properties is quite straightforward. Intentions are empirically accessible only via the first-person 
perspective. Once accessed, they can be projected onto other people and their actions. If a subject 
doesn`t ever detect – within her awareness – any morally charged intentions she won`t be able to see or 
detect those in others either and even the most harmful actions of other agents will be interpreted as 
(merely) regrettable accidents. Whatever moral properties the world might have they remain completely 
invisible for a subject that lacks morally charged intentions. 
16 Jonathan Swift, The Writings of Jonathan Swift, Robert A. Greenberg and William B. Piper (eds) 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), p.240. 
17 Ibid. 
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difficulties make-believing Swift`s description of the character of Houyhnhnms as creatures 
that are highly rational and at the same time lacking awareness of a moral dimension of the 
world shows that something very close to our perfect people scenario is easily conceivable.  
Now, in the case of the perfect people, I have claimed that there is nothing that could 
prevent them from having a robust concept of free will.18 Here the analogy with Houyhnhnms 
helps only indirectly. Gulliver`s account of his encounter and experience with Houyhnhnms 
doesn`t mention what they might have thought about free will or whether they even as much 
as talked about it. However, he mentions that they liked to meet their friends to `cultivate 
reason`19 and among the subjects they liked to talk about was `the visible Operations of 
Nature`.20 Now, in Houyhnhnms we encounter creatures whose rationality we would recognize 
as more or less indistinguishable from that of ours and who show – again, similarly to us – a 
serious theoretical interest in the external world. I find it hard to see what, in principle, could 
prevent these rational creatures from noticing the nomological nature of the world and wonder 
whether or not their own actions are similarly necessitated as the events out there in the 
objective world. Clearly, this sort of wondering would require a grasp of suitable concepts 
 
18 It could be objected that the perfect people would not be able to have an intimate acquaintance with 
free willing because such an acquaintance requires an awareness of conflicting alternatives or desires, 
such as killing someone versus letting her live, where the nature of the conflict is essentially moral (or 
reducible to the moral). The idea here is that not any set of alternatives (desires) as a focus of awareness 
suffices for formation of the concept of free will/agency. There must be a conflict of certain strength 
among the alternatives or desires for it to sustain the awareness of choice and a formation of the concept 
of free will. At this point it is insisted that only moral alternatives/desires are robust enough to sustain 
the awareness of choice and the resulting formation of the concept of free will. Or, in other words, only 
moral alternatives (desires) are – in this respect - constitutively conflicting. The perfect people, however, 
lack such conflicting desires and it is this lack of conflicting desires that prevents them to form a notion 
of free willing. No conflicting desires means no awareness of conflicting alternatives. No awareness of 
conflicting alternatives means no awareness of choice and no awareness of choice means no intimate 
acquaintance with free willing. This objection amounts to saying that the grasp of the concept of (or 
acquaintance with) free will crucially depends on the awareness of moral distinctions and as such the 
concept cannot be separated from the discussion and the concept of moral responsibility.  This, of 
course, contradicts my claim that the concept of free will/agency is independent of the concept of moral 
responsibility. There is some truth to the logic of the objection. It seems to be quite plausible to claim 
that not just any conflict between desires is strong or robust enough to sustain the awareness of choice 
(and a free choosing between them). The conflict must be painful enough to become conscious and 
moral conflicts are a very suitable (and only) candidate for a painful enough conflict. However, for the 
objection to take off it won`t suffice to identify moral conflicts as painful enough to generate the 
awareness of choice and need for the exercise of free will, it needs to insist that there are no (irreducibly) 
non-moral alternatives or desires that are sufficiently painful to sustain the formation of the concept of 
free will. And that seems rather implausible. Consider the following: Your wife and a daughter are 
drowning 100 meters away from each other. You find yourselves sitting in a boat exactly in the middle 
of the distance that separates them. It is highly probable that you will be able to – if at all – save only 
one of them. You are aware of this and you face a painful dilemma of having to decide which of the two 
you will try to save. This decision and choice is not of a moral kind – and cannot be reduced to one - 
yet it exemplifies the kind of a decision making process that involves choosing between alternatives 
that are clearly painful or conflicting enough to sustain the formation of the concept of free will/agency.  
19 Jonathan Swift, The Writings of Jonathan Swift, p.233. 
20 Ibid., p.242. 
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(and distinctions) such as agency, causation, free will, etc.21 And again, I can`t see what could 
possibly – and in principle - prevent Houyhnhnms from engaging in subtle and sophisticated 
discussions about the possibility of free will/agency in a causally determined world despite 
them lacking any moral concepts.  
1.2.2  Stipulating the connection? 
My claim that the notion of free will/agency is conceptually independent of the notion of moral 
responsibility might be conceded at this point. However, this concession could be seen as a 
harmless one. In reply, something like the following could be suggested here: it is true, strictly 
speaking, that the concept of free will/agency is independent of the concept of moral 
responsibility in the sense explained above. We can accept this claim of independence and yet 
insist that it is a perfectly legitimate philosophical choice to focus on a kind of freedom that 
will have grounding our attributions of moral responsibility as its essential function. It might 
be, at the same time, admitted that there are other kinds of freedom worthy of theoretical 
investigation but the one that is essentially connected with justifying moral responsibility is 
by far the most interesting and important one. Richard Double sums up this point in the 
following way: 
Although we may elect to care about anything we like under the rubric of free will, perhaps the 
majority of philosophers who have written about free will have believed that justifying moral 
responsibility (including the expression of reactive attitudes, blame, punishment) is `the prize` 
that constitutes the point of caring about free will.22 
In other words, it is, ultimately, a legitimate choice to tie the two concepts together in some 
such way that will serve a chosen theoretical goal. More specifically, there seems to be no 
reason why we can`t simply stipulate that the concept of free will/agency we are trying to 
provide an account of is to be such that it will ground attributions of moral responsibility; i.e. 
there seems to be no reason why we cannot stipulate that `free will/agency` depends in this 
sense on the concept of moral responsibility. And indeed, some such stipulation seems to be – 
explicitly or implicitly – taking place in the four passages quoted above (p. 2).  
 
21 Someone might wonder to what extent these concepts of the perfect people would overlap with those 
that we associate with the expressions above (i.e. agency, causation, free will) when in the community 
of the perfect people these concepts are not – unlike in our world – related to moral concepts. In other 
words, it could be objected that the perfect people`s concepts of agency, causation, free will are not and 
cannot be sufficiently similar to our concepts exactly because they are embedded in a different semantic 
web. My answer to the objection is part of the central claim of this chapter. I argue that the concept of 
free will/agency is conceptually independent from the concept of moral responsibility (although I agree 
that the concept of moral responsibility conceptually entails the concept of free will/agency) which, in 
the context of the objection, amounts to claiming two things: (i) some conceptual relations can be shown 
as contingent (or conceptually non-constitutive) and (ii) the relation between the concepts of free 
will/agency and moral responsibility is – with respect to the concept of free will/agency – of exactly 
such a contingent (or non-constitutive) nature.    
22 Richard Double, Metaphilosophy and Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.11. 
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I believe there are reasons to suspect that such a stipulation - or choosing a kind of 
freedom one wishes to theorize about - is rather less innocent than it, prima facie, appears to 
be. Consider the following analogy:  
 
We possess a concept of water and a concept of plant. We desire to have clear understanding 
of both concepts. We have empirically investigated the referents of both concepts. We have 
long known that plants require water for their existence. This physiological dependence of 
plants on water imposes certain explanatory requirements on our account of the concept of 
plant. Specifically, we will feel a theoretical urge to explain what about their essence23 makes 
their existence depend on water. Our theoretical account of plants (and with it our conceptual 
grasp of them) will not be considered satisfactory if it doesn`t explain their physiological 
dependence on water. Our experiential knowledge of this physiological dependence of plants 
on water will direct our scientific research regarding the essence of plants in a particular way. 
The outcome of the research will – as it typically does – shape the conceptual content 
associated with plant.  
 
What we have here is a sort of theoretical dependence of the notion of plant on the notion of 
water that is analogous to the dependence of moral responsibility on free will. 
 Crucially, this dependence runs in one direction only. The concept of water seems to be 
given fully to us to be grasped without any need for us to have any acquaintance with plants – 
that is, without possessing a concept of a plant24. Now, what happens if we stipulate – as is 
implicitly or explicitly done with the concepts of free will/agency and moral responsibility - 
that the dependence runs in both directions? That is, what happens if we adopt a requirement 
that we search for a theoretical account of water such that it is seriously (and in some sense 
essentially) incomplete if it doesn`t explain how water supports the existence of plants?  
Adopting such a requirement would have absurd consequences. First, it would imply that 
scientists in the possible worlds where there are no plants couldn`t have a full grasp of the 
 
23 I am using the expression essence very loosely here, meaning something like a constitution. Thus, a 
scientist interested in the essence of a plant in the context of its physiological dependence on water can 
be said to be interested in what in the constitution of a plant makes its biological functions depend on 
water. There is no contentious philosophical commitment involved here.  
24 There is an issue here that needs to be briefly mentioned. In our world, a competent speaker will know 
that one of the things water does is that it sustains plants. If a plant owned by such a competent speaker 
dies after being `watered` with a liquid (presumed to be water), the competent speaker might suspect 
that she has misidentified the liquid. This suggests that, in our world, the property of sustaining plants 
is one of the crucial properties when it comes to identifying a liquid as water. Does this then imply that 
there is a conceptual dependency of water on plant? No, it doesn`t. What this implies is that, in our 
world, sustaining plants is one of the identifying properties of water. However, this particular property 
is just a relational property of water and as such cannot be understood as constitutive of water.  
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concept of water. That is, clearly, an extremely implausible implication.25 The second 
implication is perhaps even more absurd: a countless number of possible worlds can be 
conceived of in which various kinds of entities depend for their existence on the existence of 
water in those worlds. In the actual world, we may never learn of the existence and nature of 
those various other water-dependent entities. If, however, our confusion regarding the 
conceptual dependence of water on whatever might, for its existence, depend on its referent 
(i.e. on water), imposes on us a requirement to theoretically account for this existential 
dependence - or else our conceptual grasp would have to be deemed seriously incomplete - we 
will find ourselves in a situation when, in the actual world, a robust grasp of the concept of 
water is simply impossible in principle. Once the arbitrary stipulations of conceptual 
dependence of the kind discussed above are allowed, we end up losing our grasp of the concept 
of water.26  
Perhaps we could ignore these absurd consequences feeling no empathy with a scientist 
trying to understand water in a gloomy world with no plants and stay similarly unperturbed by 
those purely abstract worlds full of unknown and inaccessible entities that need water for their 
existence. Those are not our worlds and we have no epistemological responsibilities towards 
them. Still, even if we focus exclusively on theorizing about water as it is given to us in our 
actual world it must, I believe, feel to us a rather arbitrary and irrational requirement to search 
for an account of water such that it – in virtue of identifying a specific structural property of 
water – explains how it is able to sustain the physiological functions of plants. In other words, 
such an explanatory requirement commits us to look for an intrinsic property of water that we 
do not have any independent reason to expect to exist; and the default position should be one 
of not expecting it to exist.  
At this point, several questions come to mind. Should it much surprise us if all attempts 
to formulate a successful account of water under this requirement keep failing? Would it not 
be appropriate to describe theorizing about water constrained by such a requirement as 
seriously misguided? Would it not be natural to expect theorizing misguided in such a way to 
reach an impasse sooner or later? I claim that the theorizing about free will is analogously 
 
25 I am trying to think what could be objected here. Perhaps, if the distinction between the real and 
Cambridge properties is denied than the relational (Cambridge) property that water possesses in virtue 
of being related to plants in our world could be seen as ineliminable from the concept of water. Then 
we could deny that the scientists in those possible worlds where there are no plants could ever have a 
full grasp of the concept of water. However, saving one absurd view (the view that scientist in the plant-
less worlds cannot have a grasp of the concept of water) by introducing a similarly absurd assumption 
(the assumption that the real and relational properties can be conflated) is a strategy that merely 
multiplies absurdities. 
26 The reader will notice that permitting arbitrary stipulations of this kind would similarly affect our 
grasp of perhaps any concept we possess. We can conceive of infinite numbers of possible world with 
entities that in some robust sense depend on entities that our concepts refer to.  
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misguided by its stipulated conceptual dependence on the notion of moral responsibility and 
has, as a result of this misguided stipulation, reached an impasse.   
Some might find the discussion of the water-plant dependency unconvincing. They could 
object that the conceptual dependence of plant on water derives from a physiological 
dependence which is a fact that seriously affects the plausibility of the analogy with the free 
will/agency-moral responsibility dependency. The latter dependence is of a different kind: it 
doesn`t derive from a physiological relation but is purely abstract. As such it is not subject to 
any external constraints. This objection is not too serious. Even purely abstract concepts can 
be shown to stand in a relationship of dependency that runs in one direction only. Consider the 
relation between the concept of sin and the concept of absolution. It is immediately obvious 
that absolution depends on sin as any absolution is always an absolution of a sin. There is, 
however, nothing similarly - that is, immediately - obvious once the reversed direction of 
conceptual dependence is inspected. It is hard to see how one`s grasp of the concept of sin and 
one`s competent usage of it could be understood as seriously affected or constrained in 
scenarios in which one has no grasp of the concept of absolution. The conceptual dependence 
seems to run in one direction only. Absolution depends on sin but not vice versa.  
Now, let`s have a quick look at what we could expect happening once the dependence is 
stipulated. For instance, the following dependence of sin on absolution could be stipulated: 
something is a sin only if open27 to absolution. What happens if we put the concept of sin 
constrained by such a stipulation to the test. It is agreed that the concept of absolution is absent 
from the world of the Old Testament scriptures28 while a sin and related issues is one of its 
primary focuses. Shall we, perhaps, conclude that the Old Testament authors are not talking 
about sin after all? They don`t have a concept of absolution and therefore they cannot – once 
it is agreed that having a concept of sin requires having a concept of absolution – have a 
concept of a sin. But then, what do the authors refer to when using the word `sin`?29 
Our puzzlement will get considerably stronger once we enter the conceptual world of 
the New Testament. The New Testament introduces Christ – the God of absolution – and ties 
the notion of sin with that of absolution in a way that conforms to the conceptual stipulation. 
This, however, comes at a price. The worlds of the Old and New Testaments are deeply 
intertwined. The authors of the New Testament had internalized the conceptual paradigm of 
 
27 To be open to absolution doesn`t mean that the absolution must be granted. It merely means that it is 
considered its target. Thus, a sin is open to absolution even if too serious to be granted any absolution. 
28 This is not to say that the Old Testament doesn`t refer to the forgiveness of sins. See, for instance, 
Leviticus 19:21-22. However, the concept of absolution goes way beyond the concept of (mere) 
forgiveness. Forgiveness restores the psychological and/or spiritual relation between the sinner and the 
one affected by the sin (often the God). Absolution undoes the sin itself.   
29 In Biblical Hebrew, the most common expression for sin is hata. Several other expressions for sin 
can be found in the Old Testament scriptures. Each of them comes with a specific connotation: pesha 
is a sin done out of rebelliousness; aveira is a sin as a transgression and avone is a sin as moral failing. 
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the Old Testament scriptures. The New Testament contains at least 302 direct quotes from and 
493 allusions to the Old Testament.30 There is a clear conceptual continuity in the usage of sin 
between the Old Testament and the New Testament. This continuity gets severed by the 
introduction of the stipulation and leads to serious exegetic problems. The problems might, 
perhaps, be solved but the solution will – highly likely – lack in explanatory simplicity 
compared to simply taking sin to be a concept that is independent of the concept of absolution. 
There is a potential misunderstanding I would like to draw the reader`s attention to here. 
The perfect people scenario might be understood as an attempt to show that necessarily the 
concept of moral responsibility cannot be constitutively involved in the concept of free 
will/agency. Understanding the scenario in this way would be a mistake. It doesn`t follow from 
the scenario, and it is not what I need to claim as part of my argument. The perfect people have 
a grasp of free will/agency without having a grasp of moral concepts. Similarly, people in the 
18th century had quite a robust grasp of water without having any idea about its chemical 
composition, i.e. without knowing that water = H2O. Later, in the 19th century, it turned out 
that being H2O is essential to being water. Analogously, it might turn out that a capacity to 
ground attributions of moral responsibility is an essential component of any coherent concept 
of free will/agency. Thus, the perfect people scenario must be understood as showing 
something weaker: as showing that the concept of moral responsibility is not obviously or 
transparently involved in the concept of free will/agency. It might, one day, turn out to be so 
but only as a result of a philosophical argument.  And, as far as I am aware, such an argument 
has yet to be formulated. 
Let me go back to the sin – absolution example to demonstrate what has just been said. 
Simple scenarios can be conceived of that will show that we can have a robust grasp of the 
concept of sin even without having any grasp of the concept of absolution. Now compare it 
with the complexities of an account attempting to show how sin - after a deeper conceptual 
investigation – turns out to entail absolution. Something like the following, for instance, could 
be suggested: the concept of sin is intelligible only in the context of a religious text. Religious 
texts presuppose a transcendental being, i.e. a god. God is an omnipotent being. That is, for 
God, there is nothing he cannot undo; whatever there is, can be made go away by Him. This 
applies to sins and their existence as well. It follows then that the concept of sin necessarily 
entails the possibility of its absolution. The two cannot be separated as without absolution the 
concept of sin lacks coherence.  
Although I don`t find this particular line of argument very plausible, I cannot rule out that 
a version of it – or a different argument altogether – could turn out to be successful, committing 
 
30 The source for the figures given here is: <https://www.blueletterbible.org/study/misc/quotes.cfm> 
[accessed 12 November 2017]. 
11 
 
us to take the concept of sin as entailing the concept of absolution. However, and that is crucial 
for my purpose here, this entailment can only be arrived at as a result of a philosophical 
argument and not assumed or stipulated. The concept of absolution is not given in the concept 
of sin in a transparent way, which is a fact that needs to be kept in mind when commencing 
any conceptual investigation of sin. Analogously, the concept of free will/agency does not – 
transparently – entail the concept of moral responsibility, which means that any conceptual 
investigation of the concept of free will/agency must start free of any commitment to 
conceptual constraints associated with moral responsibility.   
1.2.3  Concerns about conceptual analysis 
 There is an issue here that needs to be addressed. The argument behind my claim that the 
concept of free will/agency is independent – and should be discussed as such – from the 
concept (and related issues) of moral responsibility relies heavily on conceptual analysis. 
Conceptual analysis used to be the undisputed via regia of philosophizing. However, ever 
since Quine`s attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction, conceptual analysis has at best been 
looked upon with suspicion or at worst outright dismissed as epistemically worthless. Now, 
how worried should we be about the viability of an argument that relies heavily on conceptual 
analysis, i.e. on a way of philosophizing that has fallen into considerable disrepute? 
 In what follows, I will briefly explain why I think there is no need to worry much. Let 
me first give you a sketch of the position of the critics. Conceptual analysis as understood by 
its critics is a theoretical activity that, (i), with respect to its goal, seeks to identify the 
necessary and/or sufficient conditions for applicability of a concept across possible worlds 
and, (ii), regarding its method, crucially relies on (modal) intuitions. Both (i) and (ii) are taken 
as hopelessly untenable by the critics of conceptual analysis. They argue – successfully, I 
believe – that there are no necessary and/or sufficient conditions that are both epistemically 
accessible in a priori fashion31 and that could be used for a reliable identification of concepts 
across hypothetical scenarios. Conceptual analysis is epistemically worthless simply because 
`[t]here are no conceptual truths`32 to be discovered. Regarding the prominent role intuition 
plays in conceptual analysis, the critics will, typically, refer to a considerable body of scientific 
research that shows how hopelessly unreliable our intuition is. This attack on intuition 
complements the attack on the very possibility of the existence of conceptual truths and is 
understood – by the critics - as fatal for the prospects of conceptual analysis: there are no 
 
31 The focus of the criticism is, specifically, on the implicit assumption that there are necessary/sufficient 
truths that can be discovered in the act of a priori analysis. Such criticism is perfectly compatible with 
endorsing Kripke`s aposteriori necessities. 
32 Timothy Williamson, `Conceptual Truth`, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 80, no. 1 
(2006), pp.1-41 (p.39). In this paper, Williamson argues, convincingly, that even the most elementary 
conceptual/logical truths such as `Every vixen is a vixen` are not immune to the possibility of revision. 
12 
 
conceptual truths to be discovered from the philosopher`s armchair and even if there were 
some such truths they could not be reliably recovered by intuition as it is a fundamentally 
flawed faculty.   
In response, let me first deal with the attack on intuition. As mentioned above, the critics 
back their claims about hopeless unreliability of intuition by a considerable body of scientific 
evidence. However, a closer inspection of this scientific evidence reveals that what scientists 
typically call `intuition` - and what they thus focus on in their experiments – is different from 
the intuition that the advocates of conceptual analysis have in mind. George Bealer calls the 
intuition that the advocates have in mind rational intuition.33 The scientific evidence referred 
to by the critics is irrelevant as it doesn`t target the rational intuition, i.e. the kind of intuition 
employed in conceptual analysis. In the words of Bealer: 
[A]lthough [the scientific evidence] bears on “intuition” in an indiscriminate use of the term, 
they evidently tell us little about the notion of intuition […] which is relevant to justificatory 
practices in logic, mathematics, philosophy and linguistics.34 
Now, it doesn`t follow that the rational intuition is infallible. We just don`t have any 
reason to believe that it is - in normal circumstances – systematically misleading.35 The critics 
of conceptual analysis might concede the point here and claim that even the non-systematic 
unreliability suffices to disqualify rational intuition. Are they right? There is a convincing 
argument against this weaker claim of the critics. The argument was formulated by Ernest 
Sosa. Sosa draws an analogy between perception and rational36 intuition. He reminds us of 
what we all agree on: both perception and rational intuition are fallible, unreliable and 
corrigible. However, neither of them are systematically so. The analogy doesn`t finish here. 
Perception is the very starting point of any empirical investigation. Similarly, rational intuition 
is the very starting point of any theoretical investigation. We have an obvious inconsistency 
here: although perception and rational intuition seem to suffer from the same unreliability it 
is only the rational intuition that is – by some - rejected as worthless. What Sosa says about 
perception applies without qualification to rational intuition: 
 
33 For a detailed discussion of the rational intuition and how it differs from other varieties of intuition 
(that is, those that are the focus of scientific research) see George Bealer, `Intuition and the Autonomy 
of Philosophy`, in Michael R. DePaul and William Ramsey (eds), Rethinking Intuition (Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp.201-239. 
34 Bealer, Rethinking Intuition, p.213. 
35 It could be argued that it is impossible in principle to demonstrate plausibly and convincingly that 
rational intuition is – in normal circumstances – systematically misleading. The basic idea behind such 
an argument would be something like this: any attempt (theoretical or experimental) to demonstrate the 
systematic unreliability of rational intuition could always be traced back to some (implicit) initial 
rational intuition that constitutes the starting point of that very attempt to demonstrate its systematic 
unreliability. And that`s clearly self-defeating.  
36 Sosa doesn`t use the expression `rational intuition`, just `intuition`. However, it is clear, from the 
context, that when he talks about intuition, he means something sufficiently close to Bealer`s `rational 
intuition`. 
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It is evident that human perception is fallible. More, it is known that human perception is 
systematically misleading in certain conditions. What should we conclude about our faculty of 
perception? In conditions known to psychologists, a normal subject would be systematically 
misled unless aided by collateral information. Before discovering ways in which perceptual 
conditions can be misleading, one is liable to go astray systematically in a variety of perceptual 
beliefs. Absent collateral information, human perception falls far short of epistemic perfection. 
[…] In the light of this, what do we conclude about the epistemic value of perception? Surely it 
would be precipitous and imperceptive to condemn perception wholesale on the basis of such 
fallibility. Would it not be comparably precipitous and imperceptive to condemn intuition 
wholesale?37 
Let me sum up the defence of intuition. The scientific evidence referred to by the critics 
doesn`t focus on rational intuition. Thus, the criticism of intuition based on that evidence 
misses the target. An advocate of conceptual analysis admits that rational intuition is fallible. 
She argues, however, that (a) the fallibility of rational intuition is not relevantly different from 
that of perception and (b) similarly to perception, the rational intuition is irreplaceable. To be 
consistent – the advocate will insist – we either reject both perception and rational intuition as 
epistemically worthless or none of the two. And, of course, the point is that no one is ready to 
ditch the former.  
Now, I agree with the objection and concede that, strictly speaking, there are no necessary 
and/or sufficient conditions and no conceptual truths available to an a priori investigator. 
Agreeing with the critics here, however, does no harm to the particular conceptual analysis I 
engage in above. The reader will have noticed that when discussing the conceptual connection 
and the nature of the dependency between free will/agency and moral responsibility, I am not 
searching for any necessary and/or sufficient conditions to associate with the concept of free 
will/agency. I engage in something much less ambitious. Instead of seeking to identify the 
necessary and/or sufficient conditions, I am seeking to identify a conceptual confusion. The 
conceptual confusion I am after above is the implicit or explicit assumption that free 
will/agency has essentially something to do with moral responsibility.38 Understanding and 
practising conceptual analysis as seeking to identify conceptual confusions is – unlike 
searching for necessary and/or sufficient conditions - an entirely plausible project. Consider 
the following analogy: it might be futile to try to identify the necessary and/or sufficient 
conditions for the concept-applicability of consciousness and yet one will be very safe to rule 
out that it has anything relevant to do with the concept of, for instance, liquidity. To claim the 
contrary, would surely strike one as a case of serious conceptual confusion. However, not all 
conceptual confusions are similarly transparent. Often, they are hiding behind superficial 
 
37 Ernest Sosa, `Minimal Intuition`, in in Michael R. DePaul and William Ramsey (eds), Rethinking 
Intuition (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp.257-269 (p.261). 
38 Notice that this critical focus of mine on the assumed or stipulated essential connection between free 
will/agency and moral responsibility is perfectly in line with the claim of my potential critics that there 
are no essential and/or sufficient conditions. 
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plausibility and their identification will require a conceptual analysis of the kind I have 
advocated and performed above.39 
1.3  The second step 
It should be clear at this point that the concept of free will is independent from the concept of 
moral responsibility. As such, any theorizing about it should proceed outside the conceptual 
constraints associated with moral responsibility. Theorizing within the constraints is seriously 
misguided and will lead to a theoretical impasse.  Below, I will show to what impasse the 
theorizing within the constraints associated with moral responsibility can lead.  
1.3.1  Two constraints on the concept of free will 
There are, in contemporary free will literature, two major approaches to the concept of free 
will. The first one understands free will as being primarily a function of the availability of 
alternative possibilities, while the other one takes free will to be primarily a function of an 
agent being the ultimate source of her actions. Robert Kane introduces both approaches in the 
following passage: 
 
We believe we have free will when we view ourselves as agents capable of influencing the world 
in various ways. Open alternatives, or alternative possibilities, seem to lie before us. We reason 
and deliberate among them and choose. We feel (1) it is “up to us” what we choose and how we 
act; and this means we could have chosen or acted otherwise. As Aristotle noted: when acting is 
“up to us,” so is not acting. This “up-to-us-ness” also suggests (2) the ultimate control of our 
actions lie in us and not outside us in factors beyond our control.40 
Traditionally, the overwhelming majority of philosophers working on the problem of free will 
have taken the availability of alternative possibilities to be the core condition of the sort of 
freedom required for justified attributions of moral responsibility. In words of John Martin 
Fisher:  
[T]he most influential view about the sort of freedom necessary and sufficient for moral 
responsibility posits that this sort of freedom involves the availability of genuinely open 
alternative possibilities at certain key points in one’s life.41 
 A growing minority of philosophers focus on the second approach arguing that the most 
fundamental feature of a morally responsible agent is her ability to – in some appropriate way 
- `originate` or be `the source` of her actions. They will insist that the attributions of moral 
 
39 In the next chapter, when formulating an argument, I will make use of the notions of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. I will do so being, at the same time, fully aware of the limitations described above. 
The conclusion and implications of the argument will be presented as modally strong but nowhere close 
to a logical necessity.  
40 Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
p.6. 
41 John Martin Fisher, ` Recent work on moral responsibility`, Ethics, 110, no.1 (1999), pp.93-139 (p.99). 
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responsibility cannot be justified if `the sources of an agent`s actions do not originate in the 
agent but are traceable to factors outside her`.42  
Now, within the framework of theorizing about freedom-as-moral responsibility,43 it 
seems to be plausibly possible to drop the requirement dictating that an agent must have 
genuine alternatives available to her if she is to be treated as morally responsible. The existence 
of this plausible possibility has been demonstrated by Harry Frankfurt in his seminal paper 
`Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility`.44 In the paper,45 Frankfurt formulates a 
thought experiment that, slightly modified,46 reads as follows:  
 
Suppose Black wants Jones to perform a certain action. Jones is inclined to perform the action 
but hasn`t yet fully committed to performing it. Black prefers Jones to decide on his own to 
perform the action. However, Black is ready to interfere should Jones decide not to perform the 
action. Black secretly inserts a chip in Jones`s brain. Now Black can monitor and control Jones`s 
behaviour. Black`s intention is this. He will monitor Jones`s brain. If Jones decides to perform 
the action, Black will not interfere. However, should Jones show any inclination to refrain from 
performing the action, Black will interfere and manipulate Jones into performing it. 
The thought experiment invites the reader to test their conceptual intuition. If Jones decides 
on his own to perform the action, is he morally responsible for it? The majority of philosophers 
agree that, at least on the face of it, Jones should be held responsible for performing the action 
if it was his own decision. At the same time, it looks like Jones doesn`t really have an option 
to do otherwise. Even the slightest intention to refrain from performing the action will be 
detected by Black, who will then interfere and make Jones perform the action anyway. Thus, 
the thought experiment seems to show that one can be morally responsible without having 
alternatives available to them. Some philosophers have been convinced by the thought 
experiment, others not.47 What matters for my purposes here is that these Frankfurt-type 
thought experiments cast serious doubts on whether freedom-as-moral responsibility requires 
the agent to have alternatives available to her. It, then, seems safer (and it is the only option 
 
42 Michael McKenna, `Robustness, control, and the demand for morally significant alternatives: 
Frankfurt examples with oodles of alternatives`, in David Widerker and M. McKenna (eds), Moral 
Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities (VT: 
Ashgate, 2003), pp.201-217 (p.201f). 
43 Below, I shall use the expression `freedom-as-moral responsibility` to emphasize the reference to the 
kind of freedom that will support attributions of moral responsibility.  
44 Harry G. Frankfurt, `Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility`, The Journal of Philosophy, 
66, no.23 (1969), pp.829–839. 
45 Ibid., p.835. 
46 The original version of the thought experiment leaves it unspecified how exactly Black is going to 
ensure that Jones ultimately does what Black wants him to. I take the advantage here of the state of 
contemporary neuroscientific research that makes it perfectly plausible to talk about brain implants as 
means of controlling one`s behaviour. I don`t think the same level of plausibility was available to 
Frankfurt when he published the article in 1969.  
47  A good overview of arguments for and against the conclusion Frankfurt draws from the thought 
experiment is provided by J. M. Fisher in his `Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semicompatibilism: New 
Work`, in Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), pp.243-265. 
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left to those who accept Frankfurt`s interpretation of the thought experiment) to try to build a 
successful account of freedom-as-moral responsibility around the concept of sourcehood. 
There is no thought experiment showing – in a way analogous to the Frankfurt-type scenario 
– that it can be (or can feel) right to attribute moral responsibility onto an agent that is not a 
source of her actions. It won`t surprise then that the overwhelming majority of philosophers 
see sourcehood as a necessary condition of freedom-as-moral responsibility. These 
philosophers will understand the problem of free will/agency as having the form of the 
following question: how can someone be a source – in the sense of being a point where the 
causal origins of something truly start - of an event in a causally determined world?  
Below, I wish to cast doubt on the very prospects of solving the problem of free 
will/agency so understood. Before I proceed to do so, let me remind the reader what the 
background dialectics is here. There is nothing obvious about sourcehood being something 
like a necessary condition of free agency. It comes to the foreground only once freedom gets 
qualified as freedom-as-moral responsibility. When searching to identify the one responsible 
for an action, we are intuitively searching for the source: the one with whom the (causal) buck 
stops. Thus, whatever theoretical difficulties the logic of the concept of sourcehood involves 
comes in our way solely due to the stipulated qualification.  
1.3.2  The troubles with sourcehood 
 So, what are those theoretical difficulties the logic of the concept of sourcehood involves? 
And how serious are they? What follows is a brief outline of the theoretical trajectory (and 
where it ends) that any critical inspection of the concept of sourcehood in the context of a 
morally responsible agency will likely follow. First, the uncontroversial stuff. It is widely 
assumed that any successful account of free agency will relate actions to their agent in such a 
way that it will be correct to describe the agent as the `source` of those actions. The assumption 
is not of a philosophical nature but simply spells out what any competent speaker understands 
as entailed in the expression ` agent`s actions`. A competent speaker will understand the phrase 
`these are actions of a particular agent` as synonymous with the phrase `a particular agent is 
the source of these actions`.  
Let`s stay in a non-philosophical territory for a bit longer. A dictionary will give us 
something like the following definition of `source`: the place something comes from or starts 
at, or the cause of something. Now slightly more formally: `source` is an expression that 
identifies the referent of a concept or a proposition x as being the spatiotemporal or causal 
origins of the referent of a concept or a proposition y. Examples: 
 
Beer is a good source of vitamin B. 
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We walked up the creek to its source in the mountains. 
Extreme inequality has been identified as the main source of widespread obesity in the 
developed countries. 
The first example informs us that one of the origins of, or the places to look for, vitamin B is 
beer. The next one gives us the location the creek starts at and the last one identifies an 
unexpected originating cause of a particular health issue. Now, there is something fairly 
uncontroversial about sourcehood to notice here. In each of the examples the referent of 
`sourcehood` could be replaced by a description referring to objects or events that are 
(causally) constitutive of the replaced referent. The referent of this replacing description could 
then plausibly be seen as the true referent of `sourcehood`. Thus, the `beer` (as an expression 
referring to a source of vitamin B) could be replaced by a description of relevant biochemical 
processes that result in vitamin B formation in beer. Similarly, the expression referring to the 
particular location in the mountains where the water of the creek is said to have its source can 
be replaced by a description that will identify as the true source all the various ways via which 
the water gets to that particular location, e.g. subterranean stream(s), surface water and 
precipitation. Finally, `extreme inequality` (as an expression referring to the source of 
widespread obesity) could be replaced by a description capturing the explanatory causes of 
extreme inequality such as, unchecked financial deregulation, tax havens and a lack of efficient 
redistributive mechanisms. In all three cases, the replacing description refers to a new 
sourcehood.  
Notice that the replacing description in our examples is not meant to preserve synonymity 
with the replaced one. The replacing description plays an explanatory role. It plays the 
explanatory role in virtue of reinterpreting the original referent in terms of prior (causal and 
spatiotemporal) events or phenomena that constitute it. The prior constitutive events referred 
to in the replacing description play the role of a new sourcehood. This identifying of the prior 
constitutive events can be seen as moving the sourcehood backwards on the spatiotemporal-
plus-causal axis. Now, there are practically no limits to this backward motion. Any sourcehood 
can be pushed backwards on the axis and replaced by events and/or phenomena constitutive 
of that sourcehood.48 Of course, we don`t normally question the utility of the notion of a source 
on the grounds that there isn`t really any source because it can always be pushed back on the 
axis. We will, typically, accept something as a source of something else if it provides the 
required richness of explanation for that something. And that required richness will vary 
depending on the context. A casual reader might accept that the source of the tragic death of 
 
48 Two exceptions come to mind: God and the Big Bang. None of the two is open to reinterpretation in 
terms of prior constitutive events and/or causes. The reason is that they both, by definition, kick-start 
the time flow so there cannot be any prior events associated with them. 
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72 people in Grenfell Tower block of flats was the fire started by a malfunctioning fridge-
freezer on the fourth floor, while a social scientist might see as the true source of the tragedy 
the decision of the local council to use cheaper but flammable cladding.  
Three claims should feel uncontroversial at this point: 
C1: A source of something can always be pushed back on the spatiotemporal-plus-
causal axis.  
C2: A different concept or description will be used to refer to this new – pushed back – 
source.  
C3: For practical purposes, we fix the source (of something) on the spatiotemporal-plus-
causal axis at a point which gives us the required explanatory richness.  
 
How does this all relate to sourcehood as discussed in the context of moral responsibility 
discourse? As discussed above, the logic of justifiable attributions of moral responsibility is 
subject to an intuitive requirement that the agent is the true source of her actions, i.e. that she 
is where the (causal) buck stops when traced back. In other words, there is an intuitive 
requirement that an agent is morally responsible only if the source of her actions cannot be 
traced beyond her agency. I shall call this requirement a non-traceability condition (NTC). 
Now, (C1) tells us that the sourcehood can always be pushed back on the spatiotemporal-plus-
causal axis. The agency of a person and the sourcehood ascribable to it exist on the axis. This 
strongly suggests that (C1) applies here and the sourcehood can always be pushed and traced 
beyond the agency. At the same time, (C3) tells us that, normally, our choosing among the 
candidates for the source of something is guided by explanatory utility each of the candidates 
comes with. The practicalities of the everyday social interaction with others are best 
approached under the assumption that me and the others are the source of their actions. Thus, 
we have strong practical reasons to understand our own and the others` agency as the locus of 
sourcehood of actions. However, the problem of free will/agency is, ultimately, a metaphysical 
problem. As such, it dictates to find out how things really are and not how it is useful to see 
them; that is, it dictates to disregard (C3). This leaves us with (C1) and its immediate 
implication, which is that: the sourcehood of an action can always be pushed and traced beyond 
the related agency.  
Now, there is no way to block the implication once (C1) is accepted. This leaves a 
potential challenger with a desperate move: to reject (C1). The move gets us deep into the 
territory of the unintelligible. The heart of the claim in (C1) is that anything that exists has a 
causal history. The events constitutive of a particular causal history themselves have a causal 
history. And that causal history is, of course, again constituted by prior events with their own 
causal history and so on and so forth. Denying this amounts to claiming that there can be 
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causally efficacious events that do not have any causal history. Accepting that such events can 
exist gives us a theoretical framework within which the concept of agency can meet the 
constraint of (NTC). Our agency will be declared capable of originating actions in a way that 
is not (fully) causally embedded in the state of the world prior to those actions. Agents will be 
thus understood as capable of an act of originating or causing that itself has not been originated 
or caused.  
The idea of `originating that itself is not originated` is not new. Aristotle, Aquinas and 
others would recognize the phrase as referring to the concept of causa sui: a cause that causes 
itself.49 It might not be immediately obvious but the notion of `a cause that causes itself` is an 
extreme one.  On the face of it, it seems to consist of concepts that we have a good grasp of: a 
cause, causation (towards), itself. Thus, we might, reading the phrase, get a feeling that we 
have a grasp of something here. We haven`t though. Even a rather casual reflection exposes 
an unyielding unintelligibility of the notion. How does one as much as begin to conceive of 
something that causes itself? A philosopher as deep as Nietzsche was so appalled by the notion 
of causa sui that he called it `a sort of rape and perversion of logic`.50 Much more recently, 
Galen Strawson has argued convincingly that moral responsibility is ultimately impossible 
because it would require the agent to be causa sui, a requirement that Strawson finds so 
obviously absurd that without much supporting argument he rests his case confident that 
something like an ultimate moral responsibility is metaphysically impossible.51 It won`t 
surprise then that this truly mindboggling capacity of self-causation has been attributed to God 
only.52 I shall take it as uncontroversial that causa sui is an impossible concept and reaffirm 
(C1). 
1.4  Conclusion 
Let me, briefly, sum up what has been done above in steps 1 and 2 and how the steps relate to 
each other. In step 1, I drew the reader`s attention to the fact that in the literature on free will 
the concepts of free will and moral responsibility are – implicitly or explicitly – understood as 
standing in a relationship of mutual conceptual dependence. I argued that, at best, the 
 
49 The concept of causa sui entails the absence of causal history. 
50 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Walter Kaufmann (trans.) (New York: Vintage, 1966), 
§ 21. 
51 Galen Strawson, `The Impossibility of Ultimate Moral Responsibility` in Galen Strawson, Real 
Materialism and Other Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), pp.319-336. 
52 Consider for instance Aristoteles` concept of prime mover – the first uncaused cause of all the motion 
in the universe; a being that is perfectly beautiful, indivisible, intelligent and self-contemplating. For 
more see Aristotle, The Metaphysics, Hugh Lawson-Tancred (trans.) (London: Penguin Classics, 2004), 
book Lambda. Similarly, process theologians such as Charles Hartshorne, Jon B. Cobb, Jr. and David 
Ray Griffin who – inspired by process philosophy of Alfred Whitehead – will see God as causa sui. For 
more see John W. Cooper, Panentheism: The Other God of the Philosophers (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2006).  
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dependency runs in one direction only: the concept of moral responsibility theoretically 
depends on the concept of free will but not vice versa. I proceeded to argue against a possible 
suggestion that it is a permissible move to simply stipulate that free will conceptually depends 
on moral responsibility. I claim that such a stipulation is seriously misleading and that, 
consequently, reaching a theoretical impasse should be expected. Step 2 is meant to show how 
the conclusion of step 1 applies to the current state of discussion in the literature on free will. 
I briefly presented the reasons behind my strong suspicion that any theorizing about free will 
that continues to take place within the constraints of moral theory will, ultimately, lead to an 
unintelligible requirement on any account of free will/agency that aspires to succeed. As a 
result of an unwarranted stipulation of conceptual dependence of free will/agency on moral 
responsibility, any successful account of free will/agency will have to be built around the 
concept of an agent that is capable of uncaused causation. The notion of uncaused causation 
is a seriously incomprehensible one. Any theoretical account built around such a notion is, I 
am convinced, doomed to fail.  
Steps 1 and 2 relate to each other in the following way: the argumentative burden behind 
my call to sever the concept and discussion of free will/agency from the concept and discussion 
of moral responsibility is carried by step 1. Step 2 provides motivating considerations by 
showing the seriousness of the theoretical impasse that the arbitrary stipulation of conceptual 
dependence of free will/agency on moral responsibility leads to.  
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Chapter 2: Freedom and reasoning 
2.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, I will argue for the following claim: 
C: Freedom is attributable only to agents who exercise practical reasoning. 
An outline of the argument: 
i. Free will/freedom is attributable to agents only. 
ii. Freedom in agency entails the agent having a sense of an alternative open to her. 
iii. Having a sense of an alternative - where the notion of an alternative is such that it 
sustains attributions of freedom - entails having a sense of being able to choose. 
iv. Choosing entails deliberation. 
v. Deliberation entails an exercise in reasoning. 
vi. Freedom in agency entails an exercise in reasoning. 
2.2   Free will/freedom is attributable to agents only 
In Chapter 1, I argued that tying the discussion of free will with that of moral responsibility 
is confused and misleading. We need a different starting point. I suggest starting from (i) as 
such a different starting point. (i) states that:  free will/freedom53  is attributable to agents54 
 
53 We have a bit of the paradox of analysis here. I am trying, ultimately, to arrive at a novel 
understanding of freedom (in agency). To avoid circularity this novel understanding cannot be 
presupposed in (i). At the same time freedom in (i) must have some positive content if we want (i) to 
have a truth value. In other words, the problem is that the content cannot involve any crucial elements 
of the novel understanding of freedom (to avoid even partial circularity), neither can it contradict the 
novel understanding if we want to avoid equivocation in the usage of freedom throughout one and the 
same argument. A way to neutralize the paradox is, roughly, this. There are two kinds of 
understanding: a propositional one and a non-propositional one. Both can be about the same subject 
matter. A person can have one without the other. You can non-propositionally understand how to 
generate a forehand loop when playing tennis to keep the ball in the court without having any 
propositional understanding of how the imparted spin causes the ball to curve downwards. And vice 
versa, you can perfectly understand the physics behind the downward curve of a spinning ball without 
being able to generate one, i.e. without having a non-propositional understanding how to hit a spinning 
ball. Applied to (i): As competent users of the concepts of free will and freedom we have an intuitive 
and competent understanding of the concepts. The understanding is, at least partially, non-
propositional. I don`t intend to come up with any novel modifications to this non-propositional 
understanding. My target is the propositional understanding, and this is where I intend to be original. 
Importantly, there is no circularity or paradox here as `understanding` is being used in two different 
senses. Those wishing to learn more about the paradox of analysis, see Colin McGinn`s excellent 
treatment of it in the fourth chapter of his Truth by Analysis: Games, Names, and Philosophy (Oxford: 
OUP, 2011), pp.47-61. 
54 The concept of agency is a rather heterogenous one. The Oxford English Dictionary mentions as 
the earliest use of `agent` to be found in a treatise on alchemy, written in 1471, where it refers to `a 
force capable of acting on matter`. This usage seems to have survived until the present time in 
connection with, for instance, chemical weapons. The toxic component of a chemical weapon is called 
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only. The claim is just a first approximation and its function is purely negative: to block 
attributions of freedom/free will onto such clearly freedom-lacking entities as stones, trees, 
ponds, clouds, etc. The claim introduces a very general necessary condition of attributability 
of freedom. The reader could concede that, indeed, we wouldn`t want to attribute free 
will/freedom to the above-mentioned entities while, at the same time, denying that it has 
anything to do with agency. She could simply suggest that the reason we wouldn`t want to 
attribute freedom/free will to those entities has to do with them showing no symptoms of 
anything like non-determined behaviour or a behaviour that would involve self-causation 
(causa sui). Such a suggestion would be wrong though. Consider the behaviour of a 
subatomic particle. A subatomic particle is a non-agential55 entity that exhibits an intriguing 
behaviour. Physics tells us that any future state of a subatomic particle is undetermined; i.e. 
it tells us that a subatomic particle is a non-deterministic entity in the sense of having 
alternative future states open to it. The non-deterministic nature of a subatomic particle also 
makes it interpretable as a causa sui phenomenon. The fact that a subatomic particle has 
alternative future states open to it is intelligible only if it entails that nothing outside of it 
determines (causally or otherwise) its future state. The remaining option is that the particle 
determines its future state from within itself.  
Now, the availability of alternative possibilities and/or the possession of the causa sui 
power should, at least on the face of it, feel to us as sufficient to justify attributions of 
freedom/free will. Indeed, it is the very understanding of freedom/free will in terms of these 
conditions what constitutes the problem of free will in the first place, because it is these 
conditions that seem to be deeply irreconcilable with the logic of causal determinism.56 57  
And yet, despite the fact that a subatomic particle seems to be describable in terms 
constitutive of the concept of freedom/free will, we would find it strongly counterintuitive 
 
its `chemical agent`. This is, however, not a kind of `agent` we would wish to attribute free 
will/freedom onto. 
55 If subatomic particles were agents, then virtually anything in the physical world would have to count 
as an agent in virtue of being an aggregate of agents (unless one would want to deny the existence of 
collective agency). The distinction between agents and non-agents would collapse.  
56 There are influential compatibilist strategies arguing that the availability of alternative futures is not 
a necessary condition for attributability of freedom (Harry Frankfurt`s and his follower`s). The central 
claim of these compatibilist accounts of freedom doesn`t really stand in any tension with what I am 
saying above. These compatibilist accounts of freedom are the result of a philosophical argument 
motivated by an effort to solve the problem of free will. This effort involves initially accepting the 
dilemma of the problem of free will; i.e. it involves accepting freedom as having essentially something 
to do with alternative futures and/or causa sui power.  
57 The concept of causa sui is not, strictly speaking, in tension with the theory of causal determinism. 
It is in tension with a broadly related physicalist principle called The Principle of the Closure of the 
Physical. This, however, doesn`t affect the logic of the problem of free will at all. The ultimate puzzle 
– how can free will exist in the physical reality as we know it? –  remains to be solved. For more see 
Robert C. Bishop and Harald Atmanspacher, ` The Causal Closure of Physics and Free Will`, in Robert 
Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.152-170. 
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to characterize a subatomic particle as ` free` or as possessing ` free will`.58 Clearly, there must 
be something else, another condition, that needs to be met to justify an attribution of 
freedom/free will. And it is against the background of these considerations that I suggest – 
as a new starting point - that the attributability of freedom has essentially something to do 
with agency.   
The claim that the attributability of freedom has essentially something to do with 
agency is just a first approximation. Certain constitutive aspects of agency will have to be in 
place for freedom to be attributable. Consider, for instance, a sleeping agent who is having a 
dream. When such a sleeping and dreaming agent moves her hand in her sleep, we wouldn`t 
want to say that moving her hand was an exercise in agential freedom. We wouldn`t want to 
say this even after it was pointed to us that the sleeping agent`s hand movement was 
accompanied by certain quite complex mental processes, i.e. a certain richness of 
consciousness and emotional responses that dreaming comes with. This simple consideration 
suggests that, (a), an unqualified agency will not do when it comes to attributability of 
freedom and, (b), that not just any mental states will sustain the attributability.  
So, what exactly is it about agency that needs to be in place for the attribution of 
freedom to hold? I am arguing towards the claim that freedom is attributable to agents only 
if they, in some suitable way59, act rationally. I could, perhaps, ground the claim in the appeal 
to some of the insights generated by the contemporary discussions (see footnotes 56 and 57 
below) regarding the structure of actions. These discussions seem to agree, at least implicitly, 
on certain basic features an action must have to count as one. Now, what can be said about 
the nature of an action applies to the nature of agency. The reasoning here is that: an agent 
constitutes itself by acting or ceases to be an agent entirely; action and agent are the two 
sides of the same conceptual coin. Thus, the structural features identified as necessary for 
something to be an action will be the same as those necessary for agency to be one. And if 
freedom can be ascribed only to agents – which is the claim in (i) - then the necessary 
structural features of agency (and actions) will have to be understood as the necessary 
conditions for the attributability of freedom itself. So, what can we learn from the 
contemporary philosophy of action? 
 
58 It could be objected that while it is rather counterintuitive to ascribe free will to a subatomic particle 
it is much less so if what we ascribe to it is freedom. It is perhaps true that it is less counterintuitive to 
attribute freedom to a subatomic particle then it is to attribute free will to it. Still, we wouldn`t want 
to do it as it comes at a price. We possess concepts of chaos and randomness. The two concepts feel 
very suitable for describing the behaviour of a subatomic particle. If we allow freedom to refer to the 
same aspects of that behaviour, we end up with equating freedom with chaos and randomness. And 
that can`t be right.    
59 I will say more about what counts as a suitable way of acting rationally below. To quite some 
degree, however, I will leave it up to the reader to bring into the picture their own understanding of 
rationality. My account of freedom in agency can accommodate widely differing theories of 
rationality. 
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The central focus in the philosophy of action is on the necessary conditions of 
applicability of the concept of action, i.e. it is about answering the question, `What does it 
take to be an action at all?` or, alternatively, `What distinguishes action from mere activity 
or mere behaviour?`. The answers given share an appeal to an underlying logical form that 
an action must conform to if it is not to lapse into something less than that, i.e. into a mere 
activity or behaviour. What is meant by `underlying logical form` here? A good way of 
getting the idea here is to have a brief look at two popular views of action: the calculative 
and the authorship views.  
The most prominent advocates of the calculative view of action are Candace Vogler 
and Michael Thompson. According to Vogler,60 the internal structure of actions is a series of 
steps towards a termination point. The individual steps in the series relate to each other in a 
rational way, i.e.  a step is rational if it is a step on the way towards the termination point of 
the action that you are in the course of performing. The steps themselves are actions 
organized by coherent rationality striving to reach the final stopping point. The performance 
of the individual steps is motivated by calculative reasons, that is, reasons whose force is: 
this is a step toward the termination point of my action. For Vogler, calculative reasoning is 
what holds the internal structure of actions together. If missing or deficient then the action 
collapses into a mere activity or behaviour. Thompson is saying something very similar: 
actions have other, `smaller`, actions as their parts; an action is always constituted by 
modules that are themselves actions.61 These modules consist of further submodules that, 
again, are themselves actions. Our grasp of inference is what organizes nesting of actions in 
a way that leads to a successful performance of a target action. The laws of inference 
constitute the underlying structure.  
The authorship view of action doesn`t seem, on the face of it, to be about identifying 
an underlying structure as an essential feature of an action. Instead, it starts from a plausible 
assumption that any action must have an owner (similarly, any belief must have one). Thus, 
what matters, according to proponents of the view, is that an action is authored. One of the 
most developed versions of the authorship view has been formulated by Christine M. 
Korsgaard. On Korsgaard`s view, the essential feature that distinguishes action from mere 
activity is that actions – unlike activities – are owned.62 An action can be owned only if the 
owner is a whole person, i.e. only when the action is produced by the agent as a whole. The 
behaviour that is not produced by the agent as a whole but by her psychic parts is nothing 
more than events that just resemble actions. To be a whole person requires a constitution, a 
 
60 See Candace Vogler, Reasonably Vicious (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
61 See Michael Thompson, Life and Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), part II. 
62 For Korsgaard`s views see Christine M. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency (Oxford: OUP, 
2008). 
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certain form of psychic organization. For the required constitution to obtain, the agent – when 
producing the action – must identify63 with a principle of choice, where that principle must 
be universal in form. Consequently, the reasons guiding the choice, too, must be universal in 
form.64 If the agent fails to adhere to the universal forms of practical reasoning her authorship 
is compromised and `her` action collapses into a mere event.  
The brief sketch of the theories of action given above plays a very modest role in my 
argument. It is briefly mentioned here just to show that it is not uncommon among 
philosophers working on the theory of action to think about action and agency as having 
something essentially to do with an exercise of reasoning. It would be perhaps acceptable to 
fully ground (C) – that is, the central claim of this chapter - in the appeal to those theories 
only. There are, however, two reasons why I prefer not to do so. First, the theories mentioned 
here seem to share a serious weakness. They all are – at the core – stipulative and/or 
prescriptive about the necessary conditions of action. That is, rather than telling us what 
actions (and agents) are, they tell us what they should be. The central claim of this chapter 
is one of the crucial steps in my argument. Relying on a stipulative and/or prescriptive 
element would make the argument as a whole similarly stipulative and/or prescriptive. Thus, 
grounding (C) in those theories only would render my whole argument unacceptably weak. 
Second, I believe that (C) can be grounded in a robust conceptual argument that will keep 
(C) and the rest of the argument on a metaphysical path. Steps (ii) – (vi) constitute such an 
argument. 
Before I proceed, let me briefly address an important conceptual issue here. Step (ii) 
makes a frequent usage of the notion of entailment. The notion of entailment implies 
necessity. The implied necessity in the notion of a conceptual entailment commits one to the 
talk of a conceptual necessity and/or conceptual truth. Typically, a conceptual investigation 
yields, among its results, a proposition x entails y. The proposition is meant to express a 
conceptual truth or a conceptual necessity regarding (the concept) x. Here the conceptual 
truth is that whatever x`s extension is, y must, in some sense, be a part of it. There are, 
however, powerful and, as it seems to me, conclusive arguments against the viability of the 
notions of conceptual necessity and conceptual truth. In his inaugural address,65 Timothy 
Williamson argues convincingly that there is nothing necessary about our concepts or their 
mutual relations. This applies, among others, to the notion of conceptual entailment which, 
 
63 In this aspect, Korsgaard`s account resembles that of Harry Frankfurt. Frankfurt argues that a desire 
(and the related action) is full-fledgedly yours when via your second-order desire (the desire that 
targets the first-order one) you identify with the first-order one.  
64 At this point Korsgaard takes a broadly Kantian path and insists that the reason deployed in the 
choice of action must satisfy certain (Kantian) universal-in-form principles. 
65 See Timothy Williamson, `Conceptual Truth`, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 80, no. 
1 (2006), pp.1-41. 
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of course, represents one such relation. I won`t go into detail about Williamson`s argument 
here. I am perfectly happy to accept Williamson`s conclusion as nothing in my argument 
turns on it or its refutation. At the same time, I shall continue using the notion of entailment 
throughout the thesis, and do so for two reasons. First, there is no ready to hand alternative 
to the notion of entailment that does the job without implying necessity. Second, throughout 
my conceptual investigation, I will be after conceptual implications and connections whose 
modal tie to truth is, though not necessary, sufficiently strong. Most of our philosophical 
theorizing is perfectly satisfactory even if grounded merely in strong intuitive plausibility 
and/or strong overall coherence. To search for necessary conceptual relations is not only – if 
one agrees with Williamson – a futile project but also one that philosophers don`t have to 
pursue. Thus, I shall ask the reader to remember that the notion of entailment (and the related 
notions of conceptual necessity and conceptual truth) as used throughout the thesis doesn`t 
imply necessity66 but only something like a strong modal tie to truth.67  
2.3  Freedom in agency entails the agent having a sense of an alternative open to her 
I believe it uncontroversial that in our intuitive, common sense, understanding of freedom 
we take it to entail the availability of an alternative.68 I don`t intend to establish – via an 
empirical survey perhaps – whether this belief of mine is true or not. The reason for this lack 
of intention is that even if this claim about freedom turned out to be untrue we – who work 
on the problem of free will - would have to assume otherwise. We would have to assume 
otherwise as the very entailment is what co-constitutes the original dilemma at the heart of 
the problem of free will. Recall the logical structure of the dilemma: The world is causally 
determined. Causal determinism excludes an availability of alternatives. We are free agents. 
Freedom entails an availability of alternatives. Thus, free agency entails a condition that is 
excluded by causal determinism. Clearly, if freedom did not entail this condition (i.e. the 
 
66 There still might be adherents of conceptual necessity and/or conceptual truth out there; and judging 
by the not infrequent occurrence of those notions in contemporary philosophical literature there are 
quite a few of them. These adherents can read entailment as involving necessity should they wish to 
do so. The logic of the argument stays unaffected; just its modal force is greater. 
67 At the core of this is our faculty of rational and modal intuition. This is a crucial and foundational 
faculty in any philosophical and other theorizing about the world. My views here on the rational and 
modal intuitions and their epistemological role are more or less indistinguishable from those of George 
Bealer (see, for instance, his `Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy`, in Michael R. DePaul and 
William Ramsey (eds), Rethinking Intuition (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 
pp.201-239.). I won`t go into more detail and defend the view here as nothing of importance turns on 
it. My argument will retain sufficient force even if the notion of (conceptual) entailment as used 
throughout the argument is understood as packing just enough modal force to convince most of the 
competent users of the relevant concepts. Perhaps this force won`t be particularly strong, just stronger 
than that of the alternatives. 
68 That is, having a sense of at least one alternative is entailed here. Of course, it could be more. The 
point here is that one can be seen as a free agent only if one is having a sense of at least being able to 
refrain from a particular course of action (where refraining from a particular course of action 
constitutes an alternative). 
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condition of an availability of alternatives), we wouldn`t have any problem of free will to 
theorize about in the first place. 
It could be objected that this dilemma is not the whole story. The problem of free will 
is often recognized as involving two dilemmas. The one mentioned in the previous paragraph 
turns crucially on understanding freedom as entailing availability of alternatives. But does 
the other too? The other dilemma is, roughly, this: We can be said to exercise our free agency 
only if we have control over the available alternatives. The world is causally undetermined. 
Agential control over available alternatives entails a capacity to determine the choice of the 
preferred alternative. In the world that is essentially undetermined, it is a mystery how such 
a capacity of determination in choosing could be embedded in it. Here the dilemma is rising 
out of the conceptual entailments of the concepts of control and determination: controlling 
is determining and determining is controlling. Thus, it might seem that the problem of free 
will survives in a version that is independent of understanding freedom as entailing 
availability of alternatives. If true it would contradict my claim that the logical structure of 
the problem of free will commits us to understanding freedom as entailing an availability of 
alternatives. It will, however, be immediately noticed that the concept of agential control is 
about control over available alternatives. It is so simply because the concept of control 
entails (the availability of) alternatives as its target. There must be a possibility for things to 
go a different way if left uncontrolled for the notion of control to make any sense. The 
possibility for things to go a different way is synonymous with availability of alternatives.  
There is a complication related to the notion of control that has to be addressed here. In 
their Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility, Fischer and Ravizza 
exploit the logic of a Frankfurt-type scenario to distinguish two kinds of control: regulative 
control and guidance control. The regulative control involves the dual power to perform 
either an action X or some other action Y. That is, the regulative control involves availability 
of alternative possibilities. The guidance control, on the other hand, doesn`t involve any such 
power. Fischer and Ravizza illustrate the distinction on the following example: 
 
Sally is driving her car with a driving instructor sitting next to her. The road they are on is 
winding up a steep hill. Sally is carefully guiding the car through the many twists and turns the 
road has. The driving instructor is quite happy with Sally`s performance and lets her guide the 
car on her own. However, should Sally show any inclination to steer the car off the road, the 
driving instructor will interfere, take control of the car and keep it on the winding road.69  
 
The example of Sally and the driving instructor shows that there is a kind of control that 
doesn`t involve the availability of alternative possibilities. Undeniably, it is Sally who 
 
69 This scenario is a short and paraphrased version of the case presented in John Martin Fischer and 
Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp.30-32. 
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controls the car when guiding it through the twists and turns of the road. At the same time, 
Sally doesn`t have the option to deviate from the bounds of the road curvature. Any deviation 
will immediately be stopped by the driving instructor. Sally controls (has guidance control 
of) the car in the sense of making it follow a predetermined trajectory having, however, no 
(regulative) control over what trajectory her car will follow.  
As mentioned above, the regulative control involves the availability of alternatives 
while the guidance control doesn`t. Thus, Sally can be plausibly described as having control 
of her car without having any (relevant) alternatives available to her when controlling it. 
Clearly, this contradicts the above made claim of mine that the concept of control entails (the 
availability of) alternatives. How serious is this? Not very, I believe. Let us concede, for the 
sake of the argument, that Fischer and Ravizza have demonstrated successfully that 
something like guidance control – that is, a kind of control that doesn`t involve availability 
of alternatives – is a conceptual possibility.70 However, and importantly, Fischer and Ravizza 
draw the distinction between the regulative and the guidance control in the context of 
theorizing about moral responsibility (and not in the context of theorizing about free will). 
Fischer and Ravizza are determinists. They deny the existence of free will. This denial, they 
claim, doesn`t imply the non-existence of moral responsibility because moral responsibility 
can be grounded in guidance control, which is a capacity of agents that is fully compatible 
with determinism. The reader will remember that in the first chapter we have emancipated 
theorizing about free will/agency from theorizing about moral responsibility. This means that 
we should be wary of the conceptual intuitions elicited within the context of moral theory. 
Outside of that context, the concept of free will/freedom feels to be undeniably about 
availability of alternative possibilities. Thus, although the notion of control might, perhaps, 
not involve alternatives when analysed within the context of theorizing about moral 
responsibility, it certainly does so when analysed within the context of theorizing about free 
will/freedom. (By the way, the reason Fischer and Ravizza deny the possibility of free will - 
but not the possibility of moral responsibility - is exactly because they are determinists who 
take it as obvious that the notion of free will implies alternative possibilities.) We can 
conclude, I believe, that the very recognition of freedom (in agency) or free will as a 
 
70 It is, in fact, a hotly contested issue whether the Frankfurt-kind cases (like the one with Sally and 
the driving instructor) show that the notion of control without alternatives is a coherent one. Perhaps 
the most serious objection against the concept of guidance control comes from (rather surprisingly) 
John Martin Fischer himself. Fischer argues that the very possibility that an agent might try an 
alternative constitutes what he calls a `flicker of freedom` (see his The Metaphysics of Free Will: An 
Essay on Control (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994), p.134-147). Kadri Vihvelin argues, as I understand 
her, along a similar line (see her `Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate 
Possibilities`, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 30, no. 1 (2000), pp.1-23 (pp.8-9). For an intriguing 
argument against the `flicker of freedom` strategy, see Eleanor Stump, `Alternative Possibilities and 
Moral Responsibility: The Flicker of Freedom`, The Journal of Ethics, 3, no. 4, The Contributions of 
Harry G. Frankfurt to Moral Responsibility Theory (1999), pp.299-324.  
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philosophical problem commits one to understanding71 freedom as entailing the availability 
of alternatives. 
Now, there are some distinctions I wish to make about the notion of availability of 
alternatives.  Making the distinctions will expose some ambiguities in the notion allowing 
me to arrive at the claim in (ii). Alternatives can be available in three ways: 
W1. Metaphysically only. The agent is not aware of them. 
W2. Both metaphysically and in awareness.  
W3. In awareness72 only. Metaphysically unavailable.  
(W1) is, on the face of it, a perfectly intelligible kind of availability (of alternatives). It refers 
to a rather common state of affairs: something is the case out there in the world without the 
subject being aware of it. Thus, it feels perfectly intelligible to say, in many situations, that 
there were options, possibilities or alternatives without the agent (or anyone else) being 
aware of them. Above, when discussing subatomic particles and alternative future states 
available to them, I assumed an agreement on subatomic particles being incapable of any 
awareness. I expected no controversy when describing them as having alternatives 
(alternative future states) available/open to them.  Let`s take (W1), for now at least, to be a 
clear and uncontroversial distinction even though below I will argue that (W1) is problematic 
and, ultimately, incompatible with freedom.  
Regarding (W2), I am unable to think of a problem or an objection here. If it is agreed 
that (W1) is clear and uncontroversial then (W2) must be even more so as there is a sense in 
which the state of affairs referred to in (W2) is a more basic state than the one referred to in 
(W1). Clearly, to be able to conceive of a scenario where something is metaphysically 
available without the relevant subject being aware of this availability, one must be first 
capable of conceiving a more primitive scenario: a scenario in which one is aware of 
metaphysically available alternatives. The point here is that there is no way one could arrive 
at thinking about the world as containing available alternatives that one is unaware of without 
prior acquaintance – that is, without prior experience in awareness – of some of the available 
ones. How could we think about the world as containing any alternatives had we never been 
 
71 This is not to say that this understanding of freedom has to be preserved in the final account of 
freedom. It might turn out – as a result of theoretical analysis – that freedom, to be a coherent notion, 
must be divorced from the assumption(s) that was/were thought of as constitutive of it at the beginning 
of the theoretical inquiry.  
72 Below, when discussing (W3), I will switch to talking about an agent having a sense of alternatives 
instead of an agent being aware of alternatives.  Being in awareness implies the existence of that 
which is in awareness (as to be aware is a factive verb), which is an implication I wish to avoid in 
(W3). I present the distinction in (W3) in terms of (being in) awareness because that`s the notion used 
in (W1) and (W2) and its usage in (W3) makes it easier to see how the three ways that the alternatives 
can be given relate to each other.  
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aware of any? Thus (W2) is a default position here while (W1) depends – in a way that 
doesn`t need to be explicated here – on it.  
To see how best to understand (W3), let`s first have a look at how (W1) relates to (W2). 
(W2) is, as explained above, in some sense, the most basic way that alternatives can be given: 
There is an alternative available to me to act on and I am aware of it. I have run out of milk, 
so I go to a local grocery shop to get a box. When about to pay, I reach for my debit card that 
I always carry in the left front pocket of my jeans. It is not there and I immediately realize I 
left it on the desk in my study room. I get annoyed as I will have to go back home for it and 
then repeat the trip to the grocery shop. I don`t stay annoyed for long though. Still at the 
counter I recall, suddenly and with relief, that there is some change in one of the pockets of 
my coat - just enough to buy the milk. I don`t have to go back home for the debit card. I have 
an alternative: I can pay by cash that is in my coat pocket, and I am aware of this alternative. 
This is a case of (W2).  
Cases like this and their analogues are very common. Perhaps even more common is the 
following variation. The story runs an identical course up to the point when I realize that I 
have left my debit card at home. I don`t happen to recall that there is some cash (enough to 
buy the milk) in one of my coat pockets. I return home for the debit card. Only there I 
remember the money in the coat pocket. I get rather annoyed. I could have paid using the 
cash in my coat pocket and could have saved myself a boring walk back to the shop. The 
alternative was there but I was not aware of it. This variation is a case of (W1).  
Now, (W3) too is derived from the more basic (W2). Consider yet another variation of 
the milk story. I need to go to a local grocery shop to get a box of milk. I can be rather absent 
minded so, still at home, I check my pockets. The debit card is in my jeans and there is some 
change (three pounds and a few coppers) in my coat. I suspect that there might be insufficient 
funds on my debit card but I don`t worry about it much as there is an alternative: I could pay 
by cash. Unbeknown to me the coat pocket where my cash is meant to be has got a little hole 
in it. Putting the coat on I stretch it a bit and the hole in the pocket gets bigger; big enough 
for the coins to slip through. I lose the coins when walking on a grassy path in the park that 
is situated between my house and the grocery store. I didn`t hear the coins hit the ground as 
the ground is soft and grassy. At the till in the grocery shop, it turns out there are insufficient 
funds on my card and – to my puzzlement – there is no change in my coat pocket. It seems 
natural to describe the scenario as one in which, from a certain point on, the alternative of 
paying by cash existed in my awareness only.  
Now, clearly, we could think of many other scenarios analogous to the milk story and 
its variations. The milk story kind of scenarios are a rather common part of our everyday life. 
This commonality is what gives (W1) – (W3) a strong intuitive support. There is, however, 
a problem regarding (W1) and an issue to be clarified regarding (W3).  
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Recall the claim in (W1): alternatives can be available metaphysically only, that is, they 
exist out there in the world without the agent being aware of them. In what sense, however, 
can we talk about freedom here if the kind of availability of alternatives it entails is of the 
(W1) kind? Consider the following scenario:  
 
You are locked up in prison and you would like to escape. One of the bricks in the wall of 
your cell is loose. It can be taken out. There is a little cavity in the wall behind the brick with 
keys from the prison in it. You have not got a slightest idea about the loose brick, the cavity, 
the keys. There is an alternative to your remaining locked up in the prison. You could take 
the keys, open the doors and walk out.  
 
Yet, it seems extremely unintuitive to describe you as being free on the grounds that there is 
a relevant alternative to your staying locked up in the cell available to you in this way, i.e. in 
the (W1) way.  
Now, it is immediately obvious that the reluctance to describe you in this scenario as 
being free (with respect to your stay in prison) has something to do with the lack of 
awareness of the relevant alternative. Our theoretical response to this can be one of the 
following: we could either deny that something can be an alternative without being, at the 
same time, in awareness, or insist that the notion of availability implies being in awareness. 
For our purposes here it doesn`t matter much which response one prefers as both of them 
boil down to an identical necessary condition to be associated with the availability of 
alternatives in the context of the entailment of this notion in the concept of freedom. The 
identical necessary condition is this: attributing freedom to an agent requires the agent to be 
aware of at least one73 of the relevant74 available alternatives. Thus, it turns out, under closer 
inspection, that (W1) refers to a kind of availability of alternatives which is incompatible 
with freedom.  
 
73 There is also a complication here regarding possible redundancy of relevant available alternatives. 
There could be two cavities with identical keys in the cell with the agent knowing about one of them 
only. Or there could be, instead of keys and unbeknown to the agent, enough money to bribe the 
guards. Thus, it could be objected that the agent is not aware of (some other or all) relevant available 
alternatives and the necessary condition for ascribing freedom is thus not met. At the same time, it 
feels intuitively correct to attribute freedom to him just on the grounds of him knowing about the 
cavity with keys. A simple qualification will suffice here: The agent must be aware of at least one 
relevant and available alternative. 
74 Clearly, there might be unrelated alternatives that the agent is aware of. Awareness of unrelated 
alternatives is irrelevant. Consider the prison-cell-loose-brick-keys-in-the-cavity scenario again. The 
prisoner desires to escape the prison. Imagine there is another loose brick with a cavity in the wall of 
the cell. Instead of a set of keys there is a flute in the cavity. The prisoner happens to know about this. 
It could be suggested, as an alternative to using the keys he knows are in the other cavity, that he takes 
out the flute and learns to play it. In the context of his desire to escape the prison this alternative is 
irrelevant. His unawareness of this irrelevant alternative does not affect the attribution of freedom onto 
him once it is conceded that he knows about the cavity with the keys. 
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We are left with (W2) and (W3) as the two remaining ways of how, in the context of 
attributions of freedom, alternatives can be available. Our discussion of (W1) above has 
resulted in identifying a condition that must be met for the notion of availability of 
alternatives to sustain attributions of freedom. We know now that an agent must be aware of 
a (at least one) relevant available alternative, i.e. it will not suffice for the alternatives to be 
available metaphysically only. The condition of an agent`s awareness of available 
alternatives turns out to be a necessary one.  
Now, this talk of awareness of available alternatives seems to imply that available 
alternatives are, somehow, out there and we are or are not aware of them. The notion of 
awareness refers to a factive75 mental state. Awareness is always of something that really is 
the case. If that something doesn`t really exist neither does the awareness of that something. 
Thus, any talk of awareness of alternatives implies that the alternatives really are out there 
in the world. If this is correct then (W3) is an incoherent claim because it posits in awareness 
metaphysically unavailable items, which is at odds with the facticity of awareness. There is 
a relatively easy way of dealing with this issue about (W3). We can switch from talking about 
awareness of alternatives to talking about sense of alternatives. The semantics of having a 
sense of something doesn`t require for that something to really exist out there as having a 
sense of something refers to a non-factive mental state. Thus, an alternative could be said to 
be available in a (W3) way if an agent had a sense of it even though there wouldn`t, as a 
matter of fact, really be an alternative out there in the world. This little terminological move 
gets rid of the contradiction in (W3).  
Now, there is an important thing to notice here. It will often be phenomenologically 
indistinguishable to an agent whether the relevant alternative is given in (W2) or (W3) way; 
i.e., it will often be impossible for the agent to know or be sure whether it is just a sense of 
an alternative she is having or awareness of it.76 Recall the variation of the milk story where 
I first make sure – become aware - that there is cash in my coat pocket only to discover later 
 
75 A good way to understand what factive mental states are is to contrast them with the non-factive 
ones. In words of Jennifer Nagel: `Factive mental states, such as knowing or being aware, can only 
link an agent to the truth; by contrast, non-factive states, such as believing or thinking, can link an 
agent to either truths or falsehoods.` See Jennifer Nagel, `Factive and non-factive mental state 
attribution`, Mind and Language, 32, no. 5 (2017), pp.525-544 (p.1). 
76 I offer the following consideration in support of the viability of the notion of phenomenological 
indistinguishability as related to the distinction between a sense and awareness (of an alternative): 
Were we able to determine whether what we are having is a sense or awareness of an alternative, we 
wouldn`t find the problem of free will terribly exciting. We would simply be able to say, i.e. to 
distinguish, whether the world is or isn`t such that it contains real alternatives. We would be able to 
do so just by inspecting our mental states. That is, if we, in one case at least, established that what we 
are having is not a sense but awareness of an alternative, we would be able to conclude that we are, 
in principle, free agents. I am convinced that it is exactly this, in principal, inability to determine 
whether what we experience is a sense or awareness of an alternative that is a necessary precondition 
of us recognizing the problem of free will as a problem at all.   
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that, to my surprise, there is none (as there is a hole in my pocket and the coins have slipped 
through it unnoticed). It would feel extremely implausible to suggest that I was somehow 
able to notice – perhaps by being attentive to my internal mental state - the switch from 
having awareness of the alternative to having a sense of it (after the coins slipped through 
the hole in my pocket).  
There is an important asymmetry here. Being aware of an alternative entails having a 
sense of an alternative but not vice versa. The reason is that having a sense of an alternative 
refers to the phenomenological component of the mental state of having awareness of an 
alternative.77 Thus, whenever one is aware of something, he is, at the same time and 
inseparably, having a sense of that something, i.e. having a sense of an alternative is a 
necessary component of having awareness of it. Having a sense of something, on the other 
hand, doesn`t entail the existence of that something and as such doesn`t imply awareness. 
What does it mean for our discussion of the concept of freedom/free will as entailing 
availability of alternatives? It means that having a sense of an alternative is, due to it being 
an essential component of any relevant availability of alternatives, a necessary condition for 
attributability of freedom/free will. In other words: freedom in agency entails the agent 
having a sense of an alternative open to her.78  
2.4  Having a sense of an alternative – where the notion of an alternative is such that it 
sustains attributions of freedom - entails having a sense of being able to choose. 
We have the same propositional phrase – having a sense of – on both sides of the entailment 
claim. Having a sense entails having a sense. This is a trivial and uninformative kind of 
entailment. The interesting entailment is the one that, as I claim, obtains between an 
alternative and an ability to choose. This entailment is not an obvious one. Recall the story 
that physics tells us about subatomic particles. According to the story, a subatomic particle 
has, at any point, a number of alternative future states open to it. Each state open to it comes 
with a certain probability value attached to it. The value is higher than zero.79 At the same 
time, a subatomic particle is not capable of choosing anything. What we have here is a 
plausible talk of genuine availability of alternatives that is accompanied by the lack of an 
 
77 The other component of the mental state of awareness of an alternative (or anything else) is the 
alternative itself (or anything else) out there in the world. 
78 A reminder: at this point it seems natural to take (W2) as the only kind - out of the three - of 
availability of alternatives that will sustain attributions of freedom onto agents. In this context, my 
conclusion that freedom in agency entails the agent having a sense of an alternative open to her must 
be understood as identifying that which cannot be given up, i.e. that which is necessary for 
attributability of freedom. Nothing that has been said so far indicates that having awareness of 
alternatives (i.e. the availability of real alternatives) is an unnecessary condition and can be given up. 
Only later, and as a result of a dedicated argument, it will be shown how freedom can be plausibly 
attributed to agents even without metaphysical availability of alternatives. 
79 And, of course, lower than one for the other states to have some probability of obtaining. 
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ability to choose. Thus, it looks like we can talk perfectly well about alternatives without 
implying an ability to choose (one of them). This doesn`t look good for my claim that having 
a sense of an alternative entails having a sense of being able to choose. A closer inspection 
is needed. 
Let me derive a definition of an alternative from the subatomic particle story: 
 
DA: Something is an alternative if and only if the probability of it obtaining is higher 
than 0 (and lower than 1). 
Now, what we are after in our conceptual analyses of freedom in agency is a notion of an 
alternative that will sustain attributions of freedom. Thus, we have to ask: Can an alternative 
as defined in (DA) do the job of sustaining such attributions? It can`t. Consider the following 
scenario: 
The world is such that there is a set of states of affairs involving me that could happen two 
minutes from now where each state has a positive (and at the same time lower than 1) 
probability of obtaining. A brilliant scientist (helped by a supercomputer) comes up with a 
list of those states. He gives it to me. I read it and become aware of all the alternatives that 
are open to me in this way. However, I am incapable of choosing – and aware of it - any of 
those states and have to wait for the two minutes to pass to learn which of the alternatives – 
that involve me – will obtain.  
I expect no objections whatsoever to refusing to describe myself as free in that scenario. Such 
a description is simply way too counter-intuitive despite the fact that there is a robust sense 
in which I have alternatives open to me in that scenario. The scenario exposes two things. 
First, it shows that the concept of an alternative as defined in (DA) won`t sustain attributions 
of freedom. Second, it shows that the notion of an alternative that is needed to sustain the 
attributions must entail an ability to choose.  
Within the phenomenological framework of having a sense, the above will work in 
the following way. When, in a particular situation, I wish to establish – via reflection – 
whether or not I am free, I will identify as relevant only those alternatives I have a sense of 
that come merged with me having a sense of being able to choose them. How do I know that 
this is how the identification will proceed? It has been tested above. In the scenario above, I 
– and the reader – have already tested our conceptual intuition regarding the entailment 
relation running from freedom to alternative to choosing. When reflecting on whether or not 
I am free in a particular situation, I will employ – on pain of being inconsistent – the same 
conceptual intuition and identify something that I have a sense of as an alternative only if it 
comes merged with me having a sense of being able to choose that something.  
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I can conclude now: having a sense of an alternative – where the notion of an alternative 
is such that it sustains attributions of freedom - entails having a sense of being able to choose. 
2.5  Choosing entails deliberation 
What is choosing? I am, ultimately, looking for an account of freedom in agency built around 
a notion of freedom that can be recognized by a non-philosopher. The concepts constitutive 
of such a notion should themselves be similarly recognizable. In this context, the safest way 
is to have a look at what an authority such as the Cambridge English Dictionary has to say 
about choosing. The dictionary80 gives the following two definitions of the verb to choose81: 
- According to British English, (BE), to choose is: to decide what you want from two 
or more things or possibilities 
- According to American English, (AE), to choose is: to think about which one of the 
several things is the one you want, and take the action to get it 
It is immediately obvious that more is involved in the meaning of the verb as understood 
in American English compared to its understanding in British English. In American English, 
the verb to choose entails taking an action while there is no such entailment essential to it in 
British English. At the same time, both (BE) and (AE) take the verb to refer to a process of 
picking out – from two or more options – what one wants. British English specifies the 
process as deciding what one wants while American English specifies it as thinking about 
which one it is that one wants. The phrases deciding what one wants and thinking about 
which one it is that one wants refer to an identical process.82 Now we can express the relation 
between (AE) choosing and (BE) choosing in something like the following simple way: (AE) 
choosing = (BE) choosing + a relevant action (or, alternatively: (BE) choosing = (AE) 
choosing – a relevant action).  
I wish to convince you that choosing entails deliberation. This task requires focusing 
on what is conceptually essential83 about choosing and disregarding that which is inessential. 
 
80 See <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/choose?q=to+choose> [accessed 16 
September, 2019].  
81 I shall be using choosing and to choose interchangeably depending on the syntactical requirements 
of the sentence it is being used within. 
82 Why do the two phrases refer to an identical process? Choosing is defined in terms of these two 
phrases. To preserve the definitional equivalence, the verb to choose and the two phrases must have 
the same meaning. But they can`t have the same meaning if they have different referents.   
83 The notion of the essential is to be understood here in a relatively weak sense. The standard 
understanding is that if x is essential to y then y has x necessarily. Above (p.25), I conceded – partly 
because doing so had no bearing on my argument – that there are no conceptual necessities. If true, 
then there can`t be any conceptual essences either. Thus, analogously to my treatment of the notion of 
entailment (above, p.25), I shall disconnect the notion of essential from that of necessity and associate 
it with the condition of strong intuitive plausibility in something like the following way: x is 
conceptually essential to y if – in the absence of a successful counterargument – the majority of 
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The little `semantic` equation above identifies the action as an inessential element.  This 
element cannot be conceptually essential to choosing as it is not implied by the (BE) 
understanding of it. The essential bit here is the shared reference to the process of picking 
out an option. And the conceptualization of this process is what we need to have a look at to 
be able to see that and how choosing entails deliberation.  
The process that choosing refers to is conceptualized either as deciding what one wants 
or as thinking about which one it is that one wants. Put simply, choosing has essentially 
something to do with deciding and/or thinking. Below I will want to argue for quite an 
uncontroversial claim that both deciding what one wants and thinking about which one it is 
that one wants are phrases whose meaning overlap substantially with that of deliberation. 
Prior to that, however, there are issues that need to be addressed. 
2.5.1  The exclusivity requirement 
There is a way of understanding deciding (and thinking) which could be seen as a problem 
for my argument. To discuss this, an assumption needs to be introduced. The assumption is 
plausible and its function is to put a constraint on any successful account of freedom (in 
agency). 
The exclusivity requirement: An account of freedom (in agency) that allows attributions 
of freedom onto entities lacking phenomenological states is to be deemed unsuccessful. 
I assume agreement on the claim that we would not want robots and other purely algorithmic 
systems to be understood as free in any but most metaphorical sense. The exclusivity 
requirement is meant to keep it that way. Two things need to be briefly mentioned here. First, 
the assumption has, I believe, quite a strong prima facie plausibility. For whatever reason – 
be it the fact that robots follow preprogramed algorithms, or that they lack feelings, or that 
they are not biological entities - it just feels strongly unintuitive to attribute freedom to a 
robot or other purely algorithmic system. Our conceptual intuitions here regarding the 
attributability of freedom should be taken seriously exactly because the problem of freedom 
is a conceptual problem. Second, I will say things, below, that go beyond a mere appeal to 
intuitive plausibility regarding the assumption. When explaining how exactly my argument 
is kept within the bounds of the exclusivity requirement I will, at the same time, provide 
reasons for accepting it.84 
 
competent speakers with a good grasp of x and y find it strongly intuitively plausible that the semantic 
extension of y includes that of x. This notion of the essential is relatively weak compared to the one 
that implies necessity. It is, however, strong enough to sustain a convincing conceptual analysis. 
84 There might be readers who don`t find attributions of freedom onto robots counterintuitive and who, 
at the same time, won`t find my argument in support of the exclusivity requirement convincing. Those 
readers will then read – and correctly so – my account of freedom (in agency) as permitting attributions 
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Now, as mentioned above, there is a problematic understanding of deciding. What 
makes this understanding problematic is that it could, if not neutralized, set my account of 
freedom onto the path leading up to the violation of the exclusivity requirement. In other 
words, there is an understanding of deciding (and of thinking) that would ultimately turn my 
account into an account that allows attributions of freedom onto robots and other purely 
algorithmic systems. Such an account of freedom would be implausible and unsuccessful.  
To see what the troubling issue about deciding is, consider the following. Suppose that 
there is a robot equipped with a system of artificial intelligence which, among others, is built 
so as to satisfy modus ponens. Thus, whenever the robot gets into a state that counts as 
endorsing a representation of its environment such that it can be captured by propositions of 
the form `p` and `if p, then q`, it will move to a state that will count as endorsement of a 
representation of its environment that has a propositional form `q`. Now, is it correct to say 
that the robot draws inferences according to the law of modus ponens? There is a sense in 
which it does and a sense in which it doesn`t. Clearly, the robot is able to form and endorse 
a new representation of its environment which conforms to the inference rule of modus 
ponens. In this sense, the robot is capable of drawing inferences. On the other hand, and 
equally clearly, the robot doesn`t draw inferences in that rich way that logicians do because 
it lacks awareness of the rule that governs it. The awareness of the rule is what allows a 
logician to apply the rule, while the lack of it is what makes the robot to conform to it.85 
Deciding is similarly ambiguous. A robot, or some other purely algorithmic system, 
processes an input in accordance with a set of rules and decides what output it will generate. 
It doesn`t feel too unnatural to describe the robot as deciding even though the process of 
deciding would be understood as purely algorithmic, i.e. as a process lacking any awareness 
or a phenomenological component. At the same time, it is obvious that deciding as 
conforming to purely algorithmic rules is importantly different from deciding as a process 
that essentially involves a phenomenological state (of awareness). 
Now, the problem is roughly this. If choosing can be construed in terms of deciding and 
deciding can be understood as a purely algorithmic process, then choosing too can be 
understood as a purely algorithmic process. Choosing, on the face of it and very intuitively, 
is a core notion in any plausible account of freedom (in agency). Freedom entails availability 
of alternatives, and being, among other things, choosable is what makes something an 
alternative. Thus, if choosing can refer to a purely algorithmic process, it opens the door for 
 
of freedom onto robots. That shouldn`t discourage them from accepting my account because 
attributions of freedom onto robots is something that they don`t see as counterintuitive and 
problematic anyway.  
85 The distinction between applying a rule and conforming to a rule is due to Phillip Pettit. See his 
`Deliberation and Decision`, in Timothy O`Connor and Constantine Sandis (eds), The Companion to 
the Philosophy of Action (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), pp.252-258 (p.254). 
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justified attributability of freedom onto robots. That would violate the exclusivity 
requirement and render my account of freedom unsuccessful.  
One might suggest sticking with the sense of deciding that essentially involves a 
phenomenological state (of awareness). That would restrict the applicability of choosing to 
systems with phenomenological states thus keeping the argument within the bounds of the 
exclusivity requirement. Unfortunately, we don`t have the liberty to choose the sense of 
deciding that best suits our purposes because the logic of the argument requires that we 
respect all relevant conceptual intuitions. Throughout my argument I rely heavily on the 
relation of conceptual entailment86, peeling off the individual layers of conceptual entailment 
and trying, in this way, to arrive at the target claim that freedom in agency entails an exercise 
in reasoning. The entailment in the target claim is meant to be sufficiently strong – that is, 
grounded in a sufficiently strong conceptual intuition - which can be the case only if the steps 
of the argument preserve the strength. Thus, once it has turned out that deciding could be 
taken as a purely arithmetic process – that is, once it has turned out that deciding is not 
essentially a phenomenologically loaded process – we are bound to accept it into our 
conceptual analysis. 
It could, perhaps, be suggested that we will have more luck with keeping the argument 
within the bounds of the exclusivity requirement if we drop talking about choosing in terms 
of deciding and replace it with talking about choosing in terms of thinking. The reason for 
the replacement would then be that thinking might seem to be – when compared to deciding 
– harder to conceptualize as a process completely devoid of any phenomenology. And if 
thinking is essentially a phenomenological process then choosing is too. Defining choosing 
in terms of a phenomenologically loaded notion of thinking would thus keep the argument 
within the bounds of the exclusivity requirement. This won`t work for two reasons. First, 
there is, among contemporary philosophers, no consensus about the putative 
phenomenological nature of thinking. Philosophers of naturalistic inclination impressed with 
the theoretical models of cognitive neuroscience will deny that thinking essentially involves 
a phenomenological component. Naturalists are, typically, reductionists about 
phenomenology whenever at all possible. A naturalist will find it perfectly plausible to 
understand thinking, along with deciding, as notions referring to a purely computational 
process. And naturalism is too popular to dismiss out of hand its view that there is nothing 
essentially phenomenological about thinking (or indeed about anything else). Second, and 
more importantly, even those who – like cognitive phenomenologists87 – will find it clear 
 
86 In the relatively weak sense of entailment as explained above (see pp.24-25). 
87 Perhaps the most prominent advocate of cognitive phenomenology is Galen Strawson. See for 
instance his `Cognitive Phenomenology: Real Life` in Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (eds), 
Cognitive Phenomenology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.286-325. The philosophers 
who have kick started the cognitive phenomenology project are Terence Horgan and John L. Tienson. 
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and obvious that thinking is phenomenologically loaded, won`t be able to take this path out 
of the problem. They won`t be able to do so for exactly the same reasons that have been 
presented above in connection with the notion of deciding; i.e. specifically in connection 
with the two readings – an arithmetic and a phenomenological - that the notion permits. We 
couldn`t, for reasons given above, opt for the phenomenological reading and discard the 
arithmetic one. Analogously, we can`t choose thinking over deciding in our analysis of 
choosing just because it suits the argument. If choosing can be defined in terms of deciding 
then it must be accepted as essential to it and accepted along with all the theoretical 
consequences.  
It doesn`t look good. Plausibly, both deciding and thinking can be understood as 
referring to a purely arithmetic process. Even if it is somehow successfully argued that 
thinking is essentially a phenomenological notion, it won`t help. The logic of the argument 
requires that the relevant conceptual entailments run in one direction without any forking 
that would support a different claim. The very possibility (and plausibility) of defining 
choosing in terms of (a purely arithmetic notion of) deciding pushes the argument onto a 
collision path with the exclusivity requirement. What can be done about this? 
 It will be noticed that the discussion above of choosing, deciding and thinking has been 
done from a certain perspective. Let me distinguish two perspectives here: 
A pn-perspective: a phenomenologically neutral perspective, and 
A pl-perspective: a phenomenologically loaded perspective 
I draw here on a familiar distinction between the third-person and first-person views of 
mental events in the philosophy of mind. A pn-perspective would then be a perspective that 
shares its vantage point with that of the third-person view. And a pl-perspective would then 
be a perspective that shares its vantage point with that of the first-person view. Clearly, the 
perspective from which our discussion above of choosing, deciding and thinking has been 
done is the pn-perspective. Now, how does the distinction and its application help us here? 
Recall (iii):  
Having a sense of an alternative – where the notion of an alternative is such that it 
sustains attributions of freedom – entails having a sense of being able to choose.  
 
See their seminal `The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality`, in 
David Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary readings (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp.520-533. For an excellent collection of essays on cognitive 
phenomenology see Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (eds), Cognitive Phenomenology (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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Here the talk of choosing is embedded in the phenomenological context of having a sense; 
i.e. here choosing is to be looked at from the pl-perspective. The subsequent discussion 
defined choosing in terms of deciding and thinking. Thus, if choosing is to be looked at from 
the pl-perspective so are deciding and thinking.  
Now, looking at the two notions and the processes they refer to from the pl-perspective 
will give us an interesting conceptual constraint regarding the understanding of the two 
notions. Above we have seen that it doesn`t feel terribly unnatural to talk about deciding and 
thinking in connection with purely algorithmic systems. That stops being the case once we 
switch the perspectives. Reflect for a moment on what`s happening when you are having a 
sense of thinking. Are you having a sense of an algorithmic process? You might be tempted 
to give an affirmative answer. There is, however, a strong reason to believe that such an 
answer would not be correct. The notion of an algorithmic process is a notion that refers to 
a theoretical (not empirical) object. As a theoretical object it can be experienced (or given in 
one`s sense) only as a thought. It cannot be allowed that the thought itself, in some higher 
order awareness, is given as an algorithmic process. An appeal to thinking would have to be 
made on that higher order level too, and that would start an infinite regress. Thus, in one`s 
sense – or from the pl-perspective – thinking is always given as phenomenologically loaded, 
or not given at all. Exactly the same goes for deciding. If deciding is assumed to be a purely 
algorithmic process than it follows that it is available in one`s sense as a theoretical object. 
Theoretical objects can be experienced as thoughts only. To avoid an infinite regress those 
thoughts cannot – in the domain of one`s sense - be reduced to an algorithmic process only. 
Looking at deciding from the pl-perspective reveals that deciding too involves a 
phenomenological state. 
Let`s sum it up. The possibility of deciding and thinking being taken as referring to a 
purely arithmetic process set my argument on a collision course with the exclusivity 
requirement. A distinction between a phenomenologically loaded perspective - a pl-
perspective - and a phenomenologically neutral one - a pn-perspective - was made. The 
analysis of deciding and thinking that allowed for the notions to be conceived of as referring 
to a purely arithmetic process was identified as conducted form the pn-perspective. However, 
my argument discusses choosing and the related notions of deciding and thinking as 
embedded in the phrase - having a sense of, i.e. it discusses the notions from the pl-
perspective. It turns out that from the pl-perspective the notions of deciding and thinking 
(and choosing) cannot be conceived of as referring to a purely arithmetic process. That will 
do for the argument to meet the exclusivity requirement. 
2.5.2  Deciding and animal agency 
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I wish to convince you that choosing entails deliberation. Although I believe that the claim 
is quite uncontroversial it adds force to my overall argument if I break the claim into 
conceptually even more transparent and plausible steps. Part of this has been done above. I 
have defined and discussed choosing in terms of deciding what one wants and thinking about 
which one it is that one wants, which has moved us into a close proximity of deliberation. 
Deliberation is, in one of its senses, weighing reasons or considering and comparing the 
features of the available options (on the basis of which the agent is led to a choice). Now, 
weighing reasons or considering and comparing the features of the available options is just 
nothing but thinking which one it is in the context of determining the preferable option. That 
is, deliberation is thinking which one it is that is the preferable one and vice versa: thinking 
which one it is that one wants is deliberation applied in the context of determining the 
preferable option. That much seems to be clear. What is, however, less transparent is the 
relation between deliberation understood as weighing reasons and/or considering and 
comparing the features of the available options and the notion of deciding what one wants. 
It might not be immediately obvious how, or whether at all, deciding entails weighing 
reasons and/or considering and comparing the features of the available options.  
The issue here is closely related to the one regarding animal agency. We often employ 
intentional verbs when explaining behaviour of higher animals (i.e. those that display certain 
minimal levels of behavioural complexity). Such an employment of intentional vocabulary 
will feel most natural in the case of apes and cetaceans due to their high level of intelligence. 
However, we will often feel unconstrained to do the same even in the case of relatively lower 
animals such as dogs or cats. Consider the answer to the following question: `Why is your 
dog barking at me?` Your reply could be something like: `Because she thinks/believes that 
you want to steal food from her feeder.` That would be a perfectly natural answer. And if 
attributing thinking and believing to dogs and cats feels perfectly natural, the same must be 
the case with attributions of deciding as there seems to be no reason to assume that deciding 
requires a more complex neural base for its instantiation than thinking and/or believing does. 
True, the talk of dogs deciding anything might perhaps feel less natural then the talk of them 
thinking or believing, but it still is far from unacceptable. Consider the title of an article in 
The Huffington Post: `Dog Given A Home To Die In ... But He Decides To Live Instead 
…`88 Surely, that sounds alright. Now the problem here is that although we might be ok with 
dogs deciding things, we also might want to resist any talk of dogs weighing reasons and/or 
considering and comparing the features of the available options.89 This would suggest that 
 
88Caitlin Jill  Anders, 'Dog Given a Home to Die In ... But He Decides to Live Instead', (Huffpost, 
2016).<https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/dog-near-death-lives-in-new-
home_us_56951b9ee4b05b3245da6a3a> [accessed 23 February 2018].  
89 It could be objected here that we waived the option of resisting the talk of dogs weighing reasons 
and/or considering and comparing features of available options when we accepted as perfectly natural 
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deciding doesn`t, after all, entail weighing reasons and/or considering things. If this is 
correct, I might not be able to conclude that choosing entails deliberation because: 
deliberation is weighing reasons or considering things, and if choosing entails deciding (as 
established above) without deciding entailing weighing reasons and considering things – that 
is, without deciding entailing deliberation – then I have failed to make the crucial step90 
towards the claim that choosing entails deliberation. 
So how serious is it? Not very, I believe. The force of the objection stems from the 
prima facie plausibility of taking dogs as deciding things without taking them, at the same 
time, as being capable of weighing reasons and/or considering things. That would imply that 
deciding has nothing essentially to do with weighing reasons and/or considering things. 
There is an inconsistency and a confusion at the heart of the objection though. To address 
the inconsistency and the confusion, I need to mention briefly certain issues discussed by 
philosophers concerned with animal agency.  
Some of the central questions the philosophers theorizing about animal agency ask are: 
Can non-human animals act intentionally? Can they act for a reason? Unsurprisingly, some 
philosophers participating in the discussion of these questions will give an affirmative 
answer while others will give a negative one. Both sides will, however, agree on something 
like this: intentional behaviour is a behaviour that is both motivated by reasons and that 
involves an ability to, in some sense, operate with reasons. Now, the answer given to those 
two questions above will depend on what one takes to count as acting for a reason or 
operating with reasons. More specifically, it will depend on how demanding one`s 
conditions for the attributability to a creature of (acting for) a reason or operating with 
reasons are. You can, for instance, endorse lingualism tying the attributability to the 
possession of language. Lingualists – Davidson and others91 – will deny on a priori grounds 
 
to attribute thinking to dogs in sentences such as: `The dog was barking at me as she thought that I 
was about to steal food from her feeder`. Surely – the objector would insist – weighing reasons and/or 
considering and comparing features is an exercise of thinking. Thus, we should find it similarly natural 
to talk about dogs weighing reasons and/or considering and comparing features. True, weighing 
reasons and/or considering and comparing features is an exercise of thinking. It doesn`t follow, 
however, that the two mental processes (thinking on one side and weighing reasons and/or considering 
and comparing features on the other) are identical and that the relevant notions can be used 
interchangeably. The notion of thinking can refer to quite a basic mental process/state compared to 
the one referred to by weighing reasons or considering. Thus, when we say `He thinks Berlin is the 
capital of Germany`, we don`t imply – regarding the complexity of the mental process referred to by 
the employed intentional verb - more than when saying that `He believes Berlin is the capital of 
Germany`. Clearly, thinking in the sense of believing is much more basic than weighing reasons or 
considering things. And that explains why there is no conceptual dissonance in attributing to dogs 
thinking while, at the same time, resisting to see them as weighing reasons or considering features. 
90 A step in the transition of entailment. 
91 For instance: P.M.S. Hacker, Human Nature: The Categorical Framework (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2007), pp.204, 236, 240; John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), p.70; Harry Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004), pp.18-19. 
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that animals without language can have mental capacities at all, or at least the ` higher` mental 
capacities that are required for rational agency. This is a very demanding condition because, 
arguably, it is only humans that possess language. Consequently, only humans are capable 
of acting for a reason and operating with reasons. Another related strategy would be to tie 
rationality with conceptual competence and argue that animals lack conceptual competence 
on the grounds that they fail to meet a requirement known as the generality constraint. The 
generality constraint was introduced by Gareth Evans92 as a constraint on genuine concept 
possession, and thus as a constraint on a creature’s capacity for authentic thought. Someone 
capable of a thought that a is F has two distinct capacities. She must know, (a), what it is for 
something to be a and, (b) what it is for something to be F. The person capable of a thought 
that a is F is then capable of deploying those distinct capacities over a range of all the other 
concepts she is in possession of. Thus, the ability to grasp the thought that a is F implies an 
ability to grasp the thoughts that, for instance, a is G, that a is H, and so on for each concept 
of property that someone has. Similarly, someone capable of a thought that a is F, must know 
what it is for something to be F which implies an ability of grasping the thoughts that b is F 
and c is F and so on for any object that someone can think of. A genuine thinker is someone 
who is capable of entertaining syntactically permissible93 combinations of all the concepts in 
her possession. This ability of entertaining syntactically permissible combinations94 of 
concepts is what counts as a conceptual competence and is something that animals are not 
capable of.95 Or so it is argued. To sum up, if rationality – or operating with reasons – is tied 
 
92 See Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p.100. 
93 Clearly, there will be many `thoughts` that won`t count as permissible. A permissible way of 
combining John, Peter, tall and small would be, for instance, John is tall, and Peter is small; the 
impermissible one: John is Peter, and tall is small.   
94 The generality constraint is usually given a `syntactic` reading and that seems to correspond to 
Evans` original conception of it. Myself, I don`t think that appeals to the generality constraint under 
the syntactic reading pack much punch against the possible claim that at least some animals are 
conceptually competent. There are several rather serious problems with the constraint. The problems 
are identified and discussed by Imogen Dickie, `The Generality of Particular Thought` The 
Philosophical Quarterly, 60, no. 240 (2010), pp.508-532. The force of the generality constraint in the 
context of alleged conceptual competence of higher animals can, however, be recovered if it is given 
a `semantic` reading, i.e. a reading which takes the constraint to be claiming that to grasp any concept 
at all, however elementary, one must already have a repertoire of concepts, a range of concepts that 
provide a semantic matrix within which each concept is intelligible. The generality constraint 
semantically interpreted would then be combined with a claim that animals simply do not have a 
repertoire or a range of concepts numerous and rich enough to sustain a grasp of even a single concept. 
Imogen Dickie (albeit in a different context) seems to me to be offering something like this semantic 
reading of the generality constraint when looking for ways to save the constraint from the problems 
she herself had identified (for more, see her paper mentioned above in this footnote).    
95 Some disagree. For instance, Peter Carruthers gives a convincing example of a `monkey that is 
familiar with an aged matriarch – call her `Elsa` - [that] might be incapable of thinking that Elsa is an 
infant` because `what could we possibly do that might induce the monkey to entertain such a thought 
(whether believing it, desiring it, or whatever)?` See his `Invertebrate concepts confront generality 
constraint (and win)`, in R. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), pp.89-107 (p.95). 
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with possession of language or/and conceptual competence then non-human animals cannot 
be understood as rational or intentional agents. Those committed to tying rationality with 
linguistic and/or conceptual competence  will thus dismiss any employment of intentional 
explanations and intentional verbs in the case of non-human animals as a misleading (if 
useful) façon de parler.96  
Some philosophers, on the other hand, will be committed to a less demanding account 
of reasons and/or operating with reasons, and this will allow them to attribute intentional 
action onto non-human animals. They might, for instance, refuse to tie rationality with 
conceptual competence97. With the requirement of the conceptual competence out of the 
equation, those philosophers will be looking for behavioural similarities between humans 
and a target non-human animal as a sufficient justification for attributing a corresponding 
intentional state. For instance, a chimpanzee trying to open a locked box with her favourite 
food inside will be seen as engaged in a rational problem-solving activity on the grounds of 
her demeanour (using and discarding one type of tool for another, scratching their head, etc.) 
being sufficiently similar to the behaviour of a rational human in the same situation. Another 
possible strategy would be to defend an account of conceptual competence that is `weak` 
enough to be applicable to non-human animals.98 
Now how does the above said help us with the challenge of deciding having possibly 
nothing to do essentially with weighing reasons and/or considering things? Say you are 
committed to the demanding or - as I shall call it - a ` heavy` account of reasons and operating 
with reasons. As such you will refuse the talk of non-human animals deciding anything 
because deciding is an intentional behaviour, which is something that, on this view, non-
human animals are incapable of. You will not see any force in the appeal to newspaper 
articles that seem to take dogs as deciding (as you don`t accept the premise of a dog being 
able to decide anything) and you will dismiss the articles and their authors as having resorted 
to an anthropomorphic manner of speech. Consequently, you stick with the default position 
of understanding deciding as weighing reasons and/or considering things. If, on the other 
hand, your account of reasons and operating with them is suitably less demanding then you 
will very probably feel little or no discomfort when talking about apes (or dogs) as deciding 
things. You will be ok with that because although you accept that deciding is weighing 
 
96 Davidson puts employing intentional explanations in the case of animals on a par with employing 
them in the case of a heat-seeking missile. See Donald Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, 
Objective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.201. 
97 See for instance Hans-Johan Glock, `Animals, thoughts and concepts`, Synthese, 123, No. 1 (2000), 
pp.35-64.; Hans-Johan Glock, H.-J., `Can animals act for reasons?`, Inquiry, 52, no. 3 (2009), pp.232-
254. 
98 That`s Peter Carruthers` strategy in his `Invertebrate concepts confront generality constraint (and 
win)`, in R. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009) pp.89-107. 
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reasons, you have, at the same time, a `light` theory of reasons (and operating with them) 
that allows you to attribute intentionality onto non-human animals. Thus, you will not see 
any force in appeals to phrases of `dogs deciding things` either. Who will then?  
There are at least two answers, a charitable one and an uncharitable one. Let`s get the 
uncharitable one out of the way first. Someone might be just rather inconsistent, mixing the 
`heavy` and `light` perspectives in one and the same context. Recall the challenge: People 
sometimes say that dogs decide things. We might not want to say, however, that dogs weigh 
reasons or consider things. That would suggest that deciding does not entail weighing 
reasons and/or considering things. But the problem arises only when you employ a `light` 
reading of deciding while, at the same time, employing a `heavy` one of weighing reasons. 
That`s clearly inconsistent though. You either employ the ` heavy` reading in both cases - and 
that will not allow you to attribute a capacity for deciding to dogs – or you employ the `light` 
reading, in which case you won`t be able to conclude that deciding does not entail weighing 
reasons.99  
The charitable answer is more interesting. There is an argument to the effect that 
deciding is not an intentional behaviour.100 The conclusion of this argument can be employed 
as a premise in an argument behind the charitable answer. I will call the argument behind the 
charitable answer: The argument from the unintentionality of deciding. Intentional behaviour 
is – as mentioned above – a behaviour that is both motivated by reasons and involving an 
ability to, in some sense, operate with reasons. Thus, should it turn out that deciding is not 
an intentional behaviour we would be forced to conclude that it has nothing essentially to do 
with operating with reasons (or with weighing reasons). Consequently, even those committed 
to a `heavy` account of reasons couldn`t but attribute deciding to dogs.  
There is an ambiguity here that needs to be exposed. Deciding can have something to 
do with reasons and reasoning in two senses. First, in virtue of it being an intentional 
behaviour. I will call this sense in which deciding has something to do with reasoning an 
 
99 It is worth mentioning that the account of freedom in agency that I will ultimately arrive at is 
compatible with both `heavy` and `light` accounts of reasons. The only difference resulting from a 
commitment to one of them concerns the scope of attributability of freedom. Those committed to 
`heavy` accounts will be able to attribute freedom to human agents only, while those committed to the 
`light` one will be able to – or will have to – allow attributions of freedom not only onto humans but 
onto (higher) non-human animals too (provided they allow for non-human animals to possess 
consciousness because the argument requires that any candidate eligible for attributions of freedom to 
be capable of having a sense of alternative). It should be noticed that the possible `light` reading of 
my account cannot be taken as an unwelcomed consequence of my argument because the consequence 
cannot be drawn by those who would find it unwelcomed – i.e. by those committed to the `heavy` 
account – while those who can draw it – i.e. those committed to the `light` account – will not find it 
unwelcomed. 
100 A concise summary and discussion of the argument can be found in Joshua Shepherd, `Deciding 
as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions`, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93, no. 2 (2015), 
pp.335-351. 
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intentional sense. Second, in virtue of its meaning. I will call this sense in which deciding 
has something to do with reasoning a semantic sense. To understand the distinction here, 
contrast deciding with looking (at someone). Both refer to intentional behaviour, thus some 
motivating reasons (with some elementary reasoning being involved) are implied. However, 
the two differ importantly with respect to their meaning. If a learner of English asks what 
looking (at someone) means, the answer will not mention any reasoning at all. If, on the other 
hand, the same question is asked about deciding, the answer will have to refer to reasoning 
(or some synonymous alternative) to capture the meaning.  
Now, we could perhaps use this distinction to dismiss the charitable answer in the 
following way: The argument from the unintentionality of deciding targets only the 
intentional sense in which deciding has something to do with reasoning. It leaves the 
semantic sense untouched, and that`s all we need to be able to maintain that deciding has 
something essentially to do with reasoning. Unfortunately, the seemingly easy way to 
dismiss the charitable answer might not do. It could be argued that there is a relation of 
dependence between the intentional sense and the semantic sense. More specifically, it could 
be argued that reasoning in the semantic sense can be attributed only where it can be 
attributed in the intentional sense. It is difficult to disagree here. It seems to be clear that the 
presence of reasoning in the semantic sense entails its presence in the intentional sense. To 
deny this would be like denying that theorizing about language entails the existence of 
language. Consequently, the absence of reasoning in the intentional sense would imply its 
absence in the semantic sense. Or, in other words, once the conclusion of the argument from 
unintentionality of deciding is accepted, we won`t be able to take deciding as entailing 
weighing reasons.  
There is a relatively easy way out though. Let`s have a look at the argument behind the 
claim that deciding is not an intentional action. The argument is presented and discussed by 
Joshua Shepherd in his ` Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions`.101 It can be 
summed up in the following way: 
 
1. We ask: In virtue of what are decisions intentional? 
2. A widely adopted answer:102 Practical decisions are intentional in part because 
of the causal work of a mental state extrinsic to the decision itself – an intention 
to decide what to do. 
 
101 Joshua Shepherd, `Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions`, Australasian Journal 
of Philosophy, 93, no. 2 (2015), pp.335-351. 
102 And one given by Alfred Mele in his Motivation and Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), ch.9. 
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3. Typically, intentions that are relevant to intentional actions will, among others, 
guide actions. 
4. The content of an intention must be specific enough to do the guiding. 
5. An intention to decide what to do is essentially open-ended; i.e. it is not known 
what will be decided. 
6. The open-endedness of an intention to decide what to do makes the intention 
intrinsically non-specific. 
7. The intrinsic non-specificity of an intention to decide what to do makes it 
irrelevant to the (intentional) action. [3, 6] 
8. Conclusion: The irrelevance of an intention to decide what to do regarding 
deciding what to do shows that deciding is not an intentional action. 
 
It is not difficult to spot a problem in the argument. It is to be found in steps 5 and 6.  It 
is claimed, in step 6, that an intention to decide what to do is intrinsically non-specific 
because of the open-endedness of such an intention. An intention to decide what to do is 
claimed (in step 5) to be open-ended on the grounds that it is not known what outcome will 
the intended deciding generate. It is hard to see, however, how not knowing in advance the 
outcome of the intended deciding – i.e. how the open-endedness of the intended deciding – 
makes the intention (to decide) non-specific in any relevant way. When I intend to decide 
(what to do), my intention is perfectly specific as long as I understand the notion of deciding. 
Thus, if I take deciding to be about weighing reasons then the content of my intention is 
sufficiently clear, robust and specific: To determine what to do, my intention is to weigh 
reasons. The open-endedness of deciding (and the resulting non-specificity) doesn`t transfer 
to intending. Compare an intention to decide what to do with an intention to ask your friend 
what to do. Just like in the case of intending to decide what to do, when I intend to ask my 
friend what to do, I have no idea what her advice will be. Yet it would be plainly wrong to 
claim that the very intention to ask my friend is therefore non-specific or not specific enough. 
Asking one`s friend is an action that simply is perfectly specific and any intention to perform 
it must be taken as similarly specific.  
Let me briefly sum up here by getting back to the original question: Who will see any 
force in appeals to talk of `dogs deciding things` (in the context of settling down the issue of 
whether or not deciding entails weighing reasons)? The uncharitable answer points to those 
who mix `heavy` and `light` perspectives on what counts as acting for reasons in one and the 
same context. The charitable answer turns on something more sophisticated. It turns on the 
argument from unintentionality of deciding. A proponent of this argument will insist that the 
talk of dogs deciding things presents a serious challenge to the claim that deciding entails 
weighing reasons. She will insist so on the grounds that such a talk is correct, and that it is 
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correct because it takes deciding as an unintentional action. An unintentional action is not 
motivated by reasons. Therefore, the proponent of the argument will conclude, if deciding is 
an unintentional action then deciding can`t have anything to do with weighing reasons. We 
have, however, seen that the central premise of the argument from unintentionality of 
deciding is untenable. The central premise claims that deciding is unintentional action. The 
premise won`t survive a closer scrutiny though. The argument behind the premise confuses 
the open-endedness and non-specificity of deciding with the open-endedness and non-
specificity of an intention (to decide). As such, it fails to show that deciding is not an 
intentional action. This collapses the argument from unintentionality of deciding. Thus, the 
charitable answer – i.e. the answer that employs the argument from unintentionality of 
deciding – will have no force against the claim that deciding entails weighing reasons. 
2.5.3  Deliberation: robust and derivative  
There is one more issue I need to touch upon before summing up the discussion of (iv), that 
is, the discussion of the claim that choosing entails deliberation. It might be objected that we 
commonly take people as choosing and deciding things even in those everyday situations 
where we would find it rather unnatural to say they are weighing reasons or considering and 
comparing features. True, it will be conceded, there are clear cases of choosing and deciding 
that involve rich and robust instantiations of weighing reasons and/or considering and 
comparing features. A young couple choosing a house to buy will exercise a lot of weighing 
reasons and/or considering and comparing features. There are, on the other hand, similarly 
clear cases of choosing and deciding that happen either too fast or in an `autopilot mode` 
where it feels wrong to say that weighing reasons or considering and comparing features has 
taken place. During a ski race an alpine skier chooses an optimal trajectory between the gates. 
The choosing happens in a fraction of a second and there is no time to weigh reasons or 
consider and compare features. The skier doesn`t deliberate. Or, driving home from work 
you decide to stop at a café to get a sandwich, which is what you nearly always do on your 
way home. You were far from weighing any reasons or considering and comparing anything. 
You didn`t deliberate. You were in an `autopilot mode`. Now does this show that choosing 
doesn`t entail deliberation after all?  
I don`t think it does. True, choosing and/or deciding in an `autopilot mode` doesn`t 
involve weighing reasons in a robust sense; it does, however, involve it in a sense that is 
derivative from the robust one. Presumably, one will switch to and go into an `autopilot 
mode` – i.e. turning off any weighing of reasons when choosing and/or deciding – only if the 
relevant action is a token of a type action whose reasons had been weighed and endorsed 
before and the action turned out to be a success. Applied to the scenario of a driver on his 
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way home from work popping in the same café to get a sandwich, it is quite natural to expect 
that there is some history to this. Perhaps something like this. First week in a new job. Driving 
home after work; getting hungry and thinking and weighing reasons regarding what to do 
about this. Shall I hold on and eat at home? I could save some money plus eat in the company 
of my wife. Or shall I look for a café somewhere on the way where I could have a sandwich 
and a cup of tea? I could have a little moment just with myself and my thoughts to reflect on 
the new job and my new colleagues. I deliberate and choose to get a sandwich in a nearest 
café. The café turns out to be a cosy little place with excellent choice of sandwiches, loose 
leaf teas and relaxing music. Driving home from work next day I again get hungry and choose 
to get a sandwich in that same café. There is some deliberation involved but far less of it then 
yesterday. Dining with my wife still has the same appeal and I also believe – as I did 
yesterday - that it`s one of those little things that contribute to a happy relationship but the 
café and the sandwiches and the relaxing music were so enjoyable the day before that today 
this alternative has much more force in my reasoning. I also really enjoyed the time and 
opportunity to reflect on various issues going on in my life. This time, the deliberation is 
brief and `shallow` (or more `shallow`). The alternative to the sandwich-in-the-café one – 
i.e. driving straight home and having dinner with my wife - doesn`t really have much pull 
any more. After a few days, going to the café becomes part of my routine. I don`t deliberate. 
I switch to an `autopilot mode`. Not only do I not weigh reasons anymore, I am able to think 
about various unrelated things while choosing to stop by at that café. Yet it is correct, I 
believe, to insist that my making a decision to stop by the café involves weighing reasons. It 
does so not only in the historical sense described above - that would perhaps be felt as too 
weak – but it is there in the real time (even if only in the derivative way and not in the 
phenomenologically rich way as in the case of the young couple deliberating about the 
purchase of a new house). The evidence for this is that it generally makes sense to ask a 
human agent who made a decision in an `autopilot mode` for reasons which carried weight 
in that decision. Typically, the agent will recover, not perform, the reasoning behind the 
decision. That is, the agent will bring forth what is already there and involved in the relevant 
choosing and deciding.  
As for the cases when choosing and/or deciding happens too fast to involve weighing 
reasons in some phenomenologically robust sense – such as that of a skier choosing an 
optimal trajectory between the gates – most of them involve deliberation in a similarly 
derivative way as the `autopilot mode` cases. The skier processing the features of the race 
course and choosing the optimal trajectory is in an `autopilot mode` too. The difference is 
that – compared to the driver`s `autopilot` mode – her `autopilot` mode is just a much faster 
processing one. The sense in which the skier`s choosing the optimal trajectory involves – in 
a derivative sense – weighing reasons is something like this: Throughout many years of 
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intensive training the skier`s coach explained to her repeatedly various physical relations 
among the speed, the gravitational pull, the width of the curve, the angles of approaching the 
gate, the point of the start of a turn, and so on. Before each race, the skier will get thoroughly 
acquainted with the race course. This will involve at least one (usually two) test rides and a 
slow walk through all the gates of the race course. When getting acquainted with the race 
course (especially when going through it on foot) the skier will apply her knowledge of the 
physics of optimal trajectory to determine the best possible trajectory to get through each 
gate. The application of her knowledge can be perfectly naturally described as weighing 
reasons and/or considering and comparing features. Then she memorizes the trajectory she 
has chosen for each section of the race course. It is correct to say that during the race she 
chooses the optimal trajectory - even though no weighing of reasons at or immediately prior 
to the choosing is taking place – solely on the grounds that the relevant deliberation is 
involved in the act of choosing in a derivative sense.103 The derivative sense is strong enough 
to sustain the target entailment.104 And here too we can test the claim by asking the skier why 
she chose this and not some other trajectory. She will recover, not perform, the relevant 
reasoning in her reply.105 
 
103 An appeal to derivative presence of reasoning will play an important role in the overall plausibility 
of my account of freedom in agency. I will tie attributions of freedom with an exercise of reasoning. 
The derivative notion of reasoning will allow me to attribute freedom to agents in a variety of everyday 
situations where such an attribution feels very natural and plausible even though the agents are clearly 
not engaged in any robust exercise of reasoning.  
104 You might disagree. You might insist that this kind of historical reconstruction of how deliberation 
is present in the agent`s choosing doesn`t show that it is there essentially. Consider, however, what 
happens in scenarios where it is clearly indicated that no historical and no co-temporal deliberation 
took and/or could have taken place: Walking in the forest I suddenly hear a loud crack somewhere 
above me. I look up and this huge branch is off and about to crash on my head. I lunge forward, head 
first, landing on my belly at the exact moment when the huge branch hits the exact spot I was standing 
on just a fraction of a second ago. Now, try to insert `choose to` in between `I` and `lunge` in the third 
sentence of this little story. It just feels completely wrong to say `I choose to lunge forward…`, and 
the reason is that the scenario makes it clear that no deliberation whatsoever – derivative or non-
derivative – took, or could have taken, place. 
105 There will be grey zones here. Perhaps the skier`s coach has never explained to her the physics 
behind choosing an optimal trajectory. Perhaps he thought she was too dumb to understand it. Instead 
he always uses a 3D computer modelling of the race course, determines the best trajectory himself 
and then plays it to the skier in her 3D goggles. She memorizes and test-rides it. I suspect that scenarios 
like this will turn divisive regarding the applicability of the notion of choosing. Some might feel it ok 
to describe the skier as choosing the trajectory on the grounds that her choice is a result of deliberation 
although it is a deliberation performed not by her but by her coach. It could be seen as a case of a 
weaker – sufficient nonetheless - derivative presence of deliberation, a case where the presence of 
deliberation derives not only historically but also from a mental process of a separate individual. There 
is a helpful and well-known analogy. In philosophical semantics a speaker is taken as having a robust 
grasp of a concept just in virtue of her deference to experts regarding the conditions of applicability 
of that concept. Similarly, some might be fine with the talk of choosing if it involves the skier`s 
deference to the deliberation of her coach. Others will find this too weak and refuse to talk here about 
choosing at all. I am inclined to side with those who find it unnatural to describe the dumb skier as 
choosing although I can see why others might be fine with such a description. The important bit to 
notice here is that both sides will theorize under the assumption that choosing has something 
essentially to do with deliberation.  
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2.5.4  Subconclusion 
Let me briefly sum up and conclude. The claim was: choosing entails deliberation. In our 
ordinary language we understand choosing as deciding what one wants or/and thinking about 
which one it is that one wants, and deliberation as weighing reasons or/and considering and 
comparing features. The phrase thinking about which one it is that one wants seems to say 
the same as the phrase weighing reasons or/and considering and comparing features in the 
context of determining the preferable option. With choosing understood as thinking about 
which one it is that one wants, the exposition of the entailment – that choosing entails 
deliberation - is, therefore, very quick and straightforward. It gets somewhat less 
straightforward when choosing is analysed in terms of deciding what one wants. There are 
two challenges here.  
First, there are contexts within which deciding seems to be semantically divorced from 
weighing reasons and/or considering and comparing features. Such contexts constitute a 
challenge as they would, if not neutralized, prevent me from arriving at my target claim that 
choosing entails deliberation. However, a closer scrutiny of the contexts reveals an 
inconsistency and/or confusion. With the inconsistency removed and/or the confusion 
clarified, the first challenge is neutralized and we fall back on the natural reading of deciding 
what one wants as involving weighing reasons and/or considering and comparing features.  
Second, there is an argument from the unintentionality of deciding that, if successful, 
severs the conceptual tie between deciding and weighing reasons. The argument rests 
crucially on the claim that deciding is not an intentional action. I refuted the claim, which 
collapsed the argument behind the second challenge.  
I then proceeded to discuss a possible objection concerning the plausibility of the claim 
that any choosing or deciding involves deliberation. We commonly describe agents as 
choosing and/or deciding even when it doesn`t seem to be the case that the agents are – 
simultaneously or shortly before - engaged in any weighing reasons and/or considering and 
comparing features. I argued that the involvement of deliberation in choosing and/or deciding 
doesn`t have to be simultaneous or immediately preceding. Often, our choosing and/or 
deciding is grounded in a deliberation that was performed a long time ago. The presence of 
such a past deliberation in a present act of choosing and/or deciding is derivative but robust 
enough to sustain the target entailment.  At this point nothing prevents us from concluding 
(iv): Choosing entails deliberation. 
2.6  Deliberation entails an exercise in reasoning.  
This one is clear and uncontroversial. Above, we take deliberation to mean weighing reasons 
(and/or considering and comparing features of available options). That`s what deliberation 
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simply is. Similarly clear and uncontroversial is taking weighing reasons as a case of an 
exercise in reasoning; weighing reasons just is an exercise in reasoning. It follows then that: 
deliberation is an exercise in reasoning. Here I shall assume something, again, rather 
uncontroversial which is that an identity relation is a variety of an entailment relation,106 and 
conclude that deliberation entails an exercise in reasoning.107  
The reader might concede that there is, indeed, not much to object against here but, at 
the same time, feel somewhat cheated regarding the informativeness of the target claim. 
Reasoning and the related notion of rationality are philosophically loaded notions and the 
reader`s grasp of the entailment in the target claim will necessarily be rather tentative as long 
as its members remain theoretically `unprocessed`. I will say more about reasoning and 
rationality below, when discussing and defending the plausibility of my account of freedom 
in agency. Here my task was much simpler: to make the reader pause for a while and agree 
that deliberation has essentially something to do with reasoning.  
2.7  Freedom in agency entails an exercise in reasoning.  
This is the conclusion I wished to arrive at. It follows from (i)–(v) in virtue of entailment 
being a transitive relation.108 Or does it? The following could be objected. In steps (ii) and 
(iii), we talk about having a sense of an alternative and having a sense of being able to choose 
while the following three steps, (iv), (v) and the conclusion itself, present claims that lack 
the phenomenological constraint (of having a sense of). Shouldn`t those last three steps also 
 
106 Anderson and Belnap call the variety of entailment that an identity relation is a tautological 
entailment. See Alan Ross Anderson and Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., `Tautological Entailments`, 
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 13, no. 1/2 
(1962), pp.9–24. I shall ignore here certain complications stemming from the fact that identity is a 
symmetrical relation while entailment is not. For a discussion of some paradoxes that this fact leads 
to, see C. Lewy, ` Entailment and Propositional Identity`, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New 
Series, 64 (1963 – 1964), pp.107–122. I feel comfortable with ignoring the complications and 
paradoxes discussed by Lewy because, ultimately, they must be taken as a challenge to deal with and 
not as a proof that identity doesn`t imply entailment. To accept them as such a proof would be way 
too disruptive for our common way of reasoning about virtually anything. 
107 A reminder: The identity relation and the entailment relation referred to here are not of the strong 
kind, i.e. of the kind that implies (conceptual) necessity. Above (pp. 24-25), I have briefly touched 
upon the unviability of the notion of conceptual necessity. For the lack of a better option I stick with 
the notion of entailment but the reader is asked to remember that I use the notion as implying a strong 
modal tie to truth and not a necessity. The same goes for the notion of identity. 
108 Again, there are some complications related to the notion of transitivity of entailment. See D. L. C. 
Maclachlan, `The Pure Hypothetical Syllogism and Entailment`, The Philosophical Quarterly, 20, no. 
78 (1970), pp.26–40. Maclachlan argues against the transitivity of entailment. But see Frank Jackson 
who counters convincingly Maclachlan`s argument in his `The Transitivity of Entailment`, The 
Philosophical Quarterly, 20, no. 81 (1970), pp.385–388. I am not too disturbed by the complications. 
Even if Maclachlan is right about entailment not being a transitive relation, it won`t affect my 
argument here. Maclachlan`s treatment of entailment takes it as implying a necessary relation. This 
ultimately leads to paradoxes for reasons that Timothy Williamson appeals to in his rejection of the 
notions of conceptual necessity and conceptual truth. I don`t, however, understand the notion of 
entailment here as implying necessity - just a strong modal tie to truth – thus Maclachlan`s argument 
doesn`t have much force against my position. 
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be embedded within the phrase having a sense of? Thus, instead of `choosing entails 
deliberation`, (iv) would read as `having a sense of choosing entails having a sense of 
deliberation`; and instead of `deliberation entails an exercise in reasoning`, (v) would read 
as `having a sense of deliberation entails having a sense of an exercise in reasoning`; and, 
finally, instead of ` freedom in agency entails an exercise in reasoning`, the conclusion would 
then read as `freedom in agency entails having a sense of an exercise in reasoning`. And 
that`s a somewhat different conclusion.  
There a few ways of answering the objection. The simplest one is this. Regarding (iv) 
and (v), it would be unnecessarily cumbersome to embed the entailment in the phrase having 
a sense of. It is uncontroversial that choosing entails deliberation only if choosing involves 
essentially deliberation. Then, of course, having a sense of choosing will involve essentially 
having a sense of deliberation. And this will allow us to say that having a sense of choosing 
entails having a sense of deliberation. Exactly the same logic applies to the claim that 
deliberation entails an exercise in reasoning. This claim analogously implies that once one 
has a sense of deliberation then one must have a sense of an exercise of reasoning, which 
allows for the conclusion that having a sense of deliberation entails having a sense of an 
exercise in reasoning. That is, once the truth of (iv) and (v) has been established, the truth of 
their phenomenologically constrained variants too gets established. Thus, there is no need to 
be explicit.  
All this might be conceded. The core of the objection remains unaffected though. The 
above seems to confirm the suspicion that the valid conclusion of the argument should be: 
freedom in agency entails having a sense of an exercise in reasoning. That is, strictly 
speaking, correct. However, it becomes an issue only if it is presumed that one can have a 
sense of an exercise in reasoning without there being an actual exercise in reasoning. And 
that seems inconceivable. True, one can mistake one`s sense of something else for a sense of 
an exercise in reasoning, or the very exercise of reasoning that one has a sense of can be 
deeply flawed (i.e. involving conceptual confusions or logical errors). Neither shows, 
however, that one can have a sense of an exercise in reasoning without actually exercising 
her reasoning. It follows then that the claim that freedom in agency entails having a sense of 
an exercise in reasoning can be read as implying that freedom in agency entails an exercise 
in reasoning.  
The argument (i) – (vi) is meant to back up (C).  
 
(C): Freedom is attributable only to agents who exercise (practical) reasoning. 
 
The conclusion of the argument – freedom in agency entails an exercise in reasoning – gets 
reformulated into (C) in the following straightforward way. It is uncontroversial that (A ⊨ 
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B) → (¬B → ¬A), i.e. it is uncontroversial that from `pain entails sentience` it follows that 
`if there is no sentience, there is no pain`. In terms of attributability it says that `pain` can be 
attributed only where `sentience` is instantiated. Similarly, the entailment in (v) implies that 
if there is no reasoning then there is no freedom. And in terms of attributability we get to a 
variation of (C): `freedom` can be attributed only where `reasoning` is instantiated. I take it 
that enough has been said to establish the truth of (C).109  
 
Let me make two preliminary remarks here to prepare the ground before moving on to the 
discussion in the next chapter. First, (C) identifies a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. 
It will be the task of the next chapter and the discussion there to show in what sense (C) can 
be understood as capturing the sufficient condition of attributability of freedom. Second, I 
wish to draw the reader`s attention to where we are, dialectically speaking, regarding the 
progress we have made in solving the problem of free will/freedom in agency. In our pre-
theoretical understanding, freedom is often taken to have something to do with a lack of 
constraints. (C), however, gives us a rather contrary picture of freedom. It ties attributions of 
freedom to an exercise of reasoning. Reasoning is a rule-following activity, that is, an activity 
that is constrained by rules. This implies that freedom too is, essentially, something 
constrained. Now, the problem of free will/freedom in agency is to figure out how freedom 
can be instantiated in the world that is fundamentally constrained by causal determinism. 
With (C), however, it appears that instead of somehow weakening the constraining grip of 
causal determinism, we have identified another constraining layer: the rule-following 
exercise in reasoning. Thus (C) - far from, at this point, looking promising in some way - 
could be seen as worsening the incompatibility dilemma of the problem of free will/freedom 
in agency. There is a way of turning things around though. In the next chapter, I will present 
a thought experiment that will allow us to look at (C) from a novel perspective; a perspective 
within which it will be possible to interpret (C) as a claim about a sufficient condition of 
attributability of freedom.  
  
 
109 Let me recap an important point here: (C) is not a stipulative or normative claim. It is not, implicitly, 
saying that we should attribute freedom only to reasoning agents (it, perhaps, does so only on a meta-
level in virtue of the rational being intrinsically normative). (C) is a metaphysical claim. It tells us that 
the nature of freedom (in agency) is such that it can get instantiated only within the domain of a 
reasoning agent. 
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Chapter 3: From reasoning to freedom 
3.1  The introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to show how the conclusion that we arrived at in Chapter 2 can be 
understood as identifying a sufficient – and not just a necessary – condition of attributability 
of freedom onto an agent. The central role in this is played by a thought experiment presented 
below.  
3.2  The thought experiment 
Two things need to be introduced first. 
1. A basic, uncontroversial picture of agency: 
Input (the relevant causal history) → (conceptual and rational) Processing → Output 
(action) 
I will call this an IPO picture of agency. The thought experiment as presented below will 
provide an illuminating context should the reader find this picture of agency unclear. 
2. A concept of veto power. 
 
The concept of veto power is a minimalistic version of the default concept of free will. Free 
will as a veto power refers to the power to do A or to refrain from doing A. The default 
understanding of free will – the understanding that problematizes freedom in the causally 
determined world – takes it to be a power to do otherwise. Clearly, veto power as a power to 
refrain from doing something is a case of a power to do otherwise.  
The thought experiment: 
The setting. 
Agents A1 and A2. The agents are identical in all respects except for the following: A1 has 
no veto power while A2 has it. Scenarios S1 and S2. The scenarios are identical in all respects 
except for the following: S1 contains A1 while S2 contains A2. Both S1 and S2 are causally 
determined in the following way: The Input-Processing-Output, (IPO), triad in S1 and S2 
will be identical as long as A2 (in S2) doesn`t exercise her veto power.110 A1 and A2 have 
 
110 There is an important sense in which the world can be understood as causally determined even if 
it is inhabited by agents capable of (and occasionally performing) a veto over a causal chain running 
through their agency. There will still be lawlike causal relations out there in such a world. Our 
knowledge, our theories about such a world will be the same or very similar to the ones we possess, 
the only difference being that formulations of such knowledge will start with an implicit or explicit 
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an identical sense of available alternatives, i.e. they have phenomenologically 
indistinguishable acquaintance with choosing freely. Neither of the two knows whether their 
experience is of a real capacity or a mere illusion. 
The plot. 
An identical causal history (an identical Input) has brought both A1 and A2111 (in their 
respective scenarios) into a room with a desire to hang a favourite painting on the wall. On 
the table in front of them, there is a nail and a hammer. If A2 doesn`t exercise her veto power, 
the following will happen. Both A1 and A2 process (they go through the Process stage of the 
IPO picture of agency) the Input (the perception of nail and hammer, the knowledge of what 
these objects are for, the desire to hang the painting and so on) and act (generate Output): 
both grab the hammer, drive the nail into the wall and hang the picture. That is, the (IPO) in 
S1 and S2 will be identical.  
The twist. 
A2 is a veto power capable agent. The veto power makes agent A2 free112 in a very strong 
sense; perhaps the strongest conceivable one.113 114 She could exercise her veto power, block 
 
qualification: `Outside of the agential interference, the world follows this and that set of laws...`. I 
think this qualification might feel less unpalatable if we recall that all the laws of science are 
formulated within an (implicit) set of analogous ceteris paribus qualifications. 
111 Assuming A2 has, so far, never exercised her veto power.  
112 Freedom in will/agency is, uncontroversially, understood as the power to do otherwise. This, 
presumably, wouldn`t be denied by even Frankfurt and his followers who argue that moral 
responsibility (and freedom too, in their understanding) is attributable to agents even in contexts when 
they are incapable of doing otherwise. Their concept of freedom – being the weaker one – doesn`t 
exclude the strong one: freedom as power to do otherwise. Clearly, the veto power – the power to 
block or refrain from blocking a relevant causal chain - is a case of power to do otherwise.  
113 It could be objected that there is a stronger notion of freedom than the veto-power one. Such a 
stronger notion would be the causa-sui one. The causa-sui freedom would be a freedom where the 
agent is capable of originating a brand new causal chain in a sort of positive way without any prior 
causal determination. The veto-power freedom overlaps conceptually with the causa-sui one to the 
extent to which they both are causal events disconnected from any causal history. To this extent the 
veto-power freedom is a variety of a causa-sui action. The veto-power freedom differs from the causa-
sui one in that the former doesn`t initiate a brand new causal chain in any sort of a positive way. It 
works in a purely negative way; just blocking a relevant causal chain thus allowing a different existing 
causal chain to (potentially) take over and be realized in action. As such the veto-power freedom 
seems to be, relatively, an easily conceivable one. The causa-sui freedom, on the other hand, borders 
on inconceivability as there seems to be much more mystery involved in originating a brand new 
causal chain than there is in just blocking one. 
114 Some naturalistically oriented philosophers tend to look at thought experiments and their 
epistemological value with suspicion. Those philosophers might find the thought experiment more 
palatable once reminded of a well-known scientific experiment that is, in relevant respects, analogous 
to the A2/S2 (part of the) thought experiment. The scientific experiment (or, to be more precise, a 
series of them) was conducted by the neurologist Benjamin Libet and is described in his paper `Do 
We Have Free Will?`, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, no. 8-9 (1999), pp.47-57. Libet found out 
that any awareness of an intention to act is always preceded by a relevant neural activity. That makes 
all our decisions to act (remember: deciding is an intentional process) predetermined by neural 
processes in the brain. At the same time, and quite surprisingly, Libet also found out that the subjects 
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the causal chain and refrain from generating the Output. Now, will she choose to do so? And 
in case she does, will that count as an exercise of freedom (in agency)? I claim `no` is the 
correct answer to both questions. 
3.3  A conceptual interpretation of the thought experiment: Reasoning in agency as 
entailing freedom in agency 
Two questions to be answered: 
 Q1: Why will agent A2 choose not to interfere (i.e. use her veto power to block the 
relevant causal chain)?  
Q2: How does answering (Q1) help us recover freedom in S1 scenarios, i.e. in 
scenarios that assume a full causal determination of the world and an impossibility 
of a veto power?  
Regarding (Q1): In chapter two I argued towards the conclusion that freedom is 
attributable only to agents who exercise practical reasoning. The agency is constituted by 
actions. An action that is a result of an exercise of practical reasoning is a rational action. 
Freedom is attributable only where rational action is instantiated, that is, an irrational action 
is not to be taken as an exercise of an agency that sustains attributability of freedom. I will 
call the agency that sustains attributions of freedom: a freedom sustaining agency or an FS-
agency. And because an irrational action is not constitutive of the FS-agency I will want to 
say that:  In an irrational action the FS-agency is suspended.  
In the S1/S2 scenario, grabbing the hammer, driving the nail into the wall and hanging 
up the painting is the rational thing to do. Not doing this amounts to a collapse of the FS-
agency. If A2 interferes and blocks the causal chain, she simultaneously suspends her FS-
agency in the very act of interfering. Claiming that the agent A2 could have refrained – as in 
`could have chosen to refrain` - from performing the rational act reveals a confusion 
regarding the concept of agency and its relation to freedom. An irrational agent - that is, a 
non-FS-agent - cannot be attributed freedom and therefore, as such, can`t be said to be 
choosing anything.  The conceptual logic behind the question whether the agent A2 will 
choose to block the causal chain is incompatible with an affirmative answer. 
 
of the experiment were able to block the actualization in action of the relevant neural event; i.e. he 
noticed that the subjects had a veto power over the realization of the causal chains started by the 
subject`s brain. During the experiment(s) Libet wasn`t able to identify any relevant neural activity that 
had determined the exercise of veto power. Clearly, Libet`s inability to identify neural causes of 
subject`s vetoing a particular causal chain doesn`t mean that there are no such neural causes. Perhaps 
a different kind of experiment would have to be designed to identify them. The point here is that the 
philosophically uncorrupted mind of a scientist like Benjamin Libet doesn`t feel uncomfortable with 
conceiving of agents whose actions are causally determined and who are, at the same time, able to 
block the relevant causal chains.   
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Regarding (Q2): The answer given to (Q1) yields an intriguing result. It allows us to 
generalize something like the following. 
 
R: Whenever we act rationally (that is: whenever we exercise our FS-agency), our 
actions (that is: the actions of causally determined agents) are the same actions we 
would choose were we agents possessing the veto power over the relevant causal 
chains, i.e. were we free in a robust metaphysical sense.  
This sameness of the actions constitutes a sense in which acting rationally – regardless of the 
fact that the rational processes themselves supervene on causally determined brain processes 
and are, moreover, essentially constrained in virtue of being rule-following processes – is 
coextensive with exercising agential freedom in the way that involves the ability to do 
otherwise.  
I submit that what we have arrived at here is a robust compatibilist solution to the 
problem of free will. For those of us unable to ignore the force of the argument behind causal 
determinism, there is quite a lot of theoretical comfort to be drawn from knowing that 
whenever our action is rational it is exactly the same action we would have chosen in the 
same situation had we been free in the robust metaphysical sense. Bear in mind that the 
theoretical comfort to be drawn here will join forces with the everyday and inescapable 
experience of the phenomenology of choosing. This everyday and inescapable experience of 
the phenomenology of choosing is extremely rich and deeply constitutive of how we see and 
understand ourselves - it is so strong that many of us will refuse to really accept the truth of 
causal determinism with all its implications anyway. It is in this context that the robustness 
of my compatibilist solution should be assessed. The solution doesn`t really need to deliver 
a theoretical knock-out blow on its own because its target – the claim of causal determinism 
– is already seriously weakened by the fact of its non-theoretical implausibility and/or 
practical non-liveability.115 Still, one might wonder whether a more robust or, in some sense, 
stronger claim could be squeezed out of the proposed compatibilist solution. 
3.4  An existential interpretation of the thought experiment: Free agents exist 
A specialist in the problem of free will might be perfectly happy with (R). She understands 
the parameters of the problem, that is, the dilemma constituted by the two prima facie 
incompatible claims: we are free agents and the world is causally determined. She – the 
 
115 The talk of practical non-liveability of causal determinism is an allusion to P. F. Strawson`s view 
that, roughly, it is practically impossible to give up treating others and ourselves as free and 
responsible agents. See Peter F. Strawson, `Freedom and Resentment`, in John M. Fisher and Mark 
Ravizza (eds), Perspectives on moral responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.45-
66. This view of Strawson`s will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
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specialist – accepts the truth of the individual claims constituting the dilemma and what 
interests her is whether there could be a way of thinking about the claims such that it would 
remove the prima facie incompatibility.116 (R) represents the result of an attempt at such a 
removal of the prima facie incompatibility and the specialist will move on to another 
philosophical problem if she deems the attempt successful.  
A non-specialist might feel cheated though. A non-specialist simply wants to know 
whether we are free or whether this can`t be the case because of the world being causally 
determined.117 Giving (R) - that is: Whenever you act rationally your action is identical to 
the action that you would have chosen had you been really free – as an answer to the 
straightforward question of a non-specialist (Are we free agents?) will feel like a 
sophistic(ated) way of avoiding the question. Alternatively, the non-specialist might take (R) 
as entailing a negative answer to his question due to the unreal conditional that the 
formulation contains. Arguably, saying `you would have chosen [it], had you been really 
free` implies that you are, in fact, not free. And that`s not how I wish (R) to be read.  I could 
perhaps dismiss the non-specialist on the grounds that his is a different question from that of 
mine. At the same time, it would feel rewarding to be able to answer exactly this question. It 
is, after all, this question that the majority of people out there associate with the problem of 
free will. And even a specialist will surely be interested in finding out whether (R) can be 
translated into an existential claim about free agency.  
So, can (R) be shown to entail, imply or mean the same as the claim that: `We are free 
agents`? I believe it can. Below, I will formulate an argument that shows how. I will proceed 
in the following way. First, I will give a brief outline of the argument. Second, a discussion 
of the individual steps will follow. 
The outline:  
1. (R), and the related discussion, implies that an action being rational suffices to 
describe the action as `free`; that is: if an action is rational, it is free. 
 
116 `The Problem of Free Will` label gets attached to various positions or theoretical engagements 
related to free will/freedom in agency. Thus, you can have a specialist – such as Ted Honderich, for 
instance – who will not be interested in the problem of the prima facie incompatibility because he 
doesn`t think that we are free agents. His writings on free will focus on various implications of – what 
he believes to be – the fact of us being agents who lack free will (see for instance, Ted Honderich How 
free are you? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). So, there are specialist in the problem of free 
will who will not really be impressed by (R), but that`s mainly because they are interested in a different 
issue. I believe that the very core of the problem of free will is the issue of the prima facie 
incompatibility. All the other issues or problems that fall under `The Problem of Free Will` label 
derive from this core problem.  
117 There is a number of popular books that take on the question of free will. Whatever answer they 
give they, typically understand and frame the question as an existential one, i.e. as a question about 
whether or not metaphysical freedom and/or free agents exist in the causally determined world. A god 
example of such a popular book is, for instance, Sam Harris, Free Will (New York: Free Press, 2012). 
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2. The Principle of Undeniability of the Rational: it cannot be denied that a rational 
action exists. 
3. Free action exists. [1, 2] 
4. It is an empirical fact that people, at least sometimes, act rationally (in the sense 
that they generate rational actions). 
5. An agent that generates rational action is herself describable as `rational` if a 
condition c is met. 
6. It is an empirical fact that agents often give explanations of their rational actions 
such that it strongly suggests that condition c is, at least sometimes, met. 
7. Rational agents exist. [4, 5, 6] 
8. For an agent, being rational suffices to be describable as `free`; that is: if an agent 
is (being) rational, she is free. 
9. Free agents exist. [7, 8] 
 
Discussion of the individual steps: 
(1): (R), and the related discussion, implies that an action being rational suffices to describe 
the action as `free`; that is: if an action is rational, it is free.  
 
(R) says: Whenever we act rationally (that is: whenever we exercise our FS-agency), our 
actions (that is: the actions of causally determined agents) are the same actions we would 
choose were we agents possessing the veto power over the relevant causal chains, i.e. were 
we free in a robust metaphysical sense. 
 
Recall how we got to the sameness of the actions in (R). First, in Chapter 2, we concluded 
that only an agent who exercises practical reasoning can be described as free. Regarding 
actions, this conclusion translates as: only actions that are a result of practical reasoning (of 
an agent) can be described as free. What we have here is a necessary condition of 
attributability of freedom onto agents and actions. The thought experiment has demonstrated 
that the possession of a veto power plays no role in the agent`s choosing her action. The logic 
behind the conceptual relation among choosing, rationality, and freedom won`t permit 
describing an irrational action (and its agent) as free. Thus, both the agent with her veto 
power switched on and the agent with her veto power switched off will choose the same 
rational action because that`s the only one that can be freely chosen. The whole point in other 
words: it is uncontroversial that a vast majority (if not all) of philosophers would agree that 
an agent who possesses a veto power is free in a robust, metaphysical sense. The actions of 
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such a metaphysically free agent are, of course, free (as long as they result from an exercise 
of practical reasoning). That much is clear.  The thought experiment shows, however, that a 
metaphysically free agent cannot veto a rational action if she wishes to stay in the realm of 
freedom. Thus, once an agent is on the track of practical reasoning leading towards an action, 
the possession of veto power becomes irrelevant.118 At the same time, as everyone agrees, 
the actions of a metaphysically free agent (who acts rationally) are free. Thus, there can be 
only one conclusion: If an action is rational, it is free.  
 
 (2): The Principle of Undeniability of the Rational: it cannot be denied that a rational action 
exists. 
 
The basic idea here is this: denying is a rational activity; thus any attempt to deny that a 
rational action exists can be done only through generating a rational action – an action of 
denying – which is, clearly, self-defeating. Any attempt at denying the rational confirms it.  
It seems to me that the only way to attack the basic idea here is to deny that denying 
is or must be a rational activity. There certainly are contexts where it is correct to talk of 
denying even though the action so described is not rational in any obvious sense or might 
even be outright irrational. There is a common usage of the verb `to deny` that simply means 
the same as saying `no`. A journalist will report on a politician saying `no` to a question as 
that politician denying a particular claim, accusation or interpretation. Simply saying `no` 
doesn`t have to involve anything that could be describable as a rational action while, at the 
same time, being correctly interpretable as denying. Now, clearly, there is nothing impossible 
or even mildly difficult in denying that a rational action exists if one takes denying to mean 
saying `no` (to a question, a claim or a proposition). However, and equally clearly, that is 
not how denying in (2) is meant to be, or needs to be, understood.  In the market of 
philosophical claims any denying in the sense of simply saying `no` has absolutely no force. 
In the market of philosophical claims, any denying must be grounded in a rational argument 
to have any force. The success of a denial – that is, its impact on a philosophical argument 
or claim – will correlate positively with the force of the argument that the denial is grounded 
in. (2), of course, is a philosophical claim and must be understood as such.  
 There is a complication here that needs to be dealt with. It could be argued that the 
fact of the undeniability of the existence of something doesn`t entail the existence of that 
something. Thus, it is possible and rational to insist that, for instance, it is undeniable (in a 
sense explained below) that: yellow crocodiles that can beat Gary Kasparov in the game of 
 
118 The possession of a veto power is irrelevant even before getting on the track of practical reasoning 
preceding an action because exercising a veto power makes sense only in the context of choosing; and 
choosing is something that already involves essentially an exercise of practical reasoning. 
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chess exist. How could that be undeniable? Well, try to deny that. It is notoriously difficult 
(if at all possible) to conclusively deny any existential claim about an empirical entity or 
event.119 It is possible to generate an infinite number of existential claims that are undeniable 
in the sense of them being impossible to deny conclusively. However, it would be absurd to 
commit to the truth of those claims on the grounds that we are unable to deny them. 
Therefore, the usual practice here is to place the burden of proof on those who make the 
existential claim and not on those who deny it. Applied to (2), the objection would then be:  
O: One cannot deny (conclusively) that a rational action exists, i.e. it is undeniable 
that a rational action exists, but it doesn`t follow that it is true that a rational action 
exists.  
(O) is then accompanied by a reminder that the burden of proof is on those making an 
existential claim, which, in our case, is the claim that a rational action exists. In other words, 
(3) doesn`t, strictly speaking, imply that rational action exists; and an additional argument is 
needed.  
Now, this additional argument for the existence of a rational action is relatively simple. 
Let`s compare our two existential claims:  
 
C1: Yellow crocodiles that can beat Gary Kasparov in the game of chess exist.  
C2: Rational actions exist. 
(C1) is an existential claim that refers to empirical objects (yellow crocodiles) and an 
empirical event (beating Gary Kasparov in the game of chess). There is nothing that we know 
about the world that would indicate that, (a), there are yellow crocodiles, (b), that crocodiles 
of any colour could beat Gary Kasparov in the game of chess. On the contrary, all we know 
about crocodiles generally, and about Gary Kasparov and the game of chess suggests 
strongly that (C1) is not true. (C2), on the other hand, seems to be a default position. It is an 
empirical fact that a concept of rational action exists. True, there will be competing accounts 
of what counts as a ` rational` action but that is not a problem because claiming that a rational 
action exists doesn`t commit us to a particular account. It is also an empirical fact that 
majority of the speakers who have a grasp of the concept will feel pretty confident about the 
truth regarding the existence of the referent of this concept. It is so simply because only few 
of us see ourselves as totally incapable of a rational action. Thus, it seems to be obvious that 
 
119 Of course, if the existential claim concerns referents of concepts that are logically impossible then 
it is relatively easy to deny conclusively the existence of the referents. 
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the world is populated by rational actions and people who take it that rational actions really 
exist. 
Of course, it doesn`t follow from the above said that rational actions exist, but it shows 
what the default position is here. It shows the claim that a rational action exists to be a default 
position and that the burden of proof is on the denier. And once the burden of proof has been 
shifted where it belongs, the denier faces the full force of The Principle of Undeniability of 
the Rational. 
(3): Free action exists.  
The path from (1) and (2) to (3) is fairly straightforward. (1) tells us that rational action and 
free action are identical actions. (2) tells us that rational action exists. It follows that free 
action too exists.  
Now, let me prepare the ground for the next step. I wish to show how (R) can be 
translated into a claim that free agents exist. We find ourselves at the point where it seems 
clear that free actions exist, and it might feel tempting to jump to conclusions here. If free 
actions exist, doesn`t it mean that free agents too exist? Unfortunately, it is not that simple. 
Above (p. 22), I wrote: ` An agent constitutes itself by acting, or ceases to be an agent 
entirely; `action` and `agent` are the two sides of the same conceptual coin`. I take this claim 
as uncontroversial. The little metaphor of `the two sides of the same conceptual coin` will 
help to illustrate a point here. One would expect that if something is one of two sides of the 
same coin, then often a property of that side will be shared by the other side too. Thus, if one 
side of the coin is made of silver, the other one too will be made of silver; if one of the sides 
is rounded, the other one too will be rounded. But, clearly, that won`t always be the case. 
One of the sides can have a picture of a monarch on it, while the other one can have a number 
there instead.  
If `agents` relate to `actions` analogously (i.e. as the two sides of the same conceptual 
coin), we might wonder whether the fact that free actions exist implies that free agents exist 
or not, i.e. whether it is the case of both sides of the coin being rounded or the case of a 
monarch on one side and of a number on the other. In other words, we have a question to 
answer: does the existence of free actions entail that the agents that generate them are free?  
The answer is that it depends. To see what it depends on consider the following close 
analogy. A brave action has been generated. Does it imply that the agent that has generated 
the brave action is herself brave (or, at least had a moment of being brave)? Not necessarily. 
The agent could have acted on the basis of incomplete or incorrect knowledge of the risks 
involved in the action. For those who have the complete – or less incomplete - picture of the 
risks involved, the action will clearly be a token of a brave action, the agent herself, however, 
might have thought that her action didn`t involve any risks to her health and safety 
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whatsoever. In such a case, we will not want to describe the agent as brave although we will 
still maintain that her action was brave. The analogy shows that attributes of actions don`t 
automatically extend onto the associated agents. In our case it means that we cannot conclude 
that free agents exist just on the grounds that free actions exist. We need a separate argument 
here. The argument is provided below. 
(4): It is an empirical fact that people, at least sometimes, act rationally (in the sense that they 
generate rational actions).  
Above, when discussing The Principle of Undeniability of the Rational, I briefly argued that 
the claim that the world contains rational actions is a default position. This claim being a 
default position means that the burden of proof is on those who would want to dispute it. 
However, The Principle of Undeniability of the Rational makes any such dispute bound to 
fail. Disputing – to be successful – will have to be a rational action, which immediately 
defeats the attempt to undermine the default position. Now, the existence of rational actions 
entails the existence of agents. It is so simply because `action` and `agent` are two sides of 
the same conceptual coin. This is uncontroversial.  
What we have here now as a default position is that a rational action – that is, acting 
rationally – exists and the associated agents acting (at least sometimes) rationally also exist. 
However, as we have seen when discussing the case of a `brave` action, the attributes 
describing actions cannot be automatically transferred onto the associated agents. Thus (4) 
shouldn`t be read as implying that the default position is that the people in the claim are 
`rational`. That wouldn`t be correct. I will, however, want to claim that, at least sometimes, 
it`s not only the actions that are `rational` but the associated agents too are being `rational` 
while generating the action. In the three steps that follow I shall argue towards this claim.  
(5): An agent that generates a rational action is herself describable as `rational` if a condition 
c is met. 
We know, at this point, that attributes of actions don`t automatically transfer onto the 
associated agents. The last sentence suggests that the transfer of an attribute – even though 
not automatic – is possible. The question is what exactly would make the transfer possible.120 
 
120 There is a bit of ambiguity here regarding the notion of a `transfer`. The `transfer` in question is of 
an epistemological kind, and not of an empirical one. The `rationality` of an agent will be instantiated, 
if instantiated at all, simultaneously with the `rational` action. Thus, we cannot `transfer` it if it wasn`t 
there from the very moment when the action was generated. But we can `transfer` it in the sense of 
knowing what needs to be the case for an agent who has generated a `rational` action to be describable 
as `exercising her rationality` (or simply, as `rational`) in that action. Of course, the default position 
for an observer of `rational` actions is that, in vast majority of cases, the agents indeed exercise their 
rationality in the observed (rational) actions. In other words, the default position is to always do the 
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Some of the bits that will go into answering this question have already been mentioned above. 
We were reluctant to call an agent `brave` who generated a `brave` action on the grounds 
that her complete ignorance of the risks may have been involved in this `brave` action of 
hers. Actions are ` brave` when involving certain levels of risk or danger for the agent. Agents 
are `brave` when they are aware of those levels of risk or danger that are involved in 
generating `brave` actions. The condition that allows us to describe an action as `brave` - i.e. 
the condition that it, the action, must involve certain levels of risk and danger for the agent 
– must, at the same time, be a condition that in some sense constrains the intentional realm 
of the agent when she generates that `brave` action. The following condition is more specific 
about the constraints of the transfer of an attribute of an action onto the agents as it applies 
to the attribute of `bravery` (and perhaps some other attributes, such as: `smart`, `wise`, 
`cowardly`, etc.):  
 
Condition c: an attribute of an action can be transferred onto the associated agent if 
those constraints that an action must meet to be describable as x by a competent 
observer are, (a), constraints that the associated agent has (on a general level) a 
sufficient grasp of and, (b), part of her intention-formation leading to that action. 
 
Let me unwrap the condition a bit. A competent observer – i.e. someone who has a sufficient 
grasp of relevant concepts and is not cognitively and perceptually impaired – will see a man 
running into a house on fire to save a child. She, the competent observer, has a sufficient 
grasp of the concept of ` bravery`. She will know that what she has just witnessed is an action 
that can be correctly described as `brave`. She will take the action as so describable because 
the parameters of the action meet certain constraints of attributability of `brave` onto an 
action. The constraints on attributability of `bravery` onto an action are, among others, that 
certain levels of risk or danger for the agent must be involved in the execution of that action. 
Now, condition c requires that if we wish to transfer the attribute of `bravery` onto the 
associated agent, we can do so only if that agent understands the constraints and their 
applicability onto actions, and these constraints are part of her intention-formation that leads 
to the action. Thus, the man that ran into a house to save a child will be describable as ` brave` 
only if, (a), he understood the risks or dangers involved in running into a house on fire and, 
(b), he was being aware of those risks involved in running into a house on fire while forming 
the intention to generate that particular action.  
 
transfer unless we have reasons not to do so. The position is a default one for the same reasons for 
which Davidson introduced his principle of charity.   
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It will come as no surprise that different attributes will be subject to different 
constraints of attributability. Attributability of `bravery` onto an action has essentially 
something to do with agent`s putting herself at risk and her being aware of the risk if 
`bravery` was to be transferred onto her. What about, for instance, a `dumb` action? What 
needs to be the case for us to be able to say that not only the action was `dumb` but the 
associated agent too was `dumb`? Whatever the answer here is, one thing seems to be 
immediately obvious: the transfer of ` dumbness` from an action onto the agent will be subject 
to constraints that are different from those that apply to transfers of the attribute of ` bravery`. 
While the transfer of `bravery` required the presence of a certain skill or ability on the part 
of the associated agent – namely, the ability to understand and appreciate the risks involved 
in the exercise of the intended action – the transfer of `dumbness` not only doesn`t call for 
the presence of any skill, it seems to call for its absence. And then there are cases when the 
attribute gets transferred fairly straightforwardly from an action to the agent. For instance, it 
looks like we can`t describe an action as `entertaining` without implying that the associated 
agent is `entertaining`. It seems that all that is needed to describe an agent as entertaining is 
simply her being the cause of an entertaining action. And she is the cause of the action already 
due to her being the agent in relation to that action. To complicate things yet a bit more, there 
are attributes that don`t transfer at all: an `unfinished` action doesn`t have a counterpart in 
an `unfinished` agent; similarly, there are `postponed` actions without an option of there 
being any `postponed` agents.  And I am sure the reader would be able to come out with 
many other and different cases of constraints (or the absence of) concerning the transfer of 
an attribute from an action to the agent. There is, however, no need for us here to spend more 
time on these varieties. What we need instead is to look at the attribute of `rationality` in the 
light of what was said above and find out what (if any) constraints govern its transfer.  
 It seems to be fairly easy to conceive of scenarios in which `rational` actions are 
generated by agents who didn`t exercise any related reasoning prior to or during the ` rational` 
action.121 This is analogous to the case of a `brave` action. Also, `rational` is an attribute that 
we are totally comfortable to use when describing both actions and agents. This applies to 
the attribute of `brave` as well. And the analogy doesn`t stop here. Both attributes, when 
transferred from the associated action, seem to place a cognitive constraint onto the agent. 
When running into a house on fire to save a child, the agent is describable as `brave` only if 
she understands and appreciates the risks that her action involves. Similarly, the `rational` 
action in our scenario – picking up the hammer and a nail, driving the nail into the wall and 
 
121 Often, we don`t really exercise any robust reasoning within the time frame that immediately 
precedes or overlaps with the action. However, just acting in an auto-pilot mode – if that mode is 
anchored in some relevant reasoning that was exercised by the agent in the past – suffices to describe 
the agent as ` being rational` or as ` exercising her rationality`. For more on acting in an auto-pilot mode 
see section 2.5.3 in the previous chapter. 
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hanging the painting – is performed by an agent that is describable as `rational` in this 
scenario only if she understands a number of things here, such as: what hammers and nails 
are for, how paintings get attached to walls and so on. Thus, it seems safe to conclude that 
the attribute of `rationality` conforms to the same (the same in relevant aspects, at least) 
condition of transferability – condition c - from action to agent, as does the attribute of 
`bravery`.  
 
(6): It is an empirical fact that agents often give explanations of their rational actions such 
that it strongly suggests that condition c is, at least sometimes, met. 
 
We know, at this point, what needs to be the case for the attribute of `rationality` to be 
transferable from an action onto the associated agent. The constraints for the attributability 
are captured in condition c. Now the question is whether the condition c is, at least 
sometimes, met in the real world. And if it is, how could we possibly know?  
Let`s start with the second question. The agent in our thought experiment seems to be 
engaged in an activity that looks like a good candidate for a `rational` action. The hammer 
and the nail are being handled in a way that is consistent with their function and causal 
profile. The same applies to the handling of the painting. This plus the sequence of the 
handling – grabbing a nail, then grabbing the hammer, then hammering the nail into the wall, 
then hanging the painting – is consistent with the interpretation of the action as a `rational` 
way of bringing about the desired goal, which, in this case, seems to be having the painting 
hanging on the wall. In other words, what we observe here is a fairly uncontroversial example 
of a rational action.122  
Now, we already know that the fact that the action is rational doesn`t entail that the 
agent generating the action exercised her rationality in that action, i.e. that she too was 
rational. She might have, in fact, wanted to cook a mushroom soup and she was so confused 
about how to do that that she took a nail and a hammer that she saw on the table in front of 
her and drove the nail into the wall, and then she thought a bit more salt is needed so she 
hung the painting that happened to be on the same table on the nail. This would clearly be a 
case where `rationality` cannot be transferred from an action onto the agent. What is needed 
for a justified transfer is the agent having a desire to hang the painting on the wall, plus a 
sufficient understanding of what is involved in performing the desired action, plus this 
understanding being constitutively involved in the intention formation that precedes or runs 
 
122 There is an asymmetry here that should be noted. There are actions that – from the 3rd person 
perspective – don`t seem to be rational or might even seem outright irrational. Such actions can still 
turn out to be fully rational once the associated agent`s rationale becomes known. However, an action 
that is – from the 3rd person perspective – rational, remains so even if the associated agent hasn`t 
exercised her rationality in the action.   
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simultaneously with an execution of the action. And to find out whether all this is the case 
with the agent: We just need to ask. First, we would probably want to know why the action 
as a whole was performed. And we will get answers such as: `I`ve always wanted to have 
that painting hanging in my room` or `My daughter loves the painting and asked me to hang 
it in her room`. Already this kind of answer strongly indicates that the agent exercised her 
rationality in the action. Yet, should we perhaps want to make sure that the action was a 
robust exercise of rationality on other levels, we could inquire about the agent`s 
understanding of, for instance, the objects involved in the hanging of the painting. We could 
ask why she used the hammer to drive the nail in the wall and not, for instance, her t-shirt 
instead, or why she drove the nail into the wall and not into the windowpane. The answers 
provided will enable us to determine whether the agent did or did not exercise her 
rationality123 sufficiently and on all levels that matter.124 
Now, I don`t believe that it can be denied that people commonly give explanations of 
the – often rational – actions that they generate. People giving such explanations is simply a 
ubiquitous part of our everyday social interaction. Similarly undeniable is the fact that at 
least some of those explanations that relate to rational actions are consistent with the 
rationality intrinsic to those actions. By being `consistent` I mean, of course, that the 
explanations are such that they strongly suggest that the condition c has been met.   
Why do I say that the existence of these explanations `suggests` that the condition c is 
met? Can`t I go for a stronger claim, perhaps something like that these explanations `show` 
or `prove` or `demonstrate` that c is met? The answer has to do with the epistemic barrier 
between the 3rd and 1st person realms. It is possible, at least in principle, (as shown by Searl`s 
Chinese-room thought experiment)125 for an agent who lacks a capacity to understand things 
to generate an action whose behavioural profile is indistinguishable from the same action 
generated by an understanding agent. The epistemic barrier makes it impossible to establish 
with certainty whether the agent does or doesn`t understand her action even after she gives a 
rational explanation that is consistent with the rational profile of the action. The reason is 
that giving an explanation won`t take us beyond the behavioural realm, that is beyond the 3rd 
person and into the 1st person realm.  
 
123 Of course, there might be many cases where the agent`s exercise of rationality is only partial. In 
such cases it might be difficult to decide whether to describe the agent as `rational` or not. However, 
we don`t have to worry much about such cases as all we need for our argument to go through is that 
there are at least some cases where the exercise of rationality is sufficiently robust. And that seems to 
be very hard to deny. 
124 What is sufficient and which levels matter here will depend on one`s account of rationality and the 
conditions of its attributability onto agents. My argument can, I believe, accommodate any such 
account. Thus, there is no need to be specific here. 
125 John Searle, ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (1980), pp.417–457. 
69 
 
The strength of an argument depends on the strength of its individual premises. To be 
able to claim that free agents exist I first need to establish that rational agents exist. And I 
will be able to establish that only after I show that the condition c is, at least sometimes, met 
in the real world. In (6) I manage to arrive at a claim where the evidence doesn`t `show` but 
only `suggests` that c is, at least sometimes, met. This bit about (6) will get transferred to the 
conclusion of the argument and weaken the strength of its claim. Instead of concluding that 
free agents exist I will be able to say only something like: the evidence suggests that free 
agents exist. Now, how much should one worry about this `weakness`?  
The answer to this question is closely related to one`s theoretical attitude towards 
solipsism. Those who take solipsism to be a serious and respectable philosophical position 
will very probably be worried about the weakness. Why? The weakness that we have 
identified above stems from a position that is a variation of solipsism. Solipsism – the claim 
that the world contains only one mental subject – can be understood as a conclusion derived 
from combining the commitment to the existence of the epistemic barrier with the 
methodological imperative of Occam`s razor. In other words, we end up with solipsism once 
we (a) accept that the existence of any particular behaviour doesn`t entail the existence of 
the mental and (b) apply Occam`s razor refusing to stipulate the existence of the mental (apart 
from, of course, the existence of the Occam`s razor applying subject). Now, solipsism is a 
claim about the existence of the mental outside of the subject. The variation of solipsism that 
the weakness stems from concerns the target of the claim. In the variation it is not about the 
mental as a whole but only about one of its aspects, namely understanding. The background 
logic remains the same: no particular behaviour entails that the agent understands, and 
Occam`s razor bars a stipulation of understanding.  
Solipsism is – for various reason that I won`t discuss here – a deeply unpopular 
position among philosophers. My presenting the weakness as grounded in a variation of 
solipsism, i.e. as something that is a weakness only for a (disguised) solipsist exposes the 
theoretical costs of targeting this particular weakness, costs that few philosophers are willing 
to cover. Thus, although I shall carry on saying that the evidence merely `suggests` that c is, 
at least sometimes, met, I will stay confident that not many will perceive this as a weakness 
in the argument. 
(7): Rational agents exist.  
 
(7) follows straightforwardly from (4), (5) and (6). No further discussion is needed. 
 
(8): For an agent, being rational suffices to be describable as `free`; that is: if an agent is 
(being) rational, she is free. 
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At this point we understand, among others, the following two things: the logic behind 
describing rational actions as free actions and the constraints on the transferability of 
`rationality` from an action onto the associated agent. Combining the two things will give us 
(8). The little argument bellow shows how: 
 
i. Agents are rational if, (a), they generate a rational action, (b), in relation to 
that action, c is met. 
ii. `Freedom` is transferable from an action onto the agent. 
iii. Agents are free if, (a), they generate a rational action, (b), in relation to that 
action, c is met. 
iv. The identity of conditions (a) and (b) in (i) and (iii) implies that: if an agent is 
(being) rational, she is free.  
Let me unpack the argument. (i) is a version of the claim in step (5). All that has been said 
in support of (5) applies to (i). (ii) should be uncontroversial. I can`t think of any semantic 
barriers preventing us from talking about ` free` agents. In our everyday interaction with other 
people we both presuppose and attribute `freedom`. And if `freedom` is transferable we 
might wish to know what conditions constrain the transfer. (iii) gives us the conditions, and 
they are identical to those that govern the transfer of `rationality`. The fact of the identity of 
the conditions implies (8), i.e. the claim that if an agent is (being) rational, she is free; which 
is what we conclude in (iv).  
Now, of course, the key step is step (iii). The step contains an implicit claim and two 
explicit claims. The implicit claim is that agency – with all the attributable descriptions – is 
exercised or happens to exist only in action. Any talk of a `free` agent requires having an 
agent in the first place, and agents are constituted by their actions. Thus, we start from an 
action. Telling us what action it must be is the business of the first explicit claim, which is 
the claim formulated as condition (a). (a) prescribes that the action must be rational. Above, 
we have established that rational actions are free actions so (a) could, alternatively, prescribe 
that the action must be free. I have opted to formulate (a) in terms of `rationality` as it fits 
my intention to make clear that transfers of ` freedom` from agency onto the associated agents 
are governed by exactly the same constraints that govern the transfers of `rationality`. The 
second explicit claim – condition (b) – demands that the attribute of an action that we wish 
to transfer is transferrable onto the associated agent only if c is met. A reader with a good 
memory will, at this point, be able to see why the same condition – condition c – that governs 
the transfer of ` rationality` governs also the transfer of ` freedom`. The main argument behind 
my account of freedom in agency starts with an investigation regarding the structure of 
agency that needs to be in place for `freedom` to be attributable. In Chapter 2 – where I 
71 
 
conclude that freedom is attributable only to agents who exercise practical reasoning – I 
argue that an agent exercises her freedom only if that exercise126 has an appropriate rational 
structure. I don`t elaborate on what exactly needs to be the case for that exercise to have a 
rational structure. I am not committed to a particular theory of rationality. My account can, 
in this respect, accommodate a number of positions. It only requires a basic consistency in 
sticking with one and the same theory of rationality throughout the argument and the 
argument-testing attributions. Thus, whatever rational structure or constraints one accepts as 
governing the attributions of freedom onto agents, the same rational structure or constraints 
will govern attributions of `rationality` onto actions, the attributions of `freedom` onto 
actions and – coming full circle127 – the transference of `freedom` onto agents. Condition c 
just restates the rational structure or constraints in the context of transference of `freedom` 
onto the associated agents.  
(9): Free agents exist.  
The conclusion is straightforward: if (7), rational agents exist, and (8), rational agents are 
free agents, then (9), free agents exist. 
3.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented a thought experiment designed to show that the conclusion 
arrived at in the previous chapter – that is, the conclusion that freedom is attributable only to 
agents who exercise (practical) reasoning – is interpretable as a sufficient (and not just a 
necessary) condition of attributability of freedom to agents. The availability of such an 
interpretation allows us to say that a person is a free agent if and only if she exercises 
(practical) reasoning. And because nothing else is required, nothing prevents us from, at the 
same time, embracing the truth of causal determinism. This, I claim, is a robust compatibilist 
solution to the problem of free will. I see the proposed solution as potentially satisfactory for 
a specialist in the problem of free will. A non-philosopher might, however, feel cheated as 
the proposed solution seems to be confined to a purely theoretical realm of conceptual 
relations. Thus, to a non-philosopher, I have offered an expanded interpretation concluding 
that: free agents exist. This is a kind of conclusion that, I believe, is what a non-philosopher 
would be looking for as a satisfactory outcome of attacking the problem of free will. 
  
 
126 `The exercise of freedom` here refers not to an (extra-mental) action but to the act of making a 
choice as part of the intention-formation that precedes that action.  
127 The circle is not vicious because (C) is not an assumption but a claim that is a result of a conceptual 
analysis.  
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Chapter 4: Holding responsible and the free will assumption 
4.1  Introduction 
There is a problem regarding the justification of our common practice of holding others 
morally responsible (PHMR). As far as I am aware, all philosophers working on the problem 
of free will understand the concept of free will and the related problem as something that is 
to be approached and resolved within the conceptual and theoretical constraints of (PHMR). 
In Chapter 1, Freedom and morality: severing the connection, I argued that this approach is 
deeply misleading. The concept of free will and the related problem is independent of 
(PHMR) and should be approached as such. Severing the connection between the discussion 
of free will and (PHMR) has allowed me to develop (in Chapter 3) a novel compatibilist 
account of freedom in agency. The account shows in what sense it is plausible to attribute 
freedom to reasoning agents despite them being fully causally determined. 
Now, the account of freedom in agency that I have arrived at is such that it will be of 
no help regarding (PHMR), i.e. it won`t ground justifications of holding others moral 
responsible. Why won`t it do the grounding? Philosophers theorizing about free will within 
the framework of (PHMR)  - that is, as far as I know, all of them who theorize about it – will 
deem an account of free will successful only if it generates intuitively correct results when 
employed in moral stories. The results will be taken as correct if they accord with our moral 
intuitions as elicited by the moral stories. Most philosophers` attempts to formulate their 
accounts of free will in terms of control or sourcehood reveal what is felt as intuitively 
constraining our moral intuitions when tested in relevant moral scenarios: typically, we seem 
to be reluctant to hold a person morally responsible for her conduct if the person lacks an 
intuitively satisfactory kind of control over her actions and/or is not – in some, again, 
intuitively satisfactory way – the ultimate source128 of her actions.  
The reader will remember that in Chapters 2 and 3 my approach to the discussion of 
the problem of freedom in agency was separated from any theoretical considerations related 
to (PHMR). This means that the development of my account hasn`t been constrained by those 
moral intuitions that require an account of free will to be built around the concept of control 
and/or sourcehood. And once the discussion of freedom in agency has been disconnected 
from (PHMR), there was no reason whatsoever to voluntarily introduce the constraints. No 
wonder then that once the account gets tested in relevant moral scenarios, we get wrong 
 
128 Kevin Timpe argues that the kind of control required for morally relevant freedom is, ultimately, 
analysable in terms of sourcehood. If he is right – and I believe he is – then our moral intuitions as 
elicited by the thought experiments will ultimately scan the thought experiment scenario to determine 
whether the sourcehood is constituted and if it is, to what extent it has been corrupted by circumstances 
introduced by the scenario. For details, see Kevin Timpe, Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives 
(Continuum, 2008). 
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results. Attributions of freedom onto agents will be justified – in the context of my account 
- in various cases where holding another responsible would be felt as incorrect, that is, in 
cases where our moral intuition detects lack of satisfactory control and/or sourcehood on the 
part of the agent.  
Disconnecting the discussion of the problem of free will from the theoretical 
commitments related to (PHMR), which was done in Chapter 1, could have been taken to be 
just a sort of a dialectical step intended to allow a new approach to the solution of the 
problem. Thus, it might have been felt that, perhaps, later it would be possible to reconnect 
the account with the issue of (PHMR). Perhaps, the account could be developed such that it 
would do the required theoretical work within the framework of (PHMR). Surely, that`s what 
we all expect from a successful account of freedom in agency. And should it turn out to be 
impossible to develop the account in this way, it would, I concede, be taken by many, or even 
most, philosophers to be a major weakness of the account.  
A natural response to this perceived weakness would be to try to find out whether it 
could be developed further into an account that lacks the weakness, i.e. an account which 
would be able to ground the ascriptions of moral responsibility. There are, however, serious 
reasons to doubt that an account of free will robust and plausible enough to justify our 
common practice of ascribing moral responsibility can be defended.129 Thus, instead of trying 
to develop the account to fit the needs of a moral theorist, I shall problematise the ethical 
rationale behind our common practice of holding people morally responsible.130  
I will analyse the concept of holding morally responsible and identify some important 
ambiguities. The analysis and the resulting identification of ambiguities will allow me to 
argue that all the right holdings of moral responsibility can be performed without the need 
for the free will assumption.131 It will turn out that only the wrong holdings require the free 
will assumption. This distinction regarding attributions of moral responsibility will remove 
the apparent weakness of my account discussed above. I will proceed in the following way. 
I will analyse the concept of holding morally responsible. With each identified reading, I will 
examine whether or not it calls for the free will assumption. Before that, however, I will need 
 
129 The main problem is, very briefly, this. The ascriptions of moral responsibility (of the kind that 
call for the free will assumption) can be, ultimately, justified only if the free will available to agents 
involves the power of causa sui. Successful explanations are formulated in terms of constitutive 
reasons and/or causes. An explanation that refers to the mysterious power of causa sui violates this 
requirement and will, therefore, not be considered successful. Put simply, explaining something in 
terms of causa sui amounts, ultimately, to not explaining it at all.  
130 The assumption here is that if the practice of holding others morally responsible is, on separate 
grounds, exposed as seriously problematic then any theoretical requirements stemming from it will 
lose their appeal.  
131 The free will assumption referred to here is the one in which freedom is understood to do essentially 
with control over actions or with being the ultimate sourcehood of them.  
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to discuss an issue that has been, until now, assumed unproblematic. At this point, the issue 
will be merely touched upon and later, when more will turn on it, it will be discussed in more 
detail. 
4.2  A clarification regarding the notion of justification 
The issue is this. To be able to examine whether the practice that a particular reading refers 
to calls for the free will assumption, we need to have some understanding of what constitutes 
such a call. A practice referred to by a reading of the concept of holding morally responsible 
can, of course, call for anything only in a metaphorical sense. The call is best to be 
understood here in terms of justification. Thus, the question whether a particular practice 
calls for the free will assumption can be rendered as a question about whether a particular 
practice requires a justification of a sort that depends on the free will assumption.  
Now, the whole discussion of the problem of free will is motivated by the shared 
understanding that at least some varieties of our practice of holding others morally 
responsible stand in need of such a kind of justification, i.e. one that depends on the free will 
assumption. That much is taken, by the majority of philosophers, to be uncontroversial. 
Interestingly, the very notion of a `practice standing in need of a justification that depends 
on the free will assumption` seems to be taken as transparent and unproblematic. The 
literature on the problem of free will characterizes the problem as a pressing one on the 
grounds that what is at stake is the justification of our common practice of holding people 
responsible: if we cannot assume that people are free agents, we cannot justify our practice 
of holding them responsible as agents and for their conduct. At exactly this point it is left 
unexplained what the procedure of justification itself involves. It seems to be taken as 
intuitively clear. 
I suspect, however, that the issue of justification here is much less unproblematic and 
transparent than is commonly assumed. There are at least two considerations that support my 
suspicion. First, there are different kinds of justification. As there is no need to elaborate 
here, I shall mention, as an example, just two most obvious kinds: an epistemic justification 
and a moral justification. The employment of each requires different logic. My point here is 
that if there are different kinds of justification, governed by different logic, then we need to 
be clear about the inner workings of the governing logic as it applies to each different kind. 
Second, as mentioned above, the notion of `holding morally responsible` has several 
readings. Each of these readings refers to a different practice. It is reasonable to expect that 
different practices might differ also with respect to the exact nature of the justification 
requirement that applies to each of them. It might, and it will, turn out that not all of the 
practices picked up by the notion of `holding morally responsible` stand in need of the 
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justification grounded in the free will assumption (although they might stand in need of some 
other kind of justification).  
Now, of course, to be able to recognize which practice stands in such a need and which 
doesn`t, we have to be clear about what must be the case for something to achieve the status 
of being morally justified. However, what I mean here by being `clear about what must be 
the case` is not being clear about any particular details (that are different in different cases) 
whose presence or absence will determine whether that something (a conduct) is morally 
justifiable. What I mean by the phrase is, again, the clarity about the underlying logic that is 
employed to process the particular details and generate a verdict. Only when we are clear 
about the underlying logic shall we find ourselves in a position to distinguish those holdings 
that are morally justifiable only under the free will assumption from those that are in no need 
for the assumption. And I don`t think we have this clarity about the underlying logic.  
So, what is that underlying logic that governs our inquiry into whether a particular 
exercise of holding another responsible is morally justified? I will claim and (later) argue 
that what we are intuitively looking for when evaluating the moral justifiability of a conduct 
is whether fairness (in some morally significant sense) has been preserved. At this point, 
however, I will just rely on my reader`s intuitive grasp of the notion of `fairness` and ask – 
about any particular kind of practice of holding responsible – whether or not it stands in need 
of moral justification, i.e. whether or not it is about fairness. If a particular kind of practice 
turns out to be about fairness, I shall assume it calls for the free will assumption.  
I concede that assuming so might be seen as somewhat unwarranted here. It might be 
seen as such to the extent to which it turns on a cluster of implicit assumptions, such as: 
holding morally responsible relates primarily to wrongdoings; holding morally responsible 
essentially involves the imposition of pain on a wrongdoer; imposing pain on a wrongdoer 
stands in need of moral justification; imposing pain for a wrongdoing is morally justifiable 
– that is, fair – only if the wrongdoer could have done otherwise, that is, only if he has free 
will. I believe the assumptions do not need to be discussed individually and explicitly here. 
It suffices if the reader agrees – as she will, I believe - with a strong moral intuition that it is 
unfair to punish a wrongdoer who lacks free will. 
 
4.3  Holding morally responsible 
Talk of `holding morally responsible` is ambiguous on a few levels. Let me first deal with 
two issues of less importance which, nevertheless, could, if left unidentified, obscure those 
aspects of the notion of ` holding morally responsible` that are the actual target of my analysis 
here.  
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4.3.1  Holding vs attributing 
First, I wish to explicitly distinguish holding a person morally responsible (for a conduct) 
from attributing moral responsibility (for a conduct) to a person. Holding a person morally 
responsible is – in a sense explicated below – a richer act than just attributing moral 
responsibility to her. The former implies the latter but not vice versa. Attributions of moral 
responsibility are possible without being accompanied by holdings (an unexpressed 
identification of a culprit behind a morally reprehensible action, for instance) and often it 
would be unintuitive to perform holdings at all (in case of non-agents responsible for 
something) while attributing. Attributions of responsibility don`t call for the free will 
assumption for reasons elaborated on below when Strawson`s concepts of reactive attitudes 
and objective stance are discussed. Here it suffices to notice that with attributions of moral 
responsibility for a conduct we find ourselves on the territory of epistemic justifications and 
not on that of moral justifications. And while the moral justifications have, as mentioned 
above, something to do essentially with fairness, the epistemic ones are essentially related to 
truth. In other words, with attributions we don`t ask whether they are fair but whether they 
are correct.  
4.3.2  Moral vs non-moral responsibility 
Second, there are holdings responsible which are not morally loaded. A person can be held 
responsible in the sense of being placed `in charge` of something, which is a kind of holding 
responsible that is not morally loaded (at least not directly). We commonly say things like: 
`The person responsible for our computer system is John Smith`; or ask: `Who is responsible 
for the promotion and advertising in this firm?`. In the two sentences above, being 
`responsible` means being `in charge` (with all related duties and obligations). Here too, the 
usage of `responsibility` carries no moral significance, or, at least, no direct moral 
significance.  
The qualification `direct` is meant to pre-empt a possible objection: Surely, John 
Smith, who is responsible for the computer system can be held responsible, i.e. blamed or 
praised for malfunctioning or smooth performance respectively of the computer system. 
John Smith is – in virtue of him being responsible for the computer system – open to attitudes 
of blaming and praising, which indicates that this kind of responsibility is morally 
significant. To answer the objection, we need to distinguish between duties and obligations 
that are about moral rights and wrongs and those that aren`t. Holding a person morally 
responsible is, among other things, a binding act, i.e. an act that imposes a duty or obligation 
to behave in a morally right way. Holding a person responsible for a computer system is also 
a binding act; here too we impose a duty or an obligation onto a person. The difference here 
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is that in the case of holding a person morally responsible the duty and obligation we impose 
onto her has to do essentially with moral rights and wrongs while in the case of holding one 
responsible for a computer system the duties and obligations have to do essentially with the 
performance of the system. Clearly, the performance of a computer system is something that 
is subject to essentially non-moral criteria. It is about being fast, reliable, accessible, secure, 
virus-free, etc. Responsibility for a computer system is related to outcomes in a non-moral 
domain, while moral responsibility is related to outcomes in the moral domain. Thus, a 
person responsible for a computer system can be praised as someone excelling at the 
fulfilment of her responsibilities on the grounds of the system running flawlessly. All this 
despite the fact that the computer system itself is used by the military of a tyrannical state to 
help wage a genocidal war onto a peaceful country, and our computer system manager is 
fully aware of this fact.  
Of course, the fact of being responsible for a computer system doesn`t mean that one 
cannot be held morally responsible in connection with that computer system. To the extent 
to which the computer system affects other people`s wellbeing, it can be used to bring about 
morally significant effects. And for those morally significant effects the manager of the 
system is to be held morally responsible. The above-mentioned case of the computer system 
being used for waging an illegal war with full awareness of the manager of that system is a 
good example. And a war crime tribunal will not hesitate to hold the manager morally 
responsible and punish accordingly. A less extreme example would be one of a malicious 
manager of the computer system who dislikes his colleagues and intentionally bugs the 
system to annoy them. Here, in this less extreme case, two things might get conflated: the 
manager will be held non-morally responsible for the poor performance of the system but 
also morally responsible for intentional malevolence towards others. Yet, the two kinds of 
responsibility shouldn`t be conflated. Holding someone responsible for helping to wage an 
illegal war or for intentional malevolence towards her colleagues through bugging their 
computers is clearly different from holding someone responsible in the sense of placing them 
`in charge` of something. The former belongs to the class of reactive attitudes and shall be 
discussed in more detail below.  
Now, does holding responsible in the latter sense call for the free will assumption? I 
don`t think it does. Holding responsible in the sense of placing a person in charge of 
something (with all the duties and obligations that come with it) is placing them in a certain 
causal relation to that something. It amounts to imposing on them the role of acting as a cause 
of a (desirable) performance of that something. We impose these causal roles on people for 
practical purposes. For instance, the level of efficiency and reliability of something`s 
performance will depend on the existence and performance of its cause(s), i.e. on the 
existence of the manager (in charge) and his performance. Systems without managers or with 
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poor managers perform much worse than systems with good managers. In case of poor 
performance or malfunctioning of the system the existence and identification of the person 
in charge will often allow for fast and effective fixing of the problem. The person in charge 
is, typically, well positioned to understand and access the system she is in charge of, which 
makes her the person to call upon if the system needs to be fixed, its performance improved 
or an explanation related to it is required. 
It might be conceded that holding responsible in the sense of placing in charge doesn`t 
stand in need of the justification grounded in the free will assumption. At this point, we might 
want to know whether this kind of holding responsible stands in need of any justification at 
all. I think it does. The kind of justification called for here will be some version of a simple 
epistemic justification. Consider the following scenario:  
 
You are a manager of a big company. One of your numerous responsibilities is to choose and 
place people in charge of various departments. There are many departments and, 
consequently, many people to choose and place in charge. No wonder that you are sometimes 
unsure who is in charge of which department. This time your memory seems to have failed 
you with respect to who the person responsible for the computer system in your company is. 
You ask yourself:  Is John Smith the person I am holding responsible for the (performance 
of the) computer system?  
 
I think the context of this little scenario makes it clear that what the question really asks is: 
is John Smith the person (I placed) in charge of the computer system? Now, the answer given 
to the question will depend on whether it is true or not that John Smith has been placed in 
charge of the computer system. The answer will be affirmative in case the identity of the 
person in charge is John Smith, negative if it is someone else. Nothing else is needed, that is, 
it doesn`t need to be established whether any holding of John Smith to moral oughts has 
occured. The absence of a holding to moral oughts implies that we don`t enter the territory 
of fairness with this kind of holding responsible.132  
4.3.3  Reactive attitudes vs objective attitudes 
 
132 I admit that the distinction between holding responsible in the sense of placing in charge and in the 
sense of holding to moral oughts is a bit slippery. The reason is that the two senses rarely, if at all, 
come apart in real life situations. Placing someone in charge opens that someone to being held to 
moral oughts. And it is, perhaps, inevitable that sooner or later the holding to moral oughts will – in 
some form, weaker or stronger – take place. The whole issue gets complicated by the fact that placing 
someone in charge involves binding or holding of sorts. However, this binding or holding is not to 
moral oughts but just to oughts related to the performance of whatever it is that the person has been 
placed in charge of. This binding or holding to non-moral oughts together with the fact that the two 
senses rarely come apart in real life situation is what somewhat obscures the distinction.  
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We have distinguished holdings from attributions, and morally loaded holdings from those 
holdings that are not thus loaded. We are interested in morally loaded holdings. Here another 
important distinction needs to be made. We can hold someone responsible for her conduct 
or hold her responsible in the sense of regarding her as a responsible agent.  The distinction 
lies at the heart of the argument that Strawson presents in his seminal article `Freedom and 
Resentment`.133  
Holding someone responsible in the sense of regarding her as a responsible agent is a 
stance enabling us to engage with her as a capacitated agent. It is a broad psychological 
attitude towards another which shapes our expectations and presumptive interpretations, and 
leaves us predisposed to certain reactions and interactions. Strawson calls the reactions and 
interactions that we are predisposed to when acting from within this stance `reactive 
attitudes`. This stance is a default attitude we have towards others in ordinary personal 
relationships.134 It is a default attitude in a deep psychological sense. This attitude allows us 
to get immersed in rich interpersonal relationship by regarding others as capable of the same 
immersion.  I will follow Coleen Macnamara in calling this kind of holding responsible the 
`participant stance`.135  
The participant stance is to be distinguished from the objective stance.136 The objective 
stance is a stance that we take towards people who are deficient in some relevant agential 
way, or generally towards non-human animals and inanimate objects. We can also take this 
stance towards people in institutional or theoretical contexts where they are treated as objects 
or abstractions. The expectations, interpretations, reactions and interactions that the objective 
stance predisposes us towards are importantly different from those associated with the 
participant stance. The reactive attitudes – that is, the attitudes associated with the participant 
stance – are essentially emotional. They are, for instance, ` resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, 
anger, and the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to feel reciprocally for 
each other`.137 The participant stance assumes a robust agency on the part of the target of the 
stance. The objective attitudes – the ones associated with the objective stance – are not 
emotional in an essential way even though they may be ` emotionally toned in many ways`.138 
The objective attitude ` may include repulsion or fear, it may include pity or even love, though 
 
133 Peter F. Strawson, `Freedom and Resentment`, in John M. Fisher and Mark Ravizza (eds), 
Perspectives on moral responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.45-66. 
134 Ibid., p.55. 
135 See Coleen Macnamara, `Holding others responsible`, Philosophical Studies, 152, no. 1 (2011), 
pp.81-102 (p.82).  
136 Strawson doesn`t employ the notion of `stance` to draw the distinction. Instead he talks about the 
`attitude` (of participation). The attitude of participation can be, in some cases, suspended and replaced 
by the objective attitude. 
137 Strawson, `Freedom and Resentment`, p.52 
138 Ibid. 
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not all kinds of love`.139 Say, you have found a baby seagull that had fallen from the roof. 
Apparently, it has been abandoned by its parents and can`t fly yet. Your stance towards the 
baby seagull will be objective and yet ` emotionally toned`. You might suffer from some kind 
of phobia regarding birds, therefore, you might feel repulsion. You might think the bird is ill 
and fear that it could infect you if it touches you. You might be struck by the helplessness of 
the poor creature and feel pity for it. Consequently, you might take it home, care for it and, 
by the course of time, come to love it as your pet. However, your stance towards the seagull 
will lack certain dimensions (typical for the participant stance) because of the absence of a 
robust agency on the part of the seagull. 
For our purposes, the key difference between the reactive attitudes and the objective 
attitudes is that some of the former are morally loaded while none of the latter ever are. 
Accepting another`s promise, offering her confidences or falling in love with her are 
examples of robust reactive attitudes that are not morally loaded, while feeling resentment, 
indignation, gratitude or forgiveness for someone are examples of reactive attitudes that are 
morally loaded. The objective attitudes are never morally loaded because through them we 
attribute a responsibility that is of an explanatory and/or causal kind, or is a mere grading.140 
Thus, the objective stance and the associated objective attitudes shall be (together with 
holdings responsible in the sense of placing someone in charge of something) put aside as 
holdings responsible that are, for our purposes here, irrelevant because they are not morally 
loaded. At this point, the reader will have already understood that not being morally loaded 
implies having nothing to do with fairness, thus not calling for the free will assumption. 
4.4  Reactive attitudes: entering the moral territory of fairness 
What we are then left with – when attempting to disambiguate the notion of `holding morally 
responsible` - is the participant stance and the related reactive attitudes. Our actual target 
here are, ultimately, the reactive attitudes. The participant stance, being a stance, is merely a 
dispositional state. It is structurally rich but essentially inert. From without the participant 
stance we take or regard others as responsible but this taking and/or regarding is 
behaviourally unreactive. Adopting the participant stance, we don`t really do anything to the 
other; we don`t reach towards the other. And it is this absence of reaching towards the other 
that is incompatible with holding the other to any moral oughts.141 Also, and perhaps more 
 
139 Ibid. 
140 Attributing responsibility as grading is a distinction made by J. J. C. Smart in his “Free Will, Praise 
and Blame”, Mind, 70, no. 279 (1961), pp.291–306. Grading is an attitude towards another involving 
an attribution of responsibility which assesses another against her own evaluative standpoint, her 
practical identity, and what they `stand for`. It doesn`t involve attributions of moral responsibility. 
141 This point will be elaborated on below when the distinction between holding responsible as deep 
moral appraisal and holding responsible as holding accountable is introduced and discussed.  
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importantly, the essential inertness of the participant stance means that fairness – should it 
be raised as an issue at all – stays unaffected. And if this is the case then we can safely 
conclude that the practice of adopting the participant stance doesn`t call for a theoretical 
justification grounded in the free will assumption.  
Let me briefly address a possible objection to this conclusion: The participant stance 
is a stance of regarding another as a responsible agent. And it seems reasonable to insist that 
regarding someone as a responsible agent entails regarding her as an agent that possesses 
free will. That`s what majority of philosopher working on the problem of free will think 
anyway. Thus, it looks like the participant stance does call for the free will assumption after 
all. And if that is the case then the reactive attitudes will stand in need of this assumption 
too, as they are intelligible only against the background of the participant stance. Two things 
can be put forward to counter the objection.  
First, the fact (if it is agreed to be a fact) that regarding someone as a responsible agent 
entails regarding her as an agent that possesses free will doesn`t call for a theoretical 
justification grounded in the free will assumption exactly because it already is, as a matter of 
fact, entailed in the participant stance. The participant stance doesn`t call for the free will 
assumption not because it doesn`t need the assumption but because the assumption is already 
there. The status of the assumption is pre-theoretical in the sense that its being there is not a 
result of theorizing but of some other, non-theoretical processes.  
Second, there is an influential and coherent account of responsible agency that is 
independent of the free will assumption. The account has been formulated by Harry Frankfurt 
in his `Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility`.142 Frankfurt`s argument turns on a 
thought experiment designed to show that the moral responsibility of an agent is not 
diminished by a lack of alternatives. If we define free will in terms of the availability of 
alternatives, as most philosophers do, we can, countering the objection, appeal to Frankfurt 
and claim that others are to be treated as responsible agents even if they possess no free will.  
Thus, a Strawsonian has a range of plausible theoretical options to defend her claim 
that the participant stance (and the related reactive attitudes) do not call for a theoretical 
justification grounded in the free will assumption.   
4.4.1  Reactive attitudes and the free will assumption 
It is only with the reactive attitudes that we do something to the others, that we reach to them. 
And it is only with the reactive attitudes (not with all of them though) that we hold others 
responsible in the sense of holding them to moral oughts. Have we then finally identified the 
 
142 Harry G. Frankfurt, `Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility`, The Journal of Philosophy, 
66, no. 23 (1969), pp.829-839. 
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kind of holding responsible that is sensitive to the requirement of fairness and that, as such, 
calls for the free will assumption?  
Strawson, who introduced the concept of reactive attitudes in his `Freedom and 
Resentment`, famously argues that it doesn`t. Let me briefly recap Strawson`s position. 
Strawson attacks the widely shared assumption that holding persons responsible rests upon 
a theoretical judgement of their being responsible. Strawson takes as uncontroversial that 
being responsible presupposes having free will. Thus, his attack is to be understood as 
directed against the assumption that holding persons responsible rests upon a theoretical 
judgement of their having free will (or being free agents in some sufficiently robust sense). 
Strawson claims that we find the problem of free will to be a pressing issue only because we 
have over-intellectualized the issue of moral responsibility. The over-intellectualization 
consists in assuming that the rationality of our practice of holding another responsible 
depends upon a judgement that the person held responsible has satisfied a set of objective 
requirements, where having free will is, typically, taken to be one of the objective 
requirements. Strawson argues, however, that our practice of holding others responsible 
doesn`t depend on any such theoretical judgement. Our practice of holding others 
responsible, as he puts it, `neither calls for nor permits, an external `rational` justification`.143 
The argument behind this claim is, roughly, that the practice of holding others 
responsible is essential to and constitutive of our social interactions. It cannot be given up 
without giving up what we are as social beings. Our psychological and social constitution is 
such that it is impossible for us to divest ourselves of this practice. Moreover, even if it was 
possible to suspend our reactive attitudes (where some of these reactive attitudes are forms 
of holding others morally responsible) and assume permanently the objective stance (and 
related attitudes), it would still remain rather doubtful that rationality could ever justify such 
a profound `reformatting` of human nature. Therefore, Strawson concludes, it is pointless to 
theorize about free will in relation to the issue of the justifiability of the practice of holding 
responsible. It is pointless because the practice – even if it needed any justification - is too 
fundamental to be susceptible to the justifying force of rationality. 
4.5  Reactive attitudes and the free will assumption: contra Strawson 
If Strawson is right we could and should dismiss all reactive attitudes - and with them the 
remaining kind of holding morally responsible – as standing in no need of a justification 
grounded in the free will assumption.144 I believe, however, that Strawson is only partly right. 
 
143 Strawson, `Freedom and Resentment`, p.62. 
144 This is, strictly speaking, not what Strawson is saying. Strawson could be very plausibly taken as 
saying the exact opposite: The free will assumption cannot be given up exactly because it comes part 
and parcel with the participant stance and reactive attitudes, which is something that we are unable to 
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More specifically, I want to claim that some reactive attitudes – and with them a certain kind 
of holding morally responsible, (a), can be given up, (b), require justification that is grounded 
in, among others, the free will assumption. Arguing towards the claim, I will rely heavily on 
a distinction made by Coleen Macnamara in her `Holding others responsible`.145  
4.5.1  Holding responsible as deep moral appraisal (HRDMA) vs holding responsible 
as holding accountable (HRHA) 
Macnamara notices that contemporary theorizing about the concept of holding responsible 
is plagued by quite a few unresolved questions. Does holding responsible involve both 
sanctioning behaviour and praise, or sanctioning behaviour only? If it is both, then why does 
nearly all the discussion revolve around sanctioning behaviour, and very rarely around 
praise, as examples of holding responsible? What explains this conspicuous asymmetry? 
What is the relation between holding a person responsible as an agent and holding her 
responsible for her actions? What is the relation between holding someone responsible and 
the participant stance? Are the two equivalent, different, one part of the other? What is the 
status of unexpressed reactive attitudes and normative expectations? Do they both count as 
holdings responsible?  
Macnamara argues that the questions keep popping up because we lack certain crucial 
distinctions. Once the distinctions are made, the questions can be answered and put to rest. 
The distinction that I wish to make use of here concerns holdings morally responsible for a 
particular piece of conduct. That is, the distinction concerns the morally loaded reactive 
attitudes.  
Macnamara distinguishes between holding responsible as deep moral appraisal 
(HRDMA) and holding responsible as holding accountable (HRHA). Both faces of holding 
responsible are important in their own right. They often come merged in a single act of 
holding another responsible, yet they should not be conflated.  
(HRDMA) are essentially psychological reactions to morally significant conduct of 
others. `We feel a reaction to someone`s action; we express a reaction`.146 I despise my 
neighbour for cheating on his wife: `You`ve got kids, man. Stop thinking with your private 
member!`; I disapprove of my friend for driving a big SUV instead of a small and more 
environmentally friendly car: `You don`t seem to have heard about global warming, mate, 
 
suspend permanently. The `cannot` in `cannot be given up` is not a normative one but a modal one: it 
is a `cannot-because-impossible` kind of `cannot`. However, once it has been established that 
something cannot be altered it makes any attempts to justify alternations blatantly pointless. That 
which cannot be altered stands in no need of justification regarding its conceivable alternations.  
145 Coleen Macnamara, `Holding others responsible`, Philosophical Studies, 152, no. 1 (2011), pp.81-
102. 
146 Macnamara, `Holding others responsible`, p.89. 
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do you?`; I praise my daughter for giving up her seat to an elderly lady: `That was a very 
kind thing to do`.  
However, we often do, or wish to do, more in the act of holding another responsible 
than just emotionally react to another`s morally significant conduct. We hold others 
responsible in the sense of holding them accountable (HRHA). Macnamara gives an example 
of a worker who is having a difficult time at work.147 Imagine the worker is your sister. The 
boss distributes the workload unfairly and your sister has to do more than others. Moreover, 
she is the one who always gets blamed by her boss when things go wrong and never gets any 
credit when success comes her way. She is afraid that things might get worse if she openly 
expresses her resentment towards her boss, so she keeps it bottled up inside. This unfair 
treatment of your sister drives you crazy. You are trying to convince her that she needs to 
stand up for herself: `Don`t be so damn passive! You can`t tolerate this any longer! Stand up 
for yourself! Hold him responsible!`.  
Macnamara argues that your remark would make no sense if moral appraisal was all 
we do when holding others responsible. `Why would you urge your sister to do something 
she is already doing?`, Macnamara asks.148 Your sister already resents her boss which is an 
act of moral appraisal. And it is an act of moral appraisal even if it stays unexpressed. 
However, it all starts making sense once we understand the `holding responsible` here as 
referring to accountability. Your sister is being urged to hold her boss accountable.    
But what exactly is it to hold someone accountable? Macnamara argues that the best 
way to grasp this notion of holding responsible is via `the metaphor of holding someone to 
the oughts that bind them`, where the notion of holding `is best understood on the model of 
enforcement`.149  It works like this. When holding someone accountable what we do is 
`perform a communicative act with a distinct internal aim`.150 The internal aim is to: 
[I]nduce what we might call first-personal practical uptake of the ought-violation in the one 
we`re holding accountable - to get the wrongdoer to acknowledge her wrongdoing, feel 
remorse, apologize, make amends, and commit to doing right in the future.151 
To achieve this internal aim, we impose burdens - `the pain of punishment, the sting of 
reproof`.152  Macnamara illustrates with the following example: 
[I]magine that you are an avid environmentalist taking a walk with your friend. As you stroll 
along, your friend takes out a candy bar, unwraps it, and blithely throws the wrapper on the 
ground. Appalled, you lay into him; you reprove him. Your reproof is, I want to argue, a 
distinctive kind of act. It is a communicative act that aims at inducing in your friend first-
personal practical uptake of his wrongdoing. The point of your speech act is to get your friend 
 
147 Ibid., pp.89-90. 
148 Ibid., p. 90. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
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to recognize that he has done wrong, to feel remorse, to apologize and make amends, and to 
commit to not littering in the future. And it does this, not by merely pointing to or highlighting 
the ought-violation—displaying it or calling his attention to it. It does so, instead, by imposing 
burdens on your friend—in this case, the sting of the rebuke.153 
 
Now, I would like to believe that, at this point, the distinction between (HRDMA) and 
(HRHA) is sufficiently clear. (HRDMA) is essentially an emotional reaction to a morally 
significant conduct. (HRDMA) can come both expressed and unexpressed because appraisals 
are accomplished even when unexpressed. (HRDMA) applies not only to blameworthy 
conduct but to praiseworthy conduct too because appraisals commonly target morally right 
actions, not only the wrong ones. (HRHA) goes beyond mere appraisal. It aims to bring about 
a change in the one held responsible, namely, `first-personal practical uptake of his 
wrongdoing`. The uptake is enforced through imposing burdens. (HRHA) must be expressed 
in some way to achieve a successful uptake, and it applies to blameworthy conduct only. 
(HRHA) applies to blameworthy conduct only because unlike the praiseworthy conduct the 
blameworthy conduct reveals a moral deficit on the part of the agent. And aiming to bring 
about a practical uptake presupposes such a deficit has been revealed. Thus, we can clearly 
see at this point how distinguishing (HRDMA) – that is, holding responsible as a deep moral 
appraisal – from (HRHA) – that is, holding responsible as holding accountable – helps 
answer some of the questions that Macnamara identifies as crucial if progress is to be made. 
Does holding responsible involve both sanctioning behaviour and praise, or sanctioning 
behaviour only? It involves both when we engage in (HRDMA), and sanctioning behaviour 
only if we engage in (HRHA). What is the status of unexpressed reactive attitudes and 
normative expectations? Do they both count as holdings responsible? The two count as 
instances of holding responsible in (HRDMA) but not in (HRHA).  
There is a little complication here. The complication stems from two facts.  
Fact 1: (HRDMA) and (HRHA) get commonly merged in a single instance of a 
reactive attitude, therefore the distinction might feel somewhat artificial. Thus, when you 
rebuke your friend for littering the environment you not only attempt to induce the first-
person practical uptake (i.e. to hold your friend accountable) but you express your 
indignation too. However, the two faces of holding responsible – (HRDMA) and (HRHA) – 
come apart in some ordinary situations: when praising and when keeping the appraisal 
unexpressed.  
Fact 2 is slightly more serious: (HRHA) is, among others, a communicative act. A 
communicative act has an aim that is internal or essential to it and an aim that is external to 
it, imposed by the speaker. The two shouldn`t be confused: After two pints of strong ale, a 
friend of yours is getting into his car intending to drive home. `Are you mad?`, you ask. The 
 
153 Ibid., pp.90-91. 
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question `Are you mad?` is a token of a communicative act whose internal aim is to inquire. 
The associated external aim, however, is different. You, the speaker, are not trying to extract 
an information from your friend about the state of his mental health. You aim to make your 
friend realize that driving when drunk is wrong. In other words, it only looks like you are 
asking a question. What you really do is trying to prevent your friend from driving. How 
does this relate to (HRHA)?  There will be instances of holding responsible that will look 
like (HRHA) while being a mere (HRDMA). You make a friend of yours privy to an 
embarrassing detail about your family life. The friend, however, brakes the promise of 
keeping that detail strictly to himself and tells an acquaintance of yours about it. Upon 
learning about your friend`s betrayal, you pick up your phone and call him. As soon as your 
friend answers your call you start shouting: `You little miserable moron! How could you do 
that?! You make me sick!`. Surely, this is something that sounds like a rebuke! As such it 
might result in the first-personal practical uptake of the wrongdoing, which is something that 
suggests that what we have here is an instance of (HRHA). However, (HRHA) is a 
communicative act and as such has both internal and external aims that we associate with 
communicative acts. A communicative act can be internally a rebuke and externally a mere 
expression of resentment. Expressing resentment is what you have aimed to do, and you gave 
it the form of rebuke. And you might have even, accidentally, accomplished the first-personal 
uptake, which could be taken as implying that a (HRHA) has taken place. But that`s not what 
you intended. In other words, you performed (HRDMA) using a communicative form 
normally associated with (HRHA).  
We can see that these little complications can be dealt with and shouldn`t, therefore, 
prevent us from fully appreciating the theoretical utility of distinguishing the appraisal face 
of holding responsible (HRDMA) from the accountability one (HRHA).   
Now, let me get back to the motivation behind my introduction of Macnamara`s 
distinction. Above, I promised to argue that some holdings – contrary to what Strawson 
claims – can, (a), be given up and, (b), stand in need of a theoretical justification grounded 
in the free will assumption. So how will the distinction help me to argue for (a) and (b)? It 
will, once suitably developed. Before doing so, let me briefly examine how (HRDMA) and 
(HRHA) relate, prior to the further development, to the free will assumption.  
4.5.2  (HRDMA), (HRHA), and the free will assumption 
Above, I conceded that it is right to say that at least some reactive attitudes cannot be given 
up (permanently). As such, they stand in no need of a theoretical justification that depends 
on the free will assumption. I take it as uncontroversial that the reactive attitudes associated 
with (HRDMA) are a subset of such reactive attitudes. Being essentially emotional 
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responses, these reactive attitudes are constitutive of what we are as human beings and how 
we relate to others. They cannot be permanently suspended without causing serious 
disruption on the level of individual psyche and on the level of social interaction. This fact 
makes any concerns about their justification pointless. In this sense, the reactive attitudes 
associated with (HRDMA) stand in no need of a theoretical justification grounded in the free 
will assumption.  
As for the reactive attitudes associated with (HRHA), things are, at least on the face 
of it, different only partially. These reactive attitudes can be given up, but it looks like they 
don`t – as don`t those associated with (HRDMA) - really call for any theoretical justification 
grounded in the free will assumption. As for the suspendability of these reactive attitudes – 
the ones associated with (HRHA) - the reader will recall the scenario in which their sister 
keeps her resentment bottled up inside never holding her boss accountable for his unfair 
treatment of her. The sister feels resentment towards her boss, that is, she holds her boss 
responsible in the sense of (HRDMA). She, however, refrains from holding her boss 
responsible in the sense of (HRHA), and it is far from inconceivable that she will be able to 
do so for a long time or even for the rest of her life.  
A little complication should be noticed here. We might feel that keeping the 
resentment towards one`s boss bottled up inside is not really a sustainable situation. One 
doesn`t need to have a degree in psychology to know that supressing one`s emotions is not 
only mentally unhealthy but unsustainable in the long run. That`s a fact about our 
psychological constitution. Isn`t this exactly what Strawson is talking about? It is, and your 
sister should be advised accordingly. She should let her resentment out. It could be done in 
some direct or indirect way. An example of an indirect way would be her buying a punch 
bag and relieving her anger and resentment by violently assaulting the bag. An example of 
direct way would be to express her resentment addressing her boss. Notice, that the direct 
way doesn`t imply a performance of (HRHA). It isn`t implied even if her expression achieves 
the first-personal practical uptake by her boss of his wrongdoing; and it doesn`t do so for 
reasons discussed above.  
We can safely conclude that holdings accountable can be suspended or given up for 
prolonged periods of time or even for good. 
4.5.2.1  Jm-justification vs jf-justification 
What about (HRHA) and a theoretical justification grounded in the free-will assumption? Is 
one needed? It depends. If we stick with Macnamara`s understanding of (HRHA) then it 
might turn out that no such theoretical justification is needed. The reader will have 
remembered that, according to Macnamara, the aim of (HRHA) is to induce the first-personal 
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practical uptake of one`s wrongdoing. This is done by triggering an enforcement mechanism: 
a sanctioning behaviour or placing burdens onto the one guilty of the wrongdoing. 
Depending on various factors, the uptake will be achieved, partially achieved or not achieved 
at all.  
Now, the enforcement mechanism does the enforcing by causing pain154. And, of course, 
causing pain to a sentient being calls for a justification. But what sort of justification? Here 
a distinction needs to be made between: 
 
jm–justifications, which are justifications related to the moral domain, 
and 
jf–justifications, which are justifications related to the functional domain. 
 
Then we get the following conditionals: 
 
i) A is jm-justified to cause pain to B only if B deserves it/it is fair155 towards B. 
ii) A is jf-justified to cause pain to B only if it, in some practical or functional 
sense, benefits B, and/or the community. 
 
A murderer deserves the pain of imprisonment, and the judge is jm-justified to impose it on 
the murderer. A patient will benefit from a dental treatment, and the dentist is jf-justified to 
impose on the patient the pain associated with the treatment. I take it as immediately obvious 
that jf-justifications do not require grounding in the free will assumption. A dentist is jf-
justified to cause the pain associated with the beneficial treatment even if the patient lacks 
any free will.  
The issue of free will enters the stage only with jm-justifications: it doesn`t feel right 
to take the person who couldn`t have done otherwise as deserving the pain (of 
punishment).156 This last point is, among others, a reminder of a claim made above (p. 77) 
that moral justifications have something to do essentially with fairness. 
We have asked what sort of justification is required when imposing pain on others as 
part of (HRHA). On Macnamara`s understanding of what is involved in (HRHA), it looks 
like the sort of justification required is the jf-justification. You have expressed your 
 
154 The notion of pain is used here in a broad sense that covers both physical and psychological 
varieties of it. 
155 I will not distinguish between fairness and desert here, even though there are contexts where they 
behave semantically differently.  
156 That is not to say that jm-justifications require the free will assumption necessarily. There might 
be utilitarian readings of desert which will render jm-justifications free of the requirement. A murderer 
might deserve – under the utilitarian reading - his punishment because of the overall benefits it 
generates for him and society.  
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resentment or indignation in (HRDMA). You feel more is needed. The wrongdoer needs to 
be held accountable, that is: you aim at inducing the first personal uptake of the wrongdoing 
by causing pain. Notice that, on Macnamara`s understanding, you cause pain because it 
results in the uptake and not because the wrongdoer deserves it.157 That is a crucial point. If 
desert/fairness158 is not what motivates your (HRHA) then it can`t be that your (HRHA) 
stands in need of the jm-justification. Of course, this doesn`t, on its own, imply that it is the 
jf-justification that your (HRHA) stands in need of. For that to be true, we need to be able to 
read Macnamara`s notion of (HRHA) along functional lines, i.e. as referring to an act that is 
essentially motivated by generating practical benefits. This shouldn`t be too hard though. 
Why would one want to induce the first-personal practical uptake of a wrongdoing? Because, 
presumably, it is practically beneficial for the society if more – rather than less – people 
accomplish the uptake. Arguably, it is also beneficial for the wrongdoer herself as any such 
uptake will make her, morally speaking, a more mature person. Thus, it looks like once it is 
accepted that the essential aim of (HRHA) is to induce the uptake of wrongdoing, we find 
ourselves in the functional or practical territory where jf-justifications rule. And this kind of 
justification stands in no need of grounding in the free will assumption. This implies that 
(HRHA) – as understood by Macnamara - doesn`t require such grounding either.  
4.5.3  (HRHA) and the free will assumption: contra Macnamara 
Above, I promised that, once Macnamara`s account of (HRHA) is better understood, or just 
suitably corrected, it will turn out that our practice of holding another accountable actually 
does require grounding in the free will assumption. My strategy here is to show that in our 
practice of (HRHA) we are, as a matter of fact and contrary to Macnamara`s view, motivated 
by desert/fairness.159 Moreover, this motivation by desert/fairness is, I shall claim, essential 
to our practice of (HRHA), unlike trying to induce the uptake, which is, I will argue, merely 
contingent to the practice and playing a different role in it.  
I will ask the reader to consider two scenarios: a scenario in which the first personal 
uptakes are achievable via neurocognitive programming, a process that causes no discomfort, 
and a scenario in which the wrongdoer is, for some reason, incapable of performing the 
uptake. I shall call the scenarios the neurocognitive scenario and the incapacitated 
 
157 Macnamara doesn`t explicitly deny that one of the reasons you might have for inducing pain onto 
the wrongdoer could be that the wrongdoer deserves it. At the same time, nothing she says indicates 
that she would count desert as one of the reasons. Of course, there is a sense in which the target (the 
wrongdoer) of (HRHA) must have deserved your reactive attitude(s). The wrongdoer must have 
deserved it, minimally, in the sense of being the cause of the wrongdoing. 
158 See footnote 163. 
159 The phrase `motivated by desert` might sound somewhat ambiguous. I want it to be understood in 
the following way. When holding another accountable, one is motivated by desert if one seeks to give 
the person held accountable her dues. 
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wrongdoer respectively. The former scenario is meant to show that aiming to achieve the 
uptake is not a sufficient motivator behind our practice of holding others accountable. The 
latter is designed to answer the question whether the uptake is at least a necessary motivator 
of the practice. It will turn out that the uptake cannot be understood as a necessary motivator 
either. Yet, as it will become clear, the uptake plays an important role in the practice of 
(HRHA): it might be seen as a necessary condition of fair practice of (HRHA). This will 
clear the path towards claiming that the necessary motivator is desert/fairness. And, of 
course, if it is (preservation or restoration of) desert/fairness that motivates us in our 
treatment of a wrongdoer then that treatment calls for the jm-justification, i.e. the kind of 
justification that requires grounding in the free will assumption.   
4.5.3.1  The neurocognitive scenario 
Imagine that advances in neurocognitive programming make it possible to achieve the first-
personal uptake of one`s wrongdoing via brain manipulation of the wrongdoer. The 
procedure causes no discomfort whatsoever to the wrongdoer. It has no unpleasant side- or 
after- effects. As a matter of fact, it is not uncommon that the procedure is felt as mildly 
pleasant and relaxing. Also, undergoing the procedure will result in an above-average 
probability that the wrongdoer won`t resort to any similar kind of wrongdoing ever again.  
Now, welcome Brian to the story. Brian has committed a murder and is to be held 
responsible for the gruesome deed. Brian has already been subjected to a vast array of 
reactive attitudes – such as anger, resentment, indignation, etc. – via which various people 
held him responsible in the sense of deep moral appraisal (HRDMA) and, to some extent, 
also in the sense of accountability (HRHA).160 Now he finds himself in front of a judge and 
about to be held fully161 accountable (HRHA) for his crime.  
The reader will have remembered that according to Macnamara the aim of holding 
others accountable for their wrongdoing is to induce the uptake. We are successful in our 
 
160 Highly likely, Brian has already been subjected to reactive attitudes that involved holdings 
accountable. At least some of his friends and relatives, presumably, must have approached him with 
the aim of inducing the first personal uptake. Yet, I believe that Macnamara would agree that the 
uptake of something as serious as a murder requires a correspondingly serious enforcement 
mechanism to be employed. Thus, Brian is taken to a courtroom.  
161 Why do I talk about full accountability here? The logic of the scenario seems to put Macnamara`s 
notion of holding accountable under more conceptual stress that it might be able to withstand. The 
logic of the scenario gives rise to questions that Macnamara herself doesn`t ask and, of course, doesn`t 
answer. For instance: Should the force in the enforcement mechanism employed to achieve the uptake 
somehow reflect or correspond to the seriousness of the wrongdoing? If yes, why? This question will 
be, in a sense, answered below. For now, I will assume as intuitively obvious that the force of the 
enforcement mechanism that is at the core of holding others accountable should in some sense reflect 
or correspond to the moral seriousness of the wrongdoing. 
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holding another accountable if the uptake is achieved by the wrongdoer. The judge then 
approaches the case of the murder under the following assumptions: 
A1: My job here today is to hold Brian (fully) accountable for his crime. 
A2: To hold another (fully) accountable for their crime is to (successfully) induce the 
first- personal uptake of the wrongdoing. 
A3: The widely available procedure of neurocognitive programming offers 100% 
success rate in achieving the uptake.  
 
Constrained by the logic of the three assumptions, the judge sentences Brian to a session of 
neurocognitive programming designed to induce the uptake, and moves onto another case. 
Now, is it a happy ending? Does it feel right that a human being gets murdered and all 
that is deemed appropriate is, (a), to manipulate the murderer`s consciousness into (fully) 
realizing what a horrible crime he has done162 and, (b), making it – via the manipulation – 
improbable that the murderer will murder again? I will hope that majority of readers will join 
me in feeling that this wouldn`t be right. 
4.5.3.1.1  An objection 
I shall get ahead of my argument a bit and suggest that the verdict doesn`t feel right because 
Brian hasn`t got what he deserves. And what he deserves is pain in some form.163 I admit 
that I do not know how to argue for this claim apart from asking what else could explain the 
feeling. The question, however, invites the following objection: True, it doesn`t feel right to 
limit our response to Brian`s horrible crime to making him undergo the neurocognitive 
procedure. Pain in some form – and of a degree corresponding to the seriousness of his crime 
– needs to be imposed on Brian. However, it is not because Brian deserves the pain but 
because his suffering the pain works as a deterrent to other would-be murderers. 
The objection removes desert from the picture of holding accountable, (HRHA), and 
pushes it back into the functional domain. There, in the functional domain, it won`t call for 
a justification grounded in the free will assumption. To counter the objection, the 
neurocognitive scenario needs to be modified: Imagine that the would-be offenders in 
Brian`s community (or society as a whole) don`t, for some reason, get deterred by the pain 
 
162 Below, I will argue that there is a degree of pain that is intrinsic to achieving the uptake as such. 
Thus, those readers who will agree with me that, indeed, the uptake is always, to some degree, painful, 
might feel tempted to reply that it feels quite all right to limit the whole punishment to just 
manipulating Brian`s brain into realizing the uptake. Such a reply is fine with me as it is perfectly 
compatible with my target claim here that what we are ultimately looking for when evaluating the 
justness of a sanctioning behaviour is whether (the right degree of) pain has been imposed.    
163 This is not to say that inducing pain in some form is all that is to be done. There is no reason not 
to combine it with the neurocognitive session, for instance.  
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of punishment imposed on those who commit a crime and get caught. In Brian`s community, 
statistics and experiments have shown conclusively that no matter how severe the 
punishment is the crime rate stays unaffected. Various explanations for the unexpected fact 
are proposed: there is a neurological anomaly regarding the criminal mind that a criminal 
always and sincerely believes that she won`t be caught; people`s imaginations have been 
oversaturated by the violent images the media exposes them to, and, as a result, they are 
unable to relate to the pain of people they don`t know; or perhaps, it is not the violent images 
that make them incapable of relating to the pain that should deter them, but a common 
ingredient in processed food they eat every day that causes the incapacitation. Whatever the 
reason turns out to be, it is the case that in Brian`s community imposing pain is a zero 
deterrent.164  
Against the background of the modified scenario, I shall ask the same question I asked 
against the background of the original one: does it feel right that a human being gets 
murdered and all that is deemed appropriate is, (a), to manipulate the murderer`s 
consciousness into (fully) realizing what a horrible crime its bearer has committed and, (b), 
making it – via the manipulation – improbable that the murderer will murder again? Now, it 
can`t be answered: true, it doesn`t feel right but that feeling has nothing to do with desert 
and everything to do with the failure to establish or reaffirm a deterrent. Such an answer 
cannot be given because the modified scenario explicitly rules out the possibility that 
imposing pain as part of punishment can serve as a deterrent in Brian`s community. Thus, 
we are back to my claim that the verdict doesn`t feel right because that`s not what Brian 
deserves (or what is, in some sense, fair); and what he deserves is (corresponding) pain in 
some form. And once more I shall admit that although I do not know how to argue for the 
claim, I am, at the same time, unable to see what else could explain the feeling.  
I will conclude that the neurocognitive scenario shows that when holding others 
accountable, (HRHA), the aim of achieving the first-personal uptake of a wrongdoing cannot 
be what sufficiently (if at all) motivates the practice. The uptake, i.e. the goal of the practice, 
has been achieved and yet we find the verdict unsatisfactory. Something else or more is 
needed. At the same time, the scenario points towards desert/fairness165 as playing an 
 
164 This modification to the original neurocognitive scenario shouldn`t be seen as too fantastic. A 
deterrence effect of cruel punishments is rather questionable. For instance, the death penalty – which 
is a punishment that one would expect to be a strong deterrent – doesn`t seem to be such at all. 
Available data show conclusively that the death penalty doesn`t serve as a deterrent. See for instance 
John Lamperti, Does Capital Punishment Deter Murder? A Brief Look at the Evidence, 2010 < 
https://math.dartmouth.edu/~lamperti/my%20DP%20paper,%20current%20edit.htm> [accessed 17 
September 2019].  Lamperti concludes his survey and evaluation of the available evidence for 
deterrence with the following words: `[T]he data which now exist show no correlation between the 
existence of capital punishment and lower rates of capital crime`. 
165 The reader is asked to restrict her reading of `desert` to contexts where it relates to blameworthy 
conduct only. It is not clear that giving another what they deserve requires justification grounded in 
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important, perhaps even an essential, role as a motivator in the practice of (HRHA). And a 
motivation by desert calls for a justification that is grounded in the free will assumption. This 
transfers onto the whole practice of (HRHA) making it stand in need of a justification 
grounded in the free will assumption. 
We have established that achieving the uptake cannot be the sufficient motivator 
behind our practice of (HRHA). At the same time, it seems to be clear that achieving the 
uptake plays an important role in the practice. The question is what exactly the role is. Is it 
at least a necessary motivator? Is it perhaps necessary for the practice not as a motivator but 
in some other sense? The following scenario and its discussion are meant to answer these 
questions.  
4.5.3.2   The incapacitated wrongdoer 
Brian`s father happens to be a neuroscientist capable of manipulating psychological and 
emotional responses of people via neuro-programming. One of the things he is capable of is 
programming someone`s brain in such a way that the person permanently and irreversibly 
loses the capacity to achieve the first-personal practical uptake of a wrongdoing. Brian`s 
father is an educated man. He knows that the legal system in his society is explicitly grounded 
in Macnamara`s ethics. That is, he knows that the legal system takes punishment to be 
essentially and solely about achieving the uptake. Long-term prison sentences are agreed to 
be an efficient way of achieving the uptake. Despite Brian having committed a murder, his 
father still loves him and cannot come to terms with the idea of his son spending a decade or 
two behind bars. He devises a desperate plan. Via neuro-manipulation of his son`s brain he 
permanently and irreversibly deprives his son of the capacity to achieve the uptake. He also 
makes sure to `shut down` all the neural paths in Brian`s brain associated with violent 
behaviour making it extremely improbable that Brian would intentionally commit a violent 
crime ever again. The neuro-programming procedure has been recorded in full length, brain 
scans taken, to be used as evidence that Brian has been incapacitated regarding achievability 
of the uptake. In court, Brian`s father argues:  
 
`Your Honour, let`s take achieving A to be the only reason for doing B. It turns out that A is, 
as a matter of fact, unachievable. The unachievability of A removes, I claim, the only reason 
for doing B.  Applied to my son`s case: Our legal system takes achieving the first-personal 
practical uptake of a wrongdoing as the essential and sole, that is, the only, reason for 
imposing a punishment. This sole reason – inducing the uptake – is unachievable in the case 
 
the free will assumption in the context of praiseworthy conduct. My view is that giving one her dues 
in response to her praiseworthy conduct doesn`t stand in need of a justification grounded in the free 
will assumption. 
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of my son as evidenced by the neuro-programming procedure recording, brain scans and 
testimonies of my neuroscientific colleagues. Thus, there is no reason to punish my son.`  
 
There is a pause. The judge thinks about the argument. It occurs to him that it is unclear in 
what sense it is correct to claim that a reason for doing something is ` removed` or stops being 
there just because that something cannot be done. He soon stops worrying about this subtlety 
though. He realizes that what the argument of Brian`s father shows, at the very least, is that 
it would be totally pointless to punish Brian. And the judge would hate to be associated with 
pointless decisions. He lets Brian go free. 
Now, we don`t know enough about the society that Brian and the judge live in. The 
moral intuitions of its members might be such that they would not find anything ` out of tune` 
with the judge`s decision. If anything, perhaps, they would applaud the judge`s commitment 
to ground his decisions in sound reasoning. However, I am confident that at least some of 
my readers will find the judge`s decision somewhat troubling. Brian wasn`t incapacitated in 
any relevant sense at the time of the murder, or, at least, there is nothing in the scenario 
indicating so. He, let`s assume, intended, planned, committed and tried to cover a crime of 
murder. And it can`t feel right to let him go unpunished just because, at some point after the 
crime, he lost the capacity to achieve the uptake. Agreed? Unfortunately, there are issues that 
complicate the picture.  
It could be objected that how one feels about the verdict depends on what precisely 
(and how much) gets lost with the loss of the capacity to achieve the uptake. Let`s consider 
a case that might seem rather extreme at first. Imagine that together with losing the ability to 
achieve the uptake, Brian also loses, (a), the ability to feel any empathy whatsoever towards 
another sentient being and, (b), a related ability to understand that there is anything wrong 
with hurting someone. This shouldn`t be perceived as too fantastic and arbitrary a scenario. 
On the contrary, the psychology of the uptake seems to overlap substantially with the 
psychology of (a) and (b). The reader will recall that, according to Macnamara, to induce the 
uptake is `to get the wrongdoer to acknowledge her wrongdoing, feel remorse, apologize, 
make amends, and commit to doing right in the future`166. Thus, the person incapable of the 
uptake is incapable of acknowledging her wrongdoing, incapable of feeling remorse, 
incapable of apologizing and incapable of committing to doing right in the future. Of course, 
the person might still be able to pretend to acknowledge, feel, apologize and commit, but 
that is not what the uptake is meant to be. Now, aren`t the inability to acknowledge one`s 
wrongdoing, the inability to apologize and the inability to commit to doing right in the future 
all cases of (b)? And isn`t the inability to feel remorse a case of (a)?  They are, and we need 
 
166 Macnamara, `Holding others responsible`, p.90. 
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to adjust our understanding of Brian`s incapacitation accordingly: Brian is not only unable 
to achieve the uptake, he is, moreover and consequently, unable to comprehend any 
legitimacy of the punishment. He can`t but see it as an irrational and bizarre custom and 
himself as terribly unlucky to be subjected to it. How does it feel now when it comes to 
punishing Brian?  
I suspect that at this point the opinions will get divided. The issue here is not dissimilar 
to that concerning the moral agency of psychopaths. Due to their inability to feel empathy 
towards others, psychopaths seem to be unable to recognize that hurting others is wrong. 
This inability to recognize right from wrong makes them non-members of moral community. 
Consequently, the binding oughts of the community can`t reach them; i.e. they cannot be a 
target of holding accountable. Some philosophers find the conclusion troubling. T. M. 
Scanlon, for instance, argues that the lack of empathy doesn`t translate into an inability to 
recognize rights from wrongs.167 Gary Watson disagrees: `[A]nyone who is incapable of 
recognizing the interests of others as making valid claims on her is incapable of grasping and 
responding to moral requirements` and `no one who is morally incompetent in this way is fit 
to be held morally responsible`.168 Another dissenter here would, presumably, be John Rawls, 
who argues that `the duty of justice is owed to those [only] who are capable of a sense of 
justice`169, which seems to be something that psychopaths are incapable of. Some could insist 
that this `argument from psychopathy` doesn`t really bite here because it is different from 
Brian`s case in an important respect. A psychopath has always been a psychopath while Brian 
has become one only after the crime. And it seems, at least on the face of it, that his ability 
to recognize right from wrong at the time of the crime makes the case very different from 
that of someone who wasn`t able of such recognition at that time. These are intriguing issues. 
I shall, however, not venture into discussing them. They have been briefly mentioned to (a) 
show that the issue is far from clear and (b) to set a background against which the role of the 
uptake in the practice of (HRHA) can be clarified.  
4.5.3.3  The motivator: uptake vs fairness 
At various points, when discussing the scenarios, we asked whether a verdict felt right. The 
question is ambiguous in an important sense. Did it (or not) feel right because the scenario 
`removed` the motivator, or because it exposed a deficit in desert/fairness? Giving the former 
 
167 Thomas M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1998), ch.5. 
168 Gary Watson, `The Trouble with Psychopaths`, in R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel 
Freeman (eds), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon (Oxford: OUP, 
2011), pp.308-24 (p.309). 
169 John Rawls, `The Sense of Justice`, The Philosophical Review, 72, no. 3 (1963), pp.281-305 
(p.281). 
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as the answer would imply that the uptake is a necessary motivator while giving the latter as 
the answer would imply that although the uptake is not a necessary motivator, it still plays 
an important role of a necessary condition for desert/fairness in the practice of (HRHA).  
The question is a bit tricky as the two possible reasons for the verdict not feeling right 
could be seen as closely related. The relation is that punishing someone when the punishment 
cannot be motivated seems unfair. Thus, removing the motivator amounts to causing a deficit 
in fairness. This, of course, turns on the assumption that desert/fairness is what ultimately 
motivates our practice of (HRHA). This assumption is what I am arguing towards. It is, 
however, not what Macnamara seems to endorse. She takes the uptake to be not only a 
necessary motivator but the sufficient or ultimate one.  
Let`s have a look at the neurocognitive scenario again. In the scenario, we test 
Macnamara`s claim that the sufficient motivator behind our practice of (HRHA) is to achieve 
the uptake of a wrongdoing. I shall assume that the scenario has shown that we would wish 
to punish Brian even after the motivator (the uptake) has been removed. This implies that it 
must be something else that motivates our practice of (HRHA). I submit that what ultimately 
and sufficiently motivates us is (the normative force of) desert/fairness. However, as the 
incapacitated wrongdoer scenario shows, it won`t be that easy to dismiss Macnamara`s 
concept of the first-personal uptake and the role it plays in the practice of (HRHA). First, it 
seems obvious that often we really wish `to get the wrongdoer to acknowledge her 
wrongdoing, feel remorse, apologize, make amends, and commit to doing right in the 
future`170, i.e. it seems obvious that often what motivates us is to induce the uptake. Second, 
our moral intuition seems to lose its bearing when it comes to punishing a wrongdoer that is 
uncapable of the uptake. In other words, once `the uptake` is removed from the picture, it 
gets rather unclear whether a punishment is appropriate or not. This strongly suggests that 
the uptake plays an important role in the practice. What role though?  
 To answer this question, I shall propose and argue for the following claim: The uptake 
is not (even) a necessary motivator. A necessary (and, in fact, the sufficient) motivator is 
desert/fairness. The uptake is, at best, a necessary condition for desert/fairness to obtain or 
be preserved. In what follows, I shall employ the claim to answer all those questions that 
rose in connection with the scenarios. I hope to make the claim convincing via showing its 
explanatory force in answering the questions.  
Let me first deal with perhaps the most conspicuous inconsistency related to the claim. 
Towards the end of the previous paragraph, I concede that `often what motivates us is to 
induce the uptake`. Yet, a few sentences below, I claim that the uptake is not a (necessary) 
motivator at all. An easy reply to the perceived inconsistency would be that something being 
 
170 Macnamara, `Holding others responsible`, p.90. 
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the case often doesn`t translate into something being the case necessarily. This answer won`t 
do. It would be easy to think of scenarios where inducing the uptake is all we wish to do in 
response to someone`s wrongdoing. A wife reproaching her husband who has, once again, 
come home drunk. Surely, all171 she is after is inducing the uptake. Thus, while the uptake is 
perhaps not a necessary motivator for the practice of (HRHA) as a kind of holding 
responsible, it is, at the same time, hard to deny that often it is, in fact, all that motivates 
particular instances of the practice. This fact is, of course, something that my account of 
(HRHA) has to be able to explain. If it is the case that often all that motivates our practice of 
holding others accountable is inducing the uptake then, clearly, my claim that the practice is 
essentially motivated by desert/fairness can`t be true. So, what is happening here?  
According to Macnamara, as discussed above, the uptake is induced via imposing 
(broadly speaking) pain onto the wrongdoer. Thus, the pain is a means of achieving the 
uptake; it is something that is external to the uptake. This picture of how pain and the uptake 
relate to each other is plausible and captures correctly, I believe, what happens, among others, 
when we attempt to hold others accountable. There is, however, something here that might 
pass unnoticed. The uptake itself involves a degree of pain; that is, there is a degree of pain 
that is internal to the uptake. Let`s have a look again at what is involved in the uptake. The 
reader will have remembered that, according to Macnamara, to induce the uptake is `to get 
the wrongdoer to acknowledge her wrongdoing, feel remorse, apologize, make amends, and 
commit to doing right in the future`.172 To acknowledge one`s wrongdoing is a humiliating 
and/or humbling experience. It is a kind of experience that we, typically, wish to avoid. We 
wish to avoid it because it is painful. The same applies to the act of apologizing. Feeling 
remorse is an emotion that too is painful, although for reasons different from those associated 
with acknowledging wrongdoing and apologizing. Feeling remorse is not a humiliating 
experience. Humiliation about something presupposes awareness of other`s awareness of that 
something. Feeling remorse is essentially a private emotion and as such doesn`t depend on 
other`s being aware of anything. Feeling remorse is perhaps a humbling experience and to 
this extent it is an experience that is painful. Even if not seen as humbling, it is clearly an 
experience that we normally wish to avoid. This, again, strongly indicates that it is an 
experience that is, broadly speaking, painful.  
Making amends and committing to doing right in the future are requirements involved 
in the uptake that won`t reduce to pain as easy, if at all, as the previous ones. Making amends 
might be experienced as painful in some cases and agreeable in others depending, perhaps, 
 
171 `All` in terms of motivation. Of course, the wife`s reproaching might – and very probably will – 
involve expressing emotions constitutive of deep moral appraisal. But that`s not what motivates her 
if what she does is trying to hold her husband accountable. 
172 Macnamara, `Holding others responsible`, p.90. 
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on the maturity of one`s conscience; i.e. a person tormented by guilt (that is, someone capable 
of having guilty conscience) will often find relief in making amends. This fact suggests that 
making amends is not essentially about pain. There are two reasons why this doesn`t present 
a problem for my claim that the uptake itself involves a degree of pain. First, the truth of the 
claim doesn`t require all aspects that constitute the uptake to be reducible to pain. An apple 
is rotten even if a part of it is not. Second, the reader will remember that the reason I am 
trying to convince her that the uptake itself involves a degree of pain is that it will allow me 
to claim that it is desert/fairness that motivates our practice of (HRHA). Now, making 
amends seems to be an act that can be about desert/fairness – in the sense that it attempts to 
restore that which got disrupted in the act of wrongdoing173 – without, at least sometimes, 
being so in virtue of imposing pain. A person who has damaged a public property will be 
ordered to pay for its repair which the person might find nearly totally painless if she is 
sufficiently rich. This particular instance of making amends might not be convincing because 
perhaps making amends in the financial domain is something rather different from making 
amends in the moral domain. Making amends in the financial domain might be translatable 
into making amends in the moral domain if pain is imposed but that`s not what always 
happens.174 Macnamara`s definition of the uptake is ambiguous here and as such is consistent 
with both understandings of `making amends`. Be that as it may, there is no need to establish 
conclusively what exactly is the role of making amends in the uptake as it won`t affect the 
truth of my claim that the uptake involves a degree of pain.  
The last constituent of the uptake mentioned by Macnamara is committing to doing 
right in the future. This is an odd one here. In morally neutral contexts, the committing to 
doing right in the future can be seen as involving, at best, only a very minimal degree of pain. 
It will be seen as such by those who feel that any commitment to future action is an act of 
voluntary self-constraint that involves a degree of psychological discomfort or pain. Others 
might feel that there is nothing discomforting or painful in the act of committing to doing 
right in the future in morally neutral contexts. We don`t need to take sides here because what 
interests us is not the act of committing in the morally neutral contexts but in those that are 
morally significant (and recall: the context of the uptake is the context of a wrongdoing). 
Here, it seems to me, the act of committing to doing right in the future involves a stronger 
degree of pain (compared to the degree it involves in the morally neutral contexts) in virtue 
 
173 Below, I shall explain fairness in terms of the notion of moral equilibrium. A wrongdoing disrupts 
the equilibrium. Restoring the equilibrium is what motivates our practice of (HRHA), and the 
equilibrium gets restored in an (successful) instance of (HRHA).  
174 In Switzerland, the fine for speeding varies depending on the financial status of the offender. The 
richer the offender is the higher the fine. This fact could be interpreted along the utilitarian line or 
along the desert/fairness line (or combined). The utilitarian interpretation would be that in this way 
the force of deterrence extends to all strata of society. The desert/fairness interpretation would be that 
in this way pain can be induced (and fairness restored) in all, or nearly all, cases.  
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of it being, in fact, an act that is meant to be humbling. When one is induced to perform an 
explicit commitment it seems to be, psychologically speaking, an experience that is very 
similar to that of acknowledging wrongdoing or apologizing. It is humbling, perhaps even 
humiliating in some cases, and, as such, a painful experience.  
The above is, admittedly, a very sketchy analysis. It will suffice though as nothing of 
importance hinges on the status of the acts of making amends and committing to doing right 
in the future regarding whether or not the two acts involve a degree of pain. My claim that 
the uptake involves a degree of pain is fully sustained in virtue of the acts of 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing and apologizing being clearly acts that are painful.  
I will take it as established that the uptake involves a certain degree of pain that is 
internal to it. How does it help us with the inconsistency, i.e. with claiming, on one hand, 
that (HRHA) is essentially motivated by desert/fairness and admitting, on the other, that the 
uptake is often all that motivates instances of (HRHA)? Having established that the uptake 
itself is intrinsically painful allows me to claim that the motivation by the uptake boils down 
to the motivation by desert/fairness. The reader will have remembered that the modified 
neurocognitive scenario (the one that explicitly rules out utilitarian motivation) strongly 
suggests that what motivates our practice of (HRHA) is restoring fairness (i.e. moral 
equilibrium) disrupted by a wrongdoing, via imposing pain the degree of which corresponds 
to the seriousness of the wrongdoing. Now, if, as has been established, the uptake is 
intrinsically painful, then the fact that it is often all that motivates (HRHA) cannot be 
understood as contradicting my claim that (HRHA) is essentially motivated by 
desert/fairness. The intrinsic painfulness of the uptake allows us to take it as an instance of 
restoring the moral equilibrium and allows me to keep claiming that our practice of (HRHA) 
is essentially motivated by desert/fairness.175 
We have established that being motivated by the uptake is – in virtue of the uptake 
being intrinsically painful – being motivated by desert/fairness. In other words, the uptake is 
 
175 The essential painfulness of the uptake allows for the following `Macnamarian` reading of the 
neurocognitive scenario: It could be plausibly argued that any robust uptake will involve feelings of 
guilt accompanied by a degree of pain that will correspond to the seriousness of the wrongdoing. If 
we tie the uptake with required levels of pain in this way, we can protect Macnamara`s account from 
the force of the neurocognitive scenario. A Macnamarian could keep insisting that it is the uptake that 
motivates our practice of holding others accountable and we wouldn`t be able to object on the grounds 
that a deserved degree of pain hasn`t been induced. Such a Macnamarian account would tick all the 
boxes. I would find such an account very attractive as it would capture the following two things that 
I believe are essential to what motivates the practice of holding accountable. First, it would correctly 
capture the feeling that the wrongdoer must be burdened with a corresponding degree of pain. Second, 
it would correctly capture our desire that the wrongdoer fully realizes the wickedness of her actions 
and broadens her moral consciousness. Be it as it may, my argument in this chapter doesn`t require 
that desert/fairness (that calls for imposition of pain onto a wrongdoer) is a sufficient motivator. All 
that is needed is that it is a necessary one; and that`s what has been showed by the neurocognitive 
scenario.   
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a motivator only to the extent to which it is painful.176 The discussion above of the 
incapacitated wrongdoer scenario raised some doubts about the moral appropriateness of 
punishing a wrongdoer who is incapable of achieving the uptake. It could be felt as unfair to 
punish a wrongdoer who – as a consequence of his inability to achieve the uptake - cannot 
comprehend the legitimacy of the punishment, who can`t but see it as an irrational and bizarre 
custom and himself as terribly unlucky to be subjected to it. Those who feel so might then 
wish to list the ability to achieve the uptake as a necessary condition of a fair punishment (or 
of a fair exercise of HRHA). And that is perfectly compatible with my claim that our practice 
of (HRHA) is essentially motivated by desert/fairness. The logic in the background is this. 
Restoring the moral equilibrium (the fairness) that has been disrupted by a wrongdoing can 
be done only by a punishment (or an exercise of HRHA) that is itself fair. An unfair 
punishment disrupts the moral equilibrium even more. (More about this later) 
Let me briefly sum up the role of the uptake in our practice of (HRHA). The 
neurocognitive scenario shows that the uptake cannot be what necessarily motivates the 
practice. The modified neurocognitive scenario points to desert/fairness as the only plausible 
motivator of the practice. The incapacitated wrongdoer scenario is meant to shed some light 
on the role of the uptake in the practice of (HRHA). Is the uptake all that motivates the 
practice at least in some instances? Or is it perhaps crucial for the practice not as a motivator 
but in some other sense? It turns out that (a) those instances of (HRHA) that look like they 
are motivated solely by the uptake are in fact motivated by desert/fairness and (b) the uptake 
can be understood as, at best, a necessary condition of successful restoration of moral 
equilibrium, i.e. of fairness.  
4.5.4  Conclusion: holding accountable calls for the free will assumption 
Above (p.88), I claim that ` [t]he issue of free will enters the stage only with jm-justifications: 
it doesn`t feel right to take the person who couldn`t have done otherwise as deserving the 
pain (of punishment).` The claim is, in other words, that it wouldn`t be fair to impose pain 
on a wrongdoer for a wrongdoing that he couldn`t have avoided doing, i.e. on a wrongdoer 
who lacks free will. When holding others accountable, we impose pain. Holding others 
accountable is motivated by desert/fairness. Claiming that imposing pain on a wrongdoer in 
the act of holding accountable wouldn`t be fair if he lacks free will implies that the practice 
 
176 The issue here is a bit slippery and the reader might still feel that often, as a matter of fact, all that 
motivates her holdings of others accountable is achieving the uptake. I agree. However, I insist that 
all those cases where achieving the uptake is the sole motivator are cases in which the seriousness of 
the relevant wrongdoing is relatively low and can be counterbalanced by the relatively limited degree 
of pain that is intrinsic to the uptake. In those cases in which the seriousness of the relevant 
wrongdoing (think of murder, for instance) cannot be counterbalanced by the pain that is intrinsic to 
the uptake, the uptake will be complemented by imposing additional burden.   
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of (HRHA) - the practice of holding accountable – calls for the free will assumption. And 
that is what I have been arguing towards. 
4.6  Fairness: three claims 
Now, when the circle of the argument behind the claim is closed, I can go back and look 
again at some of the claims that the argument relies on. The plausibility of an argument 
depends on the plausibility of its individual claims and I feel that more should be said about 
some of the claims to boost the overall plausibility of the conclusion.  
The claims in need of further discussion are the following:  
 
B1: Imposition of pain is justified if deserved/fair.  
B2: Imposition of pain on a wrongdoer is deserved/fair only if the wrongdoer has free 
will. 
B3: Holding others accountable is motivated by desert/fairness.  
Let me start the discussion of (B1) and (B2) with a little reminder of why they need a 
discussion at all. I have been defending a claim – contra Strawson – that there is a kind of 
holding morally responsible that calls for a justification grounded in the free will assumption. 
The kind of holding morally responsible that calls for such a justification is the kind that 
Macnamara calls holding accountable. It is an empirical fact that we often engage in this 
kind of practice, i.e. the existence of this practice is uncontroversial. The controversial bit is 
whether holding accountable calls for a justification grounded in the free will assumption. 
This is where the plausibility o (B1) and (B2) becomes important. Holding accountable is a 
kind of practice that essentially involves the imposition of pain onto another. Imposing pain 
onto another is – according to (B1) – justified only if deserved/fair, which is something that 
is – according to (B2) - deserved/fair only if the wrongdoer possesses free will. Thus, the 
plausibility of the claim that holding accountable calls for a justification grounded in the free 
will assumption depends on the plausibility of (B1) and (B2). (B3) is a claim that has been 
endorsed above when discussing the neurocognitive scenario. As formulated, the claim 
needs some unpacking. The unpacking of (B3) will follow the discussion of (B1) and (B2). 
4.6.1  Imposition of pain is justified if deserved/fair 
(B1): Imposition of pain is justified if deserved/fair. Above (p. 88), I distinguish between, 
broadly speaking, utilitarian justifications (jf-justifications) and moral justifications (jm-
justifications). (B1) is a claim about imposing pain as a response to a morally wrong conduct. 
It is such a claim because it is made in the context of (HRHA), which is a context that 
involves morally significant behaviour and our responses to it. Thus, the justification 
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mentioned in the claim is to be understood as of a moral kind, i.e. as the jm-justification. I 
have, until now, relied on an immediate intuitive plausibility (and clarity) of the claim and 
explicitly or implicitly appealed to it without any defence of it. The time has come to say 
more about it.  
One of the problems that interests moral philosophers is the problem of what justifies 
punishment; i.e. the problem of what makes it morally permissible to punish another.177 This 
problem and its discussion is strongly analogous to what can be expected to be involved in 
the discussion of (B1). The most general and uncontroversial definition of punishment is: 
imposition of burden of some sort in response to a wrongdoing. I have been treating 
imposition of pain and imposition of burden interchangeably throughout the chapter. There 
might be some differences between the two. However, whatever the differences might be, it 
is clear that pain is burdensome. Thus, imposing pain is a case of imposing burden. 
Consequently, whatever one might say about justifiability of punishment will apply to 
justifiability of imposing pain, which is my concern regarding (B1).  
The philosophical discussions of the permissibility of punishment reduce, ultimately, 
to two positions: consequentialism and retributivism. According to consequentialism, the 
rightness or wrongness of something – an action, a rule for action, or an institution – is 
determined solely by the consequences. An action, such as imposing pain, or generally any 
punishment, will be justified if it produces the right kind of overall consequences. 
Consequentialism thus takes punishment as a means towards some valuable end. 
Retributivism, on the other hand, takes punishment as, in a sense, a goal in itself, as 
something that is intrinsically a right response to a crime. And, according to retributivism, 
punishment is intrinsically right and justified because it is deserved. 
Now, clearly, (B1) – the claim I am defending here - is a retributivist claim. 
Retributivism competes with consequentialism regarding the problem of justification of 
punishment. This raises the following question: does the existence and logic of the 
consequentialist position pose a threat to the truth of (B1)? The answer to this question 
depends on whether the two positions are mutually exclusive or whether there is a way to 
combine them into a single account. If there is a way to combine them into a single account, 
then (B1) could be accepted as stating a necessary – not sufficient – condition in such a 
combined account (consequentialism would then provide the other necessary condition(s) to 
make the account complete). If the positions are mutually exclusive then, of course, the truth 
of consequentialism invalidates (B1). Let me take the hard path and presume that the 
 
177 There is a vast literature on the issue of moral justification of punishment. The proposed accounts 
dealing with the issue can be divided into, roughly, three groups: consequentialist, deontological and 
mixed. Perhaps the best collection of essays covering all the three groups of accounts is Michael Tonry 
(ed.), Why Punish? How Much? A Reader on Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
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positions are mutually exclusive. That would imply that if consequentialism is true then (B1) 
is false. So, is consequentialism true? And if it is, do we have to abandon (B1)?  
I shall not dwell much on the first question because even if the answer turned out to 
be affirmative there is a strong reason, I will claim, to stick with (B1). I confess that I find 
the consequentialist accounts of permissibility of punishment extremely implausible and am 
unable to force myself to take them seriously. The readers who are able to take them seriously 
are referred to the neurocognitive scenario, which can be understood as a thought experiment 
designed to counter consequentialist accounts in general, to test their intuitions. As I said 
above, I won`t argue against consequentialism in any more detailed way for a simple reason: 
I don`t have to. There is – in the context of our discussion of how holding accountable relates 
to the free will assumption – a serious reason to steer away from consequentialism and accept 
(B1).  
The reason is that a consequentialist won`t see free will – i.e. its presence or absence 
in the agency of a wrongdoer – as playing any role in the moral appropriateness of punishing. 
For a consequentialist, the rightness of punishing is fully determined by the value of its 
consequences. Whether the wrongdoer lacks or possesses free will at the time of the 
wrongdoing that he is being punished for is something that cannot be construed as a 
consequence of the punishment simply because it precedes the punishment, i.e. it precedes 
that in relation to which the envisaged benefits can be seen as consequences. In other words, 
a consequence is – by definition – that which comes after something, not before.  
Now, why is it a serious reason to steer away from consequentialism in the context of 
discussing how holding accountable relates to the free will assumption? Let me remind the 
reader of an important point here. My account of freedom in agency won`t be of any use in 
grounding justifications of holding others morally responsible. At the start of this chapter, I 
concede that that is not an attractive feature of the account. The implicit assumption 
throughout the whole chapter has been that the presence or absence of free will indeed plays 
a crucial role in the justification of our practice of holding others responsible. This is, 
however, an assumption that a consequentialist must refuse. A consequentialist is unable to 
enter the framework of the discussion as he doesn`t accept one of the framework`s crucial 
assumptions. Free will is not a consequence, and a consequentialist will (have to) ignore it.  
A consequentialist will not, therefore, find my account of freedom unattractive (and if 
he does then it will be for some other reasons) and will skip this chapter. The crucial point 
here is this: whether aware of it or not, any philosopher working under the assumption that 
free will is crucial for grounding our practice of holding others responsible must - on pain 
of being inconsistent - be a retributivist. Thus, once we have accepted the assumption – as 
we had at the beginning of the chapter – we are bound to accept (B1). 
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4.6.2  Imposition of pain on a wrongdoer is deserved/fair only if the wrongdoer has free 
will 
(B2): Imposition of pain on a wrongdoer is deserved/fair only if the wrongdoer has free will. 
Why is imposition of pain deserved/fair only if the wrongdoer has free will? I don`t know 
the answer to this question and I suspect there might not be one. The vast majority of 
literature on free will and moral responsibility turns on the assumption – the assumption that 
is analogous to (B2) - that it would be inappropriate to hold others morally responsible had 
they no free will. This assumption is frequently appealed to but never argued for.  
There are accounts of moral responsibility that, on the face of it, seem to do away with 
free will (Harry Frankfurt`s and his followers`) but when one looks closer it turns out that 
those accounts work with a rather narrow definition of free will. Working with a narrow 
definition of free will allows those accounts to generate attractive claims and, at the same 
time, remain intuitively plausible in virtue of leaving those aspects of free will within their 
accounts that had been left out of the narrow definition.178 In other words, even the accounts 
that seem to be able to ground our practice of holding others responsible without an appeal 
to free will, turn out – when scrutinized – to rely on some version of it. So why is it that 
philosophers don`t seem to be bothered about answering the question why it would be 
inappropriate to hold morally responsible those who lack free will? The only answer I am 
able to give is that the philosophers working on moral responsibility take the claim that only 
agents possessing free will can be justifiably held morally responsible to be an intuitively 
primitive claim, i.e. a claim that cannot be construed as the conclusion of a logical 
arrangement of some other claims. In other words, they take it to be a claim that captures a 
foundational moral intuition. 
4.6.2.1  The sense of justice 
I could perhaps rest my case at this point and move onto discussion of (B3). I wish to say a 
bit more about it though. The following remarks are, I believe, contextually useful (for later 
purposes) generalizations that can be associated with (B2). Also, the remarks will make the 
picture of how (HRHA) works richer and more plausible.  
 
178 Thus, Harry Frankfurt first defines free will as availability of alternatives. Then he conceives of a 
scenario in which the agent doesn`t have – in a certain sense - any available alternatives. The scenario 
is conceived in such a way that it doesn`t seem to be inappropriate to hold the agent responsible even 
though she has – in a certain sense – no available alternatives. Harry Frankfurt concludes that free will 
is not needed to hold responsible. Frankfurt`s scenario, however, leaves it open whether the past of 
the agent has been determined or not because the alternatives in the scenario have been removed not 
because of the determination running from the past but because of the determination running from the 
future. This trick, if I may say so, fools our moral intuition because there seems to be a robust sense 
in which the agent is free even though she hasn`t got – in a certain sense – any available alternatives. 
For the scenario, see Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of 
Philosophy, 66, no. 23 (1969), pp.829–839. 
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One of the reasons for (B2) being a primitive claim is that it employs a primitive 
concept of fairness. It is a primitive concept in the sense that (a) it cannot be defined but only 
acquired through practice, and (b) it has an axiomatic status in any moral discourse.179 And 
while fairness cannot be defined, it can be made more transparent if we can tie it to a 
synonym that is (more) transparent. I propose moral equilibrium as such a (more) transparent 
synonym to fairness.180 The notion of moral equilibrium exposes some important aspects of 
fairness that might otherwise pass unnoticed: fairness is a moral property; fairness has 
something to do with careful balancing of pros and cons; fairness doesn`t come in degrees: 
like equilibrium, it either obtains or not, nothing in between.181  
Tying  fairness to moral equilibrium allows the following straightforward rendering 
of (B2): Imposition of pain on a wrongdoer disturbs moral equilibrium if the wrongdoer is 
not a free agent. How do we know that the moral equilibrium is (or would be) out of balance 
in the case of (B2), and in other cases generally? (B2) is a primitive claim, thus we can`t 
know it as a result of rational analysis. It is not an empirical claim – or, at least, not in any 
obvious sense of `empirical` - thus its truth is not given in perception. So how do we detect 
disruptions in the moral equilibrium? An obvious, if slightly unexciting, answer is: 
intuitively. Above, I suggested that moral philosophers are likely to understand (B2) as 
capturing a foundational moral intuition. And when a proposition captures an intuition about 
something then grasping the truth of that proposition happens intuitively. We can do better 
here though. 
In 1963, John Rawls published a paper called `The Sense of Justice`.182 Nowhere in 
the paper does he give an explicit definition of a ` sense of justice` but the context of the paper 
makes it quite clear what he takes it to be. At places, Rawls`s usage of the notions of 
`just/justice` and `fair/fairness` indicates that he takes the notions as more or less 
synonymous.183 A sense of justice then seems to be a capacity of persons to detect whether 
a state of affairs is or isn`t just/fair. Taking fairness as synonymous with moral equilibrium 
then gives us a sense of justice being a capacity of persons to detect disruptions in the moral 
equilibrium. 
 For our purposes, there are several theoretically exciting things about Rawls`s concept 
of the sense of justice. One of them is that it refers to a capacity that `may be viewed as the 
 
179 Fairness is `axiomatic` in the sense that its grasp is a necessary precondition of any non-trivial 
moral theorizing.  
180 Something being fair would then translate as being in moral equilibrium. 
181 This point doesn`t apply to unfairness. Some moral states of affairs can be more unfair than others. 
Fairness, however, doesn`t allow any scope. It is infinitely sensitive to disruption and tends to abruptly 
turn into unfairness.  
182 John Rawls, `The Sense of Justice`, The Philosophical Review, 72, no. 3 (1963), pp.281-305. 
183 See J. Rawls, `The Sense of Justice`, p.282-283. 
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result of a certain natural development`.184 Rawls makes use of a plausible theory of child 
development to show how the sense of justice `arise[s] from our primitive natural 
attitudes`.185 Throughout the paper he develops this point concluding, ultimately, that: 
 
[…] a person who lacks a sense of justice is also without certain natural attitudes and certain 
moral feelings of a particular elementary kind. Put another way, one who lacks a sense of 
justice lacks certain fundamental attitudes and capacities included under the notion of 
humanity.186 
 
A sense of justice is thus not something of an uncertain ontological status, but a capacity 
deeply embedded in the psychological constitution of a mature human being. It is, in this 
sense, an objective capacity, not an invention of a moral theorist. It gets employed in our 
practice of holding others accountable. And it is, ultimately, this sense of justice we possess 
that informs us about the truth of (B1), (B2) and many other moral claims. 
 Another theoretically exciting thing about the sense of justice is that it has a normative 
force. Not only does it detect disruptions in the moral equilibrium, it commands us to restore 
them. Rawls doesn`t talk explicitly about normative force in connection with the sense of 
justice. There are, however, passages in the paper that strongly suggest that he wouldn`t 
object taking the sense of justice as involving a normative force. The most suggestive is 
perhaps the passage where he gives an answer to the question of `what accounts for men`s 
acting on their duty of justice in particular cases`.187 Rawls answers: 
 
When they have a sense of justice, an answer is that they accept the principles of justice and 
regard themselves bound to act in accordance with schemes of co-operation which satisfy these 
principles when it comes their turn.188 
 
The plausibility of the claim that the sense of justice involves a normative force can perhaps 
be best demonstrated by an appeal to our experiences when witnessing something very unfair 
playing out in front of our eyes. We become indignant, and we feel that something must be 
done in response to the unfairness of the situation (even though we might not – for various 
reasons – do anything). The something-must-be-done feeling is a common and natural 
response to many morally significant situations: it is our sense of justice commanding to 
restore the moral equilibrium. 
4.6.3  Holding others accountable is motivated by desert/fairness 
 
184 Ibid., p.281. 
185 Ibid., p.285. 
186 Ibid., p.299. 
187 Ibid., p.298. 
188 Ibid. 
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The claim about the sense of justice involving a normative force lies at the core of (B3), i.e. 
at the core of the claim that: holding others accountable is motivated by desert/fairness. The 
phrase `holding others accountable is motivated by desert/fairness` is a compact one. It can 
be unpacked and paraphrased in the following way: in holding others accountable, our sense 
of justice commands us to restore the moral equilibrium. I believe the reader will not find the 
paraphrase objectionable. `Being motivated` (by something) entails a reference to, very 
broadly speaking, a force. `Being commanded` (by something, to do something) entails the 
same. The notion of the `sense of justice` specifies the locus where the force originates. 
`Moral equilibrium` is synonymous with `fairness`. `Holding others accountable` is a notion 
that refers to a morally significant context. We have established that holding others 
accountable involves imposition of pain. The practice of holding others accountable 
essentially involves imposition of pain because that is what – as our sense of justice informs 
us and commands us to do – restores the moral equilibrium.189  
Now we have all the pieces ready to recap in a form of a brief argument towards (B3): 
i. The upshot of the discussion of the neurocognitive scenario: the most 
plausible explanation of why it feels right to impose pain on the wrongdoer is 
that it is what the wrongdoer deserves/what is fair to do in the scenario. 
ii. At the heart of the feeling right mentioned in (i) lies what John Rawls calls a 
`sense of justice` - a common and essential human capacity to detect 
disruptions in moral equilibrium (that is, disruptions in fairness). 
iii. The sense of justice involves a normative force, i.e. it commands or motivates 
us to act in a certain way. More specifically, it commands or motivates us to 
restore the moral equilibrium that has been disrupted by a wrongdoing (the 
moral equilibrium gets restored by, among others, imposing the right amount 
of pain on the wrongdoer).  
Once (i) – (iii) are accepted, we can unpack the phrase `we are motivated by desert/fairness` 
as a phrase saying that `our sense of justice commands us to restore fairness/moral 
equilibrium`. The two phrases are then to be treated as equivalent. Consequently, the 
 
189 This last point seems to imply that the wrongdoing in response to which we hold the wrongdoer 
accountable must essentially be a pain-causing act. It seems clear that the pain imposed in the act of 
holding accountable will restore the moral equilibrium only if it has been disrupted by a pain-causing 
wrongdoing. I think this is correct as I believe that any wrongdoing must be essentially a pain-causing 
event to be a wrongdoing at all. I could be wrong here but that would still not affect in any way my 
claim that imposition of pain has a restorative effect on the moral equilibrium. The truth of that claim 
is given to us intuitively – as shown by our response to the neurocognitive scenario - and not as a 
result of an argument.  
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argument behind the latter – i.e. steps (i) – (iii) - sustains the former, and we are able to 
conclude (B3): When holding accountable, we are motivated by desert/fairness. 
4.7  Conclusion 
 At the beginning of this chapter, I promised to distinguish between right and wrong 
instances of holding responsible and provide, afterwards, an argument towards the claim that 
it is only the wrong instances of holding responsible that require the free will assumption. 
Let me prepare the ground by a way of the following recap. I set myself the task of 
establishing whether there is a kind of holding responsible that calls for the free will 
assumption. I have identified one such kind – holding accountable – as in need of the 
assumption. The path towards the identification revealed that we humans are equipped with 
the sense of justice which commands us to engage in this particular kind of holding 
responsible, i.e. in holding accountable. Holding accountable is intrinsically about restoring 
fairness or moral equilibrium disrupted by a wrongdoing, and the sense of justice commands 
us to engage in a holding accountable exactly because one of its ultimate functions is to push 
us towards the restoration. This last point is what the phrase `in holding others accountable 
we are motivated by desert/fairness` is meant to capture. Typically, the sense of justice 
commands us to impose the amount of pain that is proportionate to the amount of pain 
generated by the wrongdoing. It commands us to do so because that`s what is fair, i.e. what 
restores the moral equilibrium. 
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Chapter 5: Right and wrong holdings responsible, and the free will assumption 
5.1  Introduction 
The discussion in the previous chapter has yielded (among other things) the conclusion that 
there is a kind of holding responsible that calls for the free will assumption. It is holding 
responsible as holding accountable. Holding a person accountable is unfair if the person 
lacks free will, that is: the possession of free will by the person held responsible is a necessary 
condition of the holding to be fair.  
In this chapter, I will argue that there is another necessary condition of a fair holding. 
That condition, however, cannot be met due to certain constraints intrinsic to the moral nature 
of man. If I am right that there is such a necessary condition of a fair holding accountable 
that cannot be met, then holding a person accountable can never be fair regardless of whether 
or not the person held accountable possesses free will.  
5.2  Disruptors 
The domain of fairness or moral equilibrium is sensitive to a variety of disruptors. A 
disruptor is anything that our sense of justice identifies as bringing or keeping the moral 
equilibrium out of balance. Any wrongdoing that imposes pain is such a disruptor, and our 
sense of justice commands us to bring the equilibrium back in balance by imposing a 
proportionate degree of pain on the wrongdoer (in the act of holding accountable, or in the 
act of punishment for more serious wrongdoings). At the same time, imposing a 
proportionate degree of pain on a wrongdoer who lacks free will, i.e. who couldn`t have 
avoided doing the wrongdoing, not only would not restore the moral equilibrium, it would 
represent an additional disruptor. Similarly disruptive would be imposing pain onto a 
wrongdoer who couldn`t have known that her actions would result in causing pain. 
We can make a little distinction here regarding the notion of a disruptor. There seem to 
be two basic groups of them: disruptors as original wrongdoings and disruptors as wrong 
(i.e. disruptive) responses to the original wrongdoings. I shall call the former the target 
disruptors and the latter the targeting disruptors. The target disruptors are, for instance, all 
those morally significant actions that we teach our children to avoid, such as stealing or 
damaging someone else`s stuff or various ways of hurting others, such as beating them, 
ridiculing or disrespecting them, manipulating them, etc. The targeting disruptors are, for 
instance and as mentioned above, those responses (to the target disruptors) that impose pain 
on a wrongdoer who lacks free will or was ignorant regarding the harmful effects of her 
actions.  
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I shall take it as uncontroversial that there is no principal moral difference between a 
target disruptor and a targeting one: both disrupt the moral equilibrium; the existence and 
strength of both gets detected by our sense of justice, both are to be avoided or eliminated if 
detected. The last point, in other words, is: an instance of holding accountable or punishing 
that is unfair (disrupts the moral equilibrium) is a wrongdoing that must be avoided.190  
Now, what if there are reasons to believe that any instance of holding accountable or 
punishing is always and in principle unfair and, as such, morally wrong? This question, and 
the worry it raises, is, of course, what motivates the interest in the problem of free will 
because the impossibility of free will would constitute such a principal reason. If free will is 
impossible then whenever we hold another accountable or punish, we act unfairly, we 
generate a targeting disruptor: we do what is morally wrong. The implicit hope among the 
philosophers working on the problem of free will is that once we formulate an account of 
free will that allows for its existence in the causally determined world, there won`t be any 
other principal reason to doubt the moral rightness of our practice of holding others 
accountable.  
I am convinced, however, that there are other principal reasons - apart from the issue of 
the (im)possibility of free will – that render any instance of holding accountable unfair. This 
means that even if a successful account of free will is formulated191 our practice of holding 
others accountable will still remain essentially unfair. Should I be correct and able to 
convince you regarding the claim that there indeed are those other principal reasons to 
believe that the practice is essentially unfair, it would, I believe, remove an important 
obstacle towards accepting my account of freedom in agency. My account doesn`t help with 
grounding the practice but the practice is ungroundable anyway thus my account shouldn`t 
be dismissed because of this particular theoretical impotence. I proceed to the convincing.  
5.3  Blame, holding accountable, and the moral standing 
There has recently been increased interest in the topic of blame among moral theorists.192 
The issues discussed in connection with blame are the nature of blame, its function and the 
conditions for the appropriateness of blaming.  
Regarding the appropriateness of blaming others for their wrongdoing, there seems to 
be a consensus about what general facts have to be taken into consideration when assessing 
the appropriateness. The facts relevant for the appropriateness assessment can be sorted into 
 
190 And, of course, as such, it calls for a restorative action of some sort: a holding accountable or a 
punishment. 
191 That is, an account that will morally ground the practice of holding accountable in a causally 
determined world. 
192 For an excellent collection of essays on blame see D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini (eds), 
Blame: Its Nature and Norms (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
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roughly three groups: (a) facts about the blamer, (b) facts about the blaming interaction, and 
(c) facts about the person being blamed. In what follows, I will make use of a concept that 
plays a crucial role in discussions of the first group, i.e. in discussions of facts about the 
blamer. The concept I have in mind here is the concept of moral standing. 
There are plenty of real and imaginary scenarios in which even if the agent was 
blameworthy, and even if all procedural norms were followed, it would be morally 
inappropriate for some people to blame. For blaming to be appropriate, not only the target 
person has to be blameworthy but the blamer herself has to be what Marilyn Friedman calls 
blame(r)worthy.193  For instance, a serial thief blaming another for a petty theft would strike 
us as such a case of morally inappropriate blaming exactly because the serial thief is clearly 
not blame(r)worthy. `Who are you to criticize another for that?`, we would want to interject 
if we witnessed an instance of such a morally inappropriate blaming. What gets brought into 
focus and questioned in such an interjection is the moral standing of the blamer. The 
background intuition here is that if the moral standing of a person is in some relevant sense 
compromised then it would be morally inappropriate for that person to blame another.  
Uncontroversially, holding accountable involves blaming. Thus, to the extent to which 
the appropriateness of blaming depends on the moral standing of the blamer, holding 
accountable too will depend – with respect to its appropriateness – on the moral standing of 
the holder. If the moral standing of a holder has been compromised, then the holding is 
(morally) inappropriate or wrong. A husband involved in a long lasting extra marital affair 
attempting to hold his wife accountable for a one-night stand with her ex will strike us as an 
instance of a morally inappropriate holding accountable because of the compromised moral 
standing of the husband. Such an instance of holding accountable is a targeting disruptor of 
the moral equilibrium: it is wrong and should be avoided. 
5.4  Moral standing of human agents as essentially compromised 
The moral appropriateness or rightness of holding another accountable depends crucially on 
the moral standing of the holder. Now, what if the moral standing is always compromised? 
What if fundamentally compromised moral standing is in some sense essential to being a 
human? If this was the case, surely, we would have to conclude that our practice of holding 
others accountable is morally, and irremediably, wrong. There are reasons to believe that our 
moral standing is fundamentally compromised in such a way. Below, I shall formulate an 
argument to this effect. The argument will employ (a version of) a thesis known as The 
Principle of Plenitude and a thought experiment that allows its applicability in the context of 
 
193 Marylin Friedman, `How to Blame People Responsibly`, The Journal of Value Inquiry,47, no. 3 
(2013), pp.271-284 (p.272). 
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evaluating the moral standing of man. Let me first give you a rough outline of the argument 
so that the logical role and the mutual relation of its individual steps is clear before they are 
later discussed in detail.  
 
An outline of the argument:  
1. The Principle of Plenitude (PP): For some states of affairs s, if s is possible then 
there is a time at which s obtains. 
2. A state of affairs that has obtained is a possible state of affairs. 
3. Plausibly, if a state of affairs involving a member m of a kind k is a possible state 
of affairs then a relevantly similar state of affairs involving any other member of 
the kind k is possible too. 
4. Some men did or have done things that (have) corrupted their moral standing. 
5. It is possible for any man to have their moral standing corrupted. [from 2, 3, 4] 
6. [A thought experiment designed to show that] One`s (present) moral standing gets 
corrupted (not only by the past and present wrongdoings but even) by one`s future 
wrongdoings.   
7. [For reasons discussed below] (PP) can be applied to (5), that is: the status of 
one`s moral standing belongs to the states of affairs that (PP) applies to. 
8. For all men there is a time at which they do things that corrupt their moral 
standing. [from 1, 5, 7] 
Therefore 
9. The moral standing of man is essentially corrupted. [from 6, 8]  
The individual steps of the argument will be discussed in dedicated subsections below. 
 
5.4.1  The Principle of Plenitude 
 
The Principle of Plenitude as I will understand it here is grounded in what is sometimes 
called the `statistical interpretation of modality`.194 The statistical interpretation (or model) 
of modality can be spelled out roughly in the following way: what is necessary is always 
actual, what is impossible is never actual and what is possible is at least sometimes actual. 
The Principle of Plenitude is then a thesis about a certain kind of relation between possibility 
and actuality. A good first approximation of the principle is given by Hintikka: 
 
194 The term `statistical interpretation of modality` was introduced into modern discussion of modality 
by Oscar Becker. See his Untersuchungen über den Modalkalkül (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 
1952) 
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[A]ll genuine possibilities, or at least all possibilities of some central and important kind, are 
actualized in time. Any such possibility thus has been, is, or will be realized; it cannot remain 
unrealized through an infinite stretch of time; in a sense, everything possible will happen in the 
long run.195 
 
A version of the principle (and/or the modal intuition behind it) has been endorsed by 
philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Augustin of Hippo, St Anselm, Thomas 
Aquinas, Giordano Bruno, Spinoza, Hobbes, Leibniz, Kant and Russell.196 Kant, for instance, 
seems to endorse the principle in the following passage: 
 
The Schema of possibility […] is the determination of the representation of a thing at any time 
whatsoever. The schema of reality is the existence at a given time. The schema of necessity is 
the existence of an object at all times.197  
 
 And Russell, in his characteristically clear and unambiguous style, asserts: 
 
One may call a propositional function necessary, when it is always true; possible, when it is 
sometimes true; impossible, when it is never true.198 
 
And on the next page in the same paper, Russell casually equates the notion of sometimes 
with that of possibility:  
 
It will be out of this notion of sometimes, which is the same as the notion of possible, that we get 
the notion of existence.199 
 
Obviously, the first approximation of the principle given above allows different versions 
depending on what kind of possibility one has in mind. Possible states of affairs? Possible 
kinds? Possible particulars? The plausibility of the principle might depend on the kind of 
 
195 Jaakko Hintikka, `Aristotle on the Realization of Possibilities in Time` in Simo Knuuttila (ed.), 
Reforging The Great Chain of Being (Dordrecht: Springer-Science+Business Media,B.V., 1981), pp 
57-72, (p.58). 
196 All the names listed above, apart from that of Aristotle, Hobbes and Russell, are the names given 
by the historian of ideas Arthur Lovejoy in his The Great Chain of Being (Harvard University Press, 
1936). Lovejoy wasn`t a philosopher and the list is somewhat controversial. Thus, for instance, Jaakko 
Hintikka suggests that it wouldn`t be correct to take Plato as an adherent of the principle. Regarding 
Kant, Hintikka argues that Kant endorses the principle only in his pre-critical writings. (I tend to 
disagree with Hintikka on this point as there is, in my view, a passage in The Critique where Kant 
seems to say something which is very close to the Principle. I quote the passage below). And as for 
Leibniz, although there is a version of the principle that Leibniz embraced, it is a version that is rather 
different form the one given above. In fact, Leibniz explicitly rejected the version that we shall work 
with here. For details on these points see Jaakko Hintikka, `Kant on "The Great Chain of Being" or 
the Eventual Realization of All Possibilities: A Comparative Study`, Philosophic Exchange, 7, no.1 
(1976), pp. 69-89.  
197 Immanuel Kant, Critigue of Pure Reason, F. Max Müller (trans.) (Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y.: 
1966) p.125. 
198 Bertrand Russell, `The Philosophy of Logical Atomism` in Bertrand Russell, Logic and 
Knowledge. Essays 1901-1950, ed. R.C.Marsh (Allen&Unwin, London: 1956), p.231. 
199 Ibid., pp. 231-232. 
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possibility that it is applied to. Jonathan Barnes, for instance, thinks that the principle doesn`t 
apply to states of affairs involving perishable particulars because out of the numerous 
possible ways that a perishable particular can perish only one can happen: once the particular 
has perished, all the remaining (and previously) possible ways of perishing become 
impossible regarding that particular because the particular is no more.200 Later in this chapter 
(when discussing step 7) I will address this issue as I need the principle to apply to individual 
humans, that is, to perishable particulars. At this point, however, I have a bigger problem to 
deal with. The problem is that in the contemporary analytic literature, the statistical 
understanding of modality has been fully replaced by interpreting modality in terms of what 
is generally known as possible worlds semantics – and modality interpreted in terms of 
possible world semantics doesn`t involve any temporal references. Consequently, there is 
virtually no discussion of the principle of plenitude to be found among contemporary analytic 
philosophers writing on modality.201 Thus, not only am I unable to simply appeal to the 
principle and proceed to discussing  the following steps of the argument, I must assume that 
the principle will be perceived by my reader as weird at best and totally implausible at worst. 
A way forward at this point is to provide an argument for the principle. One such argument 
can be extracted from Jonathan Barnes` comments on Jaakko Hintikka`s Time and Necessity: 
Studies in Aristotle`s Theory of Modality.202   
Barnes gives his argument (or what could be reconstructed as his argument from the 
review) for the principle in the context of discussing Hintikka`s interpretation of some of the 
aspects of Aristotle`s treatment of modality. In his review of Hintikka`s paper, Barnes is not 
primarily concerned with providing an argument for the principle. What he is concerned with 
is complementing Hintikka`s interpretation of certain passages from Aristotle in which the 
Stagirite seems to argue for the principle with some charitable reading of those passages. In 
the passages Aristotle`s argument seems rather obscure and this is where Barnes steps in 
offering a sympathetic reconstruction of Aristotle`s thinking behind the argument.  
The argument for the principle as given by Barnes relies crucially on the assumption 
that, roughly, that which always obtains is necessary, or: 
 
A: if s always obtains then s is necessary 
 
 
200 See Jonathan Barnes (review of) J. Hintikka, `Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle`s Theory 
of Modality`, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 97 (1977), pp. 183-186, (p.184).   
201 Even though there are historians of philosophical ideas and their development who discuss the 
principle in an analytic way. One of them is the above-mentioned Jaakko Hintikka. Another one is, 
for instance, Jonathan Barnes, whose brilliant argument for the principle will be discussed below.  
202 See Jonathan Barnes` review of J. Hintikka, Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle`s Theory of 
Modality, in The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 97 (1977), pp. 183-186. 
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The assumption is, however, rather controversial. It will be pointed out that it is easily 
conceivable that s always happens and yet s is contingent. Moreover, the way modality is, in 
(A), tied to temporality seems to be uncannily similar to the way in which we wish to tie 
modality to temporality in (PP). Thus, (A) could be seen as begging the question. Clearly, an 
argument for (A) is needed, and Barnes gives us one. Unfortunately, there seem to be several 
problems with the argument. The most serious one is the fact that the argument depends 
crucially on Aristotle`s definition of possibility – a definition that is rather implausible. 
Aristotle thinks, roughly, that something is (can be defined as) possible if and only if nothing 
impossible results from its actualization; Barnes puts this more rigorously in the following 
way: 
 
T:  s is possible =(df) there is no state s* such that s* is impossible and if s obtains then 
s* obtains203  
 
It is immediately obvious, I believe, that (T) doesn`t work as a definition of possibility, 
although it perhaps works as a necessary condition of possibility. Now, as mentioned above, 
Barnes`s argument for (A) turns on the truth of (T). As a definition though, (T) is false. This 
collapses the whole argument for (A) as formulated by Barnes.204 A different argument is 
needed.  
I have thought hard about (A) and I have come to suspect that there is no good argument 
showing how something`s necessity could be conceptually derived from that something 
always obtaining. This, however, doesn`t mean that (A) cannot be argued for. An alternative 
and common way of arguing for a claim is to show that accepting its falsity is theoretically 
too costly.  
So, what are the theoretical costs of denying (A)? One way of denying (A) is this: 
 
A*: s always obtains and (yet) s is not necessary 
 
First, notice that (A*) is a claim that will be embraced by a Humean. A Humean believes 
that the world has no nomological structure, that is, she doesn`t believe that there is any law-
likeness out there in the world. She sees only contiguity, temporal priority and constant 
conjunctions where others see Laws of Nature being instantiated. Uncontroversially, the 
notions of a `nomological structure` and the `Laws of Nature` entail an appeal to the modal 
property of necessity. Thus, a Humean`s denial of the world having a nomological structure 
 
203 Ibid., p.185. 
204 Barnes is, of course, aware of the implausibility of (T). The task he sets himself in the review is to 
reconstruct what he thought was Aristotle`s argument. Barnes`s faithful reconstruction inherits the 
problematic definition of possibility from Aristotle.   
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or of (being governed by) the Laws of Nature entails her denying that there is any necessity 
out there in the world.205 Consequently, she will endorse (A*).    
The Humean view according to which there is no nomological structure (or Laws of 
Nature) behind the constant conjunctions that we observe is called a regularity theory. A 
regularity theory holds that there is nothing beyond the regularities that somehow holds the 
world together: nothing that underlies them, nothing that explains them. Now, it should be 
noticed that a regularity theory is a rather extreme theory. It implies that s`s regular and 
exceptionless obtaining is not grounded in the necessity that is intrinsic to the Laws of Nature 
but - given an infinite time - due to a mindbogglingly extraordinary coincidence. Galen 
Strawson points out this implication here: 
 
According to [regularity theories]…, the regularity of the world`s behaviour is, in a clear sense, 
a complete and continuous fluke. It`s not just that we don`t know whether or not there is any 
reason for it in the nature of things. According to [regularity theories], there is definitely no 
reason for it in the nature of things.206 
 
Strawson has no patience with this view calling it `utterly implausible` and `absurd`: 
 
[T]he theory is utterly implausible in asserting categorically that there is no reason in the nature 
of things for the regularity of the world … it is absurd to say – to insists – that there is definitely 
no reason in the nature of things why regularity rather than chaos … occurs from moment to 
moment.207 
 
I am in total agreement with Strawson here. There is more to be noticed about the view 
though. Regularity theory seriously clashes with one of the foundational assumptions behind 
any theorizing about the world: the assumption that the world can be made sense of; that it 
is explicable. In such a world, coincidences of this magnitude cannot exist. The assumed 
explicability of the world commits us to assuming that the world has a nomological structure, 
appeals to which play crucial role in anything that counts as an explanation of the world. 
What is at stake here is not only the project of natural sciences to understand and explain the 
world, but also the prospects of philosophizing about it. A Humean – that is, a regularity 
theorist – rejects any talk of nomological structures or Laws of Nature because she denies 
the reality of causation. Without causation, there is no real connection between things that 
would allow the transfer of necessity between them. Thus, without causation, there are no 
Laws of Nature and nothing nomological about the world. But one cannot philosophize 
without taking causation seriously. As Helen Beebee – who is a regularity theorist – admits, 
 
 
205 This is not to say that a Humean denies conceptual necessity. She might do so, or she might not, 
depending on her other philosophical commitments. I focus on the empirical necessity here as I am 
arguing towards a modal claim about humans, that is, about empirical entities.  
206 Gallen Strawson, The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989) p.21.  
207 Ibid., pp.21-22. 
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[there is a] huge range of fruitful philosophical theories that do appeal to causation: we have 
causal theories of perception, reference, action and knowledge; functionalist theories of the mind, 
consequentialism; and so on, and on.208  
 
A Humean is a philosopher. Thus, endorsing the regularity theory will cost her dearly: Not 
only will she have to embrace a rather unattractive claim that natural sciences don`t explain 
but merely describe the world, she will also have to ditch (on pain of being inconsistent) a 
`huge range of fruitful philosophical theories`, and, perhaps, even stop philosophizing 
altogether because, as Beebee notices, `trying to do philosophy without ever using the 
concept of causation is practically impossible`.209  
Now, it is somewhat surprising that Strawson`s objections, given how damaging they 
are, haven`t elicited much response from regularity theorists. A notable exception is the 
response given by Helen Beebee in the paper I have quoted from above. The paper accurately 
and fairly presents Strawson`s objections to regularity theories and raises several important 
and correct points about the objections that a Strawsonian should take into account. That`s 
not all. Beebee takes on what I think is Strawson`s strongest objection – an objection that 
plays a key role in my argument for (A). Above, I have appealed to the extreme implausibility 
and unpalatability of the implication (of regularity theories) that the highly complex 
orderliness of the world is a result of a mindbogglingly extraordinary luck. Strawson invites 
the reader to appreciate the absurdity of the implication through considering the following 
analogy: 
 
[Imagine that] a true randomizing device determines the colour value of each pixel on a standard 
800 x 400 computer screen, running on a ten-times-a-second cycle – so that each pixel can take 
any colour value for each 1/10th second period. On the screen it appears that there is a film 
showing. A woman enters a house, walks over to a stove, and puts on a kettle. Life – a world, as 
it were – goes on in an ordered, regular fashion, exactly as regularly as in our own world. But 
the image is being generated by the true randomizing device. It is pure fluke that what happens 
on the screen appears to tell a coherent story of a regular, ordered world, rather then filling up 
with – or suddenly switching to – a fizz of points of colour.210 
 
The analogy is powerful, vividly exposing the theoretical costs of endorsing a regularity 
theory. Beebee`s response is smart. She doesn`t attack the analogy itself - in fact, she urges 
a regularity theorist that she `must […] accept that from a metaphysical point of view the 
analogy is a pertinent one`211 - she, instead, argues that the implication can be tolerated. Her 
argument in this respect is, roughly, this: True, a regularity theory comes at the cost of 
 
208 Helen Beebee, `Does Anything Hold the Universe Together?`, Synthese, 149, no. 3, Metaphysics 
in Science (Apr., 2006), pp.509-533, (p.510). 
209 Ibid., p.510. 
210 Strawson, The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume, p.24. 
211 Beebee, `Does Anything Hold the Universe Together?`,  p.527. 
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accepting that the highly complex orderliness of the world is due to just a massive – and 
ongoing – luck. However, that`s nothing to be much upset about because we have already 
learned how to tolerate `outrageous runs of luck`.212 Consider your own life. You are alive 
as a result of an extremely long series of lucky events. Think of all those things that had to 
happen in order for you to be born. On countless occasions, your parents might have done 
something that would have prevented you having been conceived, or they might have not 
even met in the first place. The same goes for your grandparents on whose actions the 
existence of your parents – thus yours too - depends. Ultimately, your existence and everyone 
else`s existence depends on that spectacularly lucky streak of events that resulted in Earth 
being a place that supports life. Now, when you start thinking about all this, how much does 
it really bother you? Most likely, not much at all. You don`t really think there is, or must be, 
any `reason` why things happened in a way that ultimately led to your coming into existence.  
This is an intriguing reply even though I don`t think it works. Let`s have a closer look 
at what is going on here. Strawson formulates a thought experiment designed to expose the 
extreme implausibility of the claim that a purely random process can, at the same time, be a 
process that is highly ordered and keeps being so for very long periods of time. In response, 
Beebee invites the reader to consider their own life to see that it, too, despite being ordered 
and coherent, is a result of a long series of lucky events. She notices that it doesn`t seem to 
bother us much that luck plays such a fundamental role in our lives and concludes that we, 
in fact, already know how to tolerate the seemingly intolerable implication of regularity 
theories. Beebee`s reply turns on being presented as an analogy to Strawson`s thought 
experiment. And if it is an analogy then whatever the analogy shows can be – by analogy – 
said to be shown about the thought experiment. In our case: if we stay unperturbed about our 
lives being a massive fluke (as shown by the analogy), then why be perturbed about (a) a 
movie with a coherent story being generated by a randomizing device, and (b) about, 
ultimately, the implication of regularity theories? The problem with the reply is that the little 
consideration that Beebee offers as an analogy to the thought experiment is an analogy only 
seemingly.          
The intuitive force of Strawson`s thought experiment depends crucially on contrasting  
a true randomizing device with the high level of orderliness and coherence of a movie. 
Beebee, however, doesn`t mention any randomizing device at all. She, instead, talks about 
luck, and contrasts it with the orderliness and coherence of one`s life. Presumably, a true 
randomizing device and luck are treated as conceptual analogues here. Luck, however, is a 
notion that is ambiguous in a way that a true randomizing device isn`t – it has both a 
metaphysical and an epistemological reading. True randomizing device, on the other hand, 
 
212 Strawson, The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume, p.26. 
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has (at least in the context of the thought experiment) only a metaphysical reading. Now, it 
certainly feels perfectly natural to see your own life as a miracle of sorts: so many things 
could have gone wrong over such a long time, and if they had, you wouldn`t have been born. 
But they didn`t, and once you stop for a moment to appreciate this, you can`t but feel 
extraordinarily lucky. This feeling, however, is just due to you having an epistemological 
access to only a tiny fragment of the total facts that, as a whole, produced you. If you knew 
the totality of those facts you would feel about as lucky as you feel when you clap your hands 
and it produces a sound, that is: you wouldn`t find anything lucky about it. The huge gaps in 
your knowledge about the past events that gave rise to your existence give a strong 
impression that those relatively very few facts you know are somehow floating in the ocean 
of randomness. This ocean of randomness, however, is, in fact, just your inevitable ignorance 
regarding the totality of events that, ultimately, produced you. If you knew the totality of the 
facts, the ocean would evaporate. Beebee`s reply by way of offering and exploiting an 
analogy to Strawson`s thought experiment doesn`t work because Strawson contrasts a highly 
ordered and coherent state of affairs with metaphysical luck, while Beebee contrasts it with 
(what I call here) epistemological luck.  
In little bit more detail, the problem is this. Arguably, most people know, often perhaps 
in some pre-conceptual way, that the kind of luck they accept as being involved in their own 
and others` lives is something like the kind of luck I have qualified above as epistemological 
luck. Or, at least, they would resist understanding the luck involved in their lives as being 
conceptually equivalent to a true randomizing device. Why do I claim this? It is a safe bet to 
expect that the vast majority of people would find Strawson`s thought experiment 
convincing.213 That is, they would agree that highly ordered and coherent states of affairs 
lasting for long periods of time cannot emerge out of a truly random process. They, at the 
same time, accept that they are very lucky regarding their lives, which can only mean that 
people normally don`t understand luck as a truly random process.214 Thus Beebee cannot 
claim that we already know how to tolerate luck in our lives in the sense of tolerating the 
thought that our lives emerge out of a truly random process. She can claim so only in terms 
of (what I call) epistemological luck. In this sense, however, her reply misses the target.  
 
213 Recall that Helen Beebee herself agrees that the thought experiment `is a pertinent one`.  
214 The following uncharitable answer is possible: The majority of people have inconsistent intuitions. 
Therefore, they will be convinced by Strawson`s thought experiment and yet see their lives as lucky 
in the sense of being truly random. This reply is rather unattractive. Accepting that most people have 
inconsistent intuitions severely undermines any appeal to intuitions in philosophical arguments. Some 
of the most important arguments in philosophy rely on an appeal to (rational/conceptual) intuitions. 
Thus, the uncharitable reply would be far too costly. 
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To the best of my knowledge, Beebee`s response to Strawson`s thought experiment is 
the strongest challenge to it that can be found in philosophical literature. It fails nonetheless. 
Consequently, a Humean objection to (A) fails too.  
Once the truth of (A) has been established, the rest of the argument for (PP) is relatively 
straightforward. Recall:  
 
A: if s always obtains then s is necessary 
 
The Principle of Plenitude (PP): For some states of affairs s, if s is possible then there 
is a time at which s obtains. 
 
(PP) is then readily derivable from (A) in the following way. Suppose that s is a contingent 
state of affairs. That is, suppose that s is a possible but not necessary state of affairs. Then 
s`s not obtaining is a contingent (that is, possible but not necessary) state of affairs. If that is 
so, then s`s not obtaining is not necessary. And from this it follows, by (A), that `s's not 
obtaining does not always obtain; hence there is a time at which the non-obtaining of s's not 
obtaining obtains; i.e. there is a time at which s obtains`.215 This might feel too condensed, 
so let me unpack it here a little: 
i. Suppose: s is (a) contingent (state of affairs). 
ii. (i) entails that s`s not obtaining is contingent. 
iii. (ii) entails that s`s not obtaining is not necessary. 
iv. A: if s always obtains then s is necessary  . 
v. By (A): if s`s not obtaining is not necessary, then s`s not obtaining doesn`t 
always obtain. 
vi. If s`s not obtaining doesn`t always obtain, then there is a time at which s`s not 
obtaining doesn`t obtain. 
vii. To say that `there is a time at which s`s not obtaining doesn`t obtain` is to say 
that `there is a time at which s obtains`.  
I take it that it has been proved that (for some states of affairs)216: if s is (a) contingent (state 
of affairs) then there is a time at which s obtains. This is, for our purposes here, close enough 
to (PP), thus I shall, from now on, assume the truth of (PP). 
 
215 Ibid., p.185. 
216 A reminder: (PP) doesn`t apply to all kinds of states of affairs. As mentioned above, (PP) won`t 
work for states of affairs involving, for instance, perishable particulars. This deficiency will be 
addressed when discussing step 6 below.   
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Before I proceed to the discussion of step (2) regarding the argument behind the claim 
that the moral standing of man is essentially corrupted, let me briefly address a little issue 
regarding the plausibility of (PP). I strongly suspect that many readers – even those that have 
been convinced about the validity of the argument - will find (PP) and its implications just 
too fantastic to swallow. As Barnes notes: 
 
According to (PP), elephants will tell each other human jokes, the first daffodils of autumn will 
appear when the leaves fall upwards to the trees, and pigeons will hunt cats through city 
backyards.217  
 
 
This, indeed, is a rather unpalatable corollary to (PP). Is it, however, unavoidable? It isn`t, I 
believe. (PP) is a thesis about (some) possible states of affairs, i.e. it tells us something 
interesting (and perhaps unexpected) about (some) possible states of affairs. It doesn`t, 
however, come with any prior commitment to what states of affairs count as possible. In this 
respect it is entirely up to the reader to decide what states of affairs she accepts as possible. 
In other words, the reader can, if she wishes, avoid the above mentioned unpalatable 
corollary to (PP) by refusing to accept as possible states of affairs the ones in which elephants 
tell each other human jokes, the leaves fall upwards to the tress, and pigeons hunt cats 
through cities. I, for one, am far from sure that these count as possible states of affairs. A 
deeper point here is this. (PP) could be taken as a metaphysical definition of possibility – this 
is, I believe, just a matter of choice. Once accepted as a metaphysical definition of possibility, 
it pre-empts any objection that appeals to the implausibility of its implications of the kind 
Barnes gives because the logic of such a definition serves as a constraint on what counts as 
a possibility in the first place. Be that as it may, the kind of possibility we will apply (PP) to 
below is nowhere close to as fantastic as the possibilities conceived of by Barnes.  
5.4.2  A state of affairs that has obtained is a possible state of affairs 
There is an obvious sense in which this assertion is correct. If s`s not obtaining is necessary, 
then s never obtains. Hence, if s has obtained then s`s not obtaining is not necessary. And, if 
s`s not obtaining is not necessary then s is possible. This little argument appeals to a 
straightforward logical relation between the concepts of `something never obtaining`, 
`something being necessary` and `something being possible`. Now, things get a bit 
complicated once we go beyond a merely conceptual reading of the assertion. One might 
wonder whether and in what sense the assertion works out there in the world. Does the 
assertion as it stands imply that, for instance, if a state of affairs has obtained, then it is 
 
217 Jonathan Barnes (review of) J. Hintikka, `Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle`s Theory of 
Modality`, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 97 (1977), pp.183-186, (p.184). 
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possible that it will obtain again? Surely, one would be justified in reading it in this way. A 
moment`s reflection reveals, however, that, at least for some states of affairs, this cannot be 
true. There are possible states of affairs that, (a), involve perishable particulars and, (b), 
involve events that cause the involved particulars to perish. Clearly, once such a possible 
state of affairs has obtained and the particulars involved have perished, it is impossible for 
that state of affairs to obtain again (that is, to obtain in future). Thus, there are states of affairs 
that have happened and yet are in a sense impossible. For reasons that will become obvious 
later, I need to be able to read the assertion as implying that if a state of affairs has obtained 
then it is possible it will obtain again. To allow that reading, the assertion needs to be 
qualified in something like the following way: 
AQ: If a state of affairs has obtained and if its relevant subject(s) has/have survived the 
obtaining, then it is possible that the state of affairs will happen again. 
Not much turns on the notion of a relevant subject (of a state of affairs), and I don`t intend 
to give a definition of it here. Its function in the qualified assertion is just to block the 
application of the assertion onto the states of affairs that happened but cannot possibly 
happen again because its relevant subject(s) has/have perished. Clearly, the death of Bertrand 
Russell implies that a state of affairs in which Bertrand Russell has died is, conceptually 
speaking, a possible state of affairs. It is not, however, a possible state of affairs in the sense 
of (AQ) as this state of affairs cannot happen again simply because the subject of this state 
of affairs doesn`t exist anymore. 
I believe that our ordinary intuitions about possibility are governed by, among others, 
something like (AQ). Consider the case of climbing Mount Everest without the use of 
supplemental oxygen. For a long time, it had been hotly disputed whether this was possible 
at all. Then, on 8 May 1978, Messner and Habeler reached the summit of Mount Everest 
without the aid of supplemental oxygen. This achievement has established that it is possible 
for man to climb Mount Everest without supplemental oxygen.218 It has been established 
both conceptually and in the sense of (AQ). In the sense of (AQ), it has been established  
because it has happened and the subject of this kind of state of affairs – man – is still around 
to possibly repeat the performance.  
5.4.3  Plausibly, if a state of affairs involving a member m of a kind k is a possible state 
of affairs then a relevantly similar state of affairs involving any other member of the 
kind k is possible too  
 
218 Here I presume as unproblematic to generalize from a member of a species to species as a whole. 
It sounds very natural to say that a bristlecone pine tree can live (i.e. it is possible for it to live) for 
more than 5000 years on the grounds that just one particular member of this species, Methuselah in 
California`s White Mountains, has lived that long, even though vast majority of bristlecone pine trees 
had lived nowhere close that long. I will say more about this in the following section.  
123 
 
I have assumed this in the last paragraph of the previous section where I treated a particular  
achievement of two Italian mountaineers as indicative of what is possible for man as a 
species. In a footnote related to that paragraph (footnote 218), I gave a brief consideration in 
support of this treatment.  
Let me repeat and slightly expand the supporting consideration. There is a particular 
tree in California`s White Mountains that has been named, quite tellingly, Methuselah. The 
tree belongs to the species of a bristlecone pine tree and is believed to be almost 5000 years 
old. This makes it the oldest non-clonal tree in the world. Now, as far as we know, no other 
bristlecone pine tree is as old as Methuselah, and the vast majority of the other bristlecone 
pine trees had lived nowhere close to 5000 years. Yet, it is fairly common to generalize from 
what we know about Methuselah to what we take as possible about the species that 
Methuselah belongs to. When you start reading about these amazing trees, you will often 
come across something like the following perfectly natural sounding statement: `The 
bristlecone pine can live 5000 years, making it the oldest individually growing organism on 
the planet, […].219 This statement is a good example of precisely the kind of a generalization 
from a single (past) achievement of a member of a species to what is possible for the species 
as a whole that I endorse here as plausible. The context of the article this statement is taken 
from makes it clear that `the bristlecone pine` refers to a species, `can` refers to possibility, 
and the figure of 5000 years relates to Methuselah.  
5.4.4  Some men did or have done things that (have) corrupted their moral standing 
This is an uncontroversial empirical fact. The list of serious wrongdoings done by millions 
of men throughout the history is disturbingly long. In a suitable context, any of those serious 
wrongdoings would be deemed sufficient to critically undermine one`s moral standing.  
5.4.5  It is possible for any man to have their moral standing corrupted    
This is step (5) of the argument, and it follows unproblematically from the previous three 
steps.  Step (4), when slightly reformulated, says that some members of the species of homo 
sapiens – that is, some men – have done things that have corrupted their moral standing. Step 
(2) says that a state of affairs that has obtained is a possible state of affairs. This then entails 
that a state of affairs in which a member of the species homo sapiens does things that corrupt 
his/her moral standing is a possible state of affairs. Step (3) allows generalizing from a 
possibility about an individual member of a species to a possibility about the species as a 
 
219 Scott Smith, `Scientists: The Future of oldest tree species on Earth in peril`, AP News, September 
14, 2017 <https://apnews.com/776e453d15674f1e9eb20af289d6e46e/Scientists:-Future-of-oldest-
tree-species-on-Earth-in-peril> [accessed 26 June 2020] 
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whole. Hence, we can conclude that it is possible for any man to have their moral standing 
corrupted.  
5.4.6  One`s (present) moral standing gets corrupted (not only by the past and present 
wrongdoings but even) by one`s future wrongdoings 
On the face of it, this sounds rather unintuitive. How can one`s present moral standing get 
corrupted by a future wrongdoing, i.e. by a wrongdoing that hasn`t happened yet? The 
unintuitivness of the claim has to do with our common understanding of how causality and 
the time arrow relate to each other. Normally, we won`t take future events as being causally 
efficacious in the present because it seems a fundamental fact that the future is due to the 
present and not vice versa.220 And it might seem like that`s what we are being asked to do 
here: we are invited to consider and accept that one`s future wrongdoing affects one`s present 
moral standing. The appearance is misleading though. The relation between one`s 
wrongdoing and one`s moral standing is not a causal relation, or, at least, not a 
straightforwardly causal one. I don`t wish to go into the metaphysics of causality here to 
illuminate the point. Instead, consider the following simple analogy: 
You have acquired insider information that in two months the government will introduce a 
drastic currency reform that will depreciate the value of pound ten times. In response to this 
information you withdraw all the savings from your bank account and buy gold with it.  
 
Now, there is a sense in which this little story could be described as a future event affecting 
your present state or actions: a currency reform  happening in two months causes you to 
adopt (now) certain financial measures in response.221 Thus, as we can see, there is a perfectly 
natural way of taking future events as affecting the presence.  
The analogy, however, will take us only so far. The target claim is that one`s future 
wrongdoing corrupts one`s present moral standing. In the case of the currency reform, its 
happening in the future – although it, in a sense, affected my actions in the present – hasn`t 
 
220 This is not to say that this seemingly uncontroversial fact hasn`t been challenged. There is some 
intriguing literature on the issue of backward causation that seriously discusses the possibility of cases 
where the effect temporally, but not causally, precedes its cause. See for instance Michael Dummett, 
“Can an Effect Precede its Cause”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 28 (Supplement) (1954) 
pp.27–44., or Jan Faye,  “Causation, Reversibility, and the Direction of Time”, in Jan Faye, Uwe 
Scheffler and Max Urchs (eds.), Perspectives on Time (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 
Vol. 189), (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1997) pp.237–266. 
221 This, of course, is neither the only nor the most natural reading of the little story. It could be insisted 
that it is rather a present belief about a future state/event then the future state/event itself what causally 
affects your actions in the story. And I wouldn`t want to object to this. My point here is just that there 
is quite a natural way of taking future states/events as affecting the present, and that this little story is, 
by way of analogy, a first approximation towards understanding how one`s future wrongdoing could 
be taken as corruptive of one`s present moral standing.  
125 
 
done anything to the value of the currency in the present. Apart from a few insiders in the 
government and the Central Bank, no one knows about the planned reform, and, therefore, 
there are no bank runs that would depreciate the currency. Now, clearly, the currency and 
the moral standing are counterparts in the analogy. Thus, if we cannot conclude that the 
currency has devaluated then we cannot, by analogy, conclude that the moral standing has 
become corrupted. More needs to be done. Consider the following thought experiment: 
There is a time-machine device that makes it possible to find out what (if any) moral 
wrongdoing a person does in future. John`s wife Mary has found out about John`s 
extramarital affair. Mary reproaches John for cheating on her: `You are a despicable person. 
How could you betray me like this?! You make me sick.` In response, John turns on the time-
machine device. The device informs them that in 4 years from now Mary will also cheat on 
her husband (although, alas, not John but someone else will be Mary`s husband by then). 
John breaks the silence: `Who are you to call me a despicable person? You are no different!`.  
Now, I believe it will be agreed that John`s reply to Mary`s reproach, and his questioning of 
her moral standing, is totally appropriate. And if that is so, then we can conclude that one`s 
future wrongdoing corrupts one`s (present) moral standing. 
5.4.7  (PP) can be applied to (5), that is: the status of one`s moral standing belongs to 
the states of affairs that (PP) applies to     
In section 5.4.2 we have identified an ambiguity in the notion of possibility. Conceptually 
speaking, a state of affairs that has obtained is a possible state of affairs. However, the same 
state of affairs will not be possible in the sense of it possibly obtaining again if it, (a), involves 
perishable particulars and, (b), the state of affairs is such that when it has obtained, the 
relevant particulars perished.  
Now, in the following section, I will want to conclude that for all men there is a time at 
which their moral standing gets corrupted. We already know that it is possible for any man 
to have their moral standing corrupted. At the same time, many (perhaps most) men haven`t, 
yet, had their moral standing corrupted. This means that if we want to conclude that for all 
men there is a time at which their moral standing gets corrupted, then that time must be in 
the future. There is, however, something else waiting in future for all men – their death. Any 
man is a perishable particular and it is certainly possible that they will perish before they 
manage to corrupt their moral standing. Surely, it would be extremely implausible to claim 
that none of the people presently alive will die before they manage to corrupt their moral 
standing. This possibility represents a serious challenge to my argument, because if it is 
possible for a man to perish before they corrupt their moral standing then I won`t be able to 
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conclude that for all men there is a time (in future) at which their moral standing gets 
corrupted.  
One way to respond to this challenge is to appeal to certain implications that can be 
extracted from the following assertion:  
L: Luck cannot make a difference in one`s moral standing. 
Thomas Nagel refers to something like (L) when he says that it is `intuitively plausible that 
people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for what is due to factors 
beyond their control`.222 Nagel claims this in the context of discussing what has been known 
as the Problem of Moral Luck (PML). (PML), roughly, is a problem constituted by an 
obvious tension between the intuitively compelling (L) and the fact that in our common 
practice of holding others morally responsible, luck does seem to make a difference (for 
instance, a drunk driver that ran over a pedestrian will be blamed more than a drunk driver 
who was lucky that there were no pedestrians around when he was driving home from pub). 
We don`t need to go into the intriguing details of (PML) here. For our purposes, it suffices 
to notice that (PML) is a problem taken seriously by contemporary moral theorists, which 
can be the case only if the moral intuition that co-constitutes it – that is, (L) - is taken as 
sufficiently plausible. I will follow suit.  
So how exactly does (L) help us to respond to the challenge mentioned above? There is 
an essential aspect of luck that could be described as a lack of control. This should be 
uncontroversial. Surely, an event that is under one`s control cannot be described as a lucky 
event. If that is so, then (L) could be reformulated in the following way: 
L*: An event that one has no control over cannot make a difference in one`s moral 
standing. 
I take it that (L*) is no less plausible than (L).223 Now, one`s mortality is clearly beyond 
one`s control and as such it belongs to the kind of events that cannot make a difference in 
one`s moral standing. In other words, death is not an excuse for wrongdoings that one would 
do if one didn`t die. Consider this: 
 
222 Thomas Nagel, `Moral Luck` in Daniel Statman (ed), Moral Luck (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 1993) pp.57-71, (p.58). 
223 However, I don`t wish to imply that luck and lack of control are synonymous concepts. They are 
not. There is going to be full moon in several days; an event that is totally beyond my control. To 
describe this as me being lucky (whenever there is full moon) would be rather weird. There is 
remarkably little discussion on the nature of the concept of luck among moral theorists. An intriguing 
exception is Nicholas Rescher, Luck: The Brilliant Randomness of Everyday Life (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1995). 
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A terrorist plants a bomb in a theatre full of people. The bomb is controlled remotely. The 
terrorist contacts the authorities informing them that a bomb has been planted in an unknown 
public place. He presents a list of demands. After the negotiations with the authorities fail, 
the terrorist proceeds to detonate the bomb. He is about to push the button on the remote 
control when he suffers a sudden cardiac arrest. He drops the remote control before he 
manages to press the button; he passes out and a few minutes later he is dead.  
 
It will be agreed, I believe, that the terrorist in our little story is an extremely wicked person. 
He will be seen as such despite the fact that he has caused no harm to anyone. He would have 
done it, had he not been prevented by his sudden death, and that is enough for us   to judge 
him as morally corrupted.224 
We can conclude that in the contexts of evaluating moral standings, one`s perishability 
is irrelevant. That is, in these contexts, a human agent must be seen as if she was 
imperishable. Above (section 5.4.2), it has been shown that (PP) won`t work for perishables. 
Thus, if man can be treated as imperishable in the contexts of evaluating their moral standing, 
then (PP) applies in those contexts.  
5.4.8  For all men there is a time at which they do things that corrupt their moral 
standing  
This follows from steps (1), (5) and (7) in the following straightforward way. (5) tells us that 
it is possible for any man to do things that corrupt their moral standing. (1) tells us that for 
some states of affairs, if they are possible then there is a time at which they obtain. And (7) 
tells us that doing things that corrupt one`s moral standing belongs to the state of affairs that 
(1) applies to. Step (7) is crucial here, as it allows to treat man as immortal. Without this step 
it could be objected that many men will simply die before they manage to do something that 
corrupts their moral stranding. 
5.4.9  The moral standing of man is essentially corrupted 
Above, we have concluded that for all men there is a time at which they do things that corrupt 
their moral standing. It seems obvious that a wrongdoing done in the past or in the present 
corrupts one`s present moral standing. It is much less obvious, however, that one`s present 
 
224 It could be pointed out that what makes us judge the terrorist as morally corrupted is his intention 
to do harm. This could be then taken as showing that it is not only future (or past or present) actions 
that corrupt one`s moral standing but the intentions to do them as well. This can be conceded without 
any harm to the logic of the argument. The reader is invited to understand an action as morally 
corrupting only if it is intentional.  
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moral standing gets corrupted by a future wrongdoing. Step (6) explains how that is the case 
nonetheless.  
At this point we can draw something like the following picture of man`s moral standing. 
It is possible for any man to do a wrongdoing. There is a time at which all men will do a 
wrongdoing. Regardless of whether the time of one`s wrongdoing is in the past, in the present 
or in the future, the wrongdoing corrupts one`s (present) moral standing. Therefore, at any 
present moment, all men`s moral standing is corrupted. Another way of putting the last point 
is that: the moral standing of man is essentially corrupted.  
5.5  Conclusion 
We have come full circle. We want our practice of holding others responsible to be fair. The 
fairness of the practice depends on the possession of free will. The idea of possessing free 
will in a causally determined world constitutes a serious dilemma. Philosophers are 
concerned about the fairness of the practice and, therefore, they address the dilemma. A 
successful account of free will is expected to sustain the fairness of the practice. The 
philosophers addressing the dilemma work under the assumption that once the dilemma is 
solved there won`t be any other reason preventing us from pronouncing the practice as, in 
principle, fair. I submit, however, that there is another such reason. It is commonly accepted 
that the practice of holding another responsible is unfair if the holder`s moral standing has 
been compromised. I argue that morally compromised standing is essential to all men. Thus, 
the fairness of the practice cannot be saved even if a successful account of free will is 
formulated. This means that the fact that my compatibilist solution to the problem of free 
will doesn`t enable theoretical justification of the practice of holding others responsible 
shouldn`t be seen as a weakness of the solution. It shouldn`t be seen as such because the 
practice is – for a separate reason – essentially unjustifiable anyway.  
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Appendix 
My argument here in Appendix will crucially depend on a philosophical interpretation of a 
passage from the New Testament. It is somewhat tricky to try to build a convincing 
philosophical argument around a passage from a religious text. Presumably, most of my 
readers will be either atheists and/or those unwilling to mix philosophical with theological 
assumptions. They will, therefore, see little theoretical value (regarding philosophical 
arguments) in appeals to religious texts. Thus, almost half of the chapter is devoted to 
convincing the presumably atheistic reader that a religious text can be relevant in a 
philosophical argument. The convincing will consist of two arguments. The first one relies 
on some rather controversial claims, and although I will provide an argument in support of 
each controversial claim, I do not expect the first argument to convince all or even most of 
my readers. I hope to have, in this respect, more success with the second argument as it 
employs considerably less controversial claims. 
1.1  The epistemic status of a religious text: two arguments 
I will extract the reasons for claiming that the moral standing of man is essentially corrupted 
from the following story in the New Testament: 
 
Then each of them went home, while Jesus went to the Mount of Olives. Early in the morning 
he came again to the temple. All the people came to him and he sat down and began to teach 
them.  The scribes and the Pharisees brought a woman who had been caught in adultery; and 
making her stand before all of them, they said to him, "Teacher, this woman was caught in the 
very act of committing adultery. Now in the law Moses commanded us to stone such women. 
Now what do you say?" They said this to test him, so that they might have some charge to bring 
against him. Jesus bent down and wrote with his finger on the ground. When they kept on 
questioning him, he straightened up and said to them, "Let anyone among you who is without 
sin be the first to throw a stone at her." And once again he bent down and wrote on the ground. 
When they heard it, they went away, one by one, beginning with the elders; and Jesus was left 
alone with the woman standing before him. Jesus straightened up and said to her, "Woman, 
where are they? Has no one condemned you?" She said, "No one, sir." And Jesus said, "Neither 
do I condemn you. Go your way, and from now on do not sin again."225 
 
I wish to extract philosophical reasons from a religious text. A secular, materialist reader will 
understandably look at such a wish with suspicion. Religious texts, almost by definition, 
draw their plausibility from an (alleged) divine authority. This is something that stands in a 
strong contrast to modern philosophy which – inspired by the Enlightenment – recognizes 
Reason and only Reason as the ultimate authority in theorizing about the world.  
I am fully in agreement with this Enlightenment-inspired approach to philosophising. 
There is, however, something peculiar about moral issues that, at least in some cases, ties 
their discussion with relevant religious texts. There is an obvious, historical connection. 
 
225 Bible (New Revised Standard Version), John 7:53 – 8:11 
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Since the beginning of the Abrahamic faiths and of Greek philosophy, religion and morality 
have been very closely intertwined, in fact, inseparable until very recently. The truth of a 
moral claim used to be fully established by a reference to a relevant passage in a canonical 
religious text. In modern, predominantly atheistic, ethical theory, canonical religious texts 
don`t wield such authority anymore. They are, however, still seen, amongst other things, as 
records of what a culture is strongly inclined to take to be morally right and wrong. Thus, a 
modern (atheistic) moral theorist will respect the texts not as something that fixes the truth 
of their moral claims in virtue of being inspired by the divine but merely as something that 
has historically informed our moral axioms without providing, in itself, any resources to 
ground their truth.  
Now, this obvious, historical connection between moral values and religious texts is not 
good enough for my little project of extracting philosophical reasons (relevant to a moral 
theory) from a religious text exactly because the texts themselves offer no resources to 
ground the truth of their moral claims. More is needed here. Below, I formulate and defend 
two arguments that purport to show that religious texts should be seen as carrying a 
significant epistemic weight in moral theorizing. The arguments won`t convince a moral non-
realist as they assume the truth of moral realism. That shouldn`t bother us here because we 
have already lost a moral non-realist above (see sections 4.2 and 4.5.2.1) when we have tied 
the issue of justifying the practice of holding others accountable in a causally determined 
world to the notion of fairness. A moral non-realist has to resist such a tie because fairness 
is a notion that refers to an objective (mind-independent) moral property; that is, it refers to 
a kind of property that a moral non-realist doesn`t accept into their ontology. 
1.1.1  The first argument 
Before I give you an outline of the first argument, let me show my hand here as it will make 
it easier to see how the argument is supposed to work.  
Atheism has always been associated with the worry that if God doesn`t exist then there 
are no moral obligations, no moral rights or wrongs. Richard Taylor, who is a non-theist, 
argues against moral realism on exactly these grounds: 
 
Our moral obligations can […] be understood as those that are imposed by God. […] But what 
if this higher-than-human lawgiver is no longer taken into account? Does the concept of moral 
obligation […] still make sense? […] [T]he concept of moral obligation [is] unintelligible apart 
from the idea of God. The words remain but their meaning is gone.226 
 
William James seems to hold a similar view when he says: 
 
226 Richard Taylor, Ethics, Faith, and Reason (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), pp.83-
84. 
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The stable and systematic moral universe for which the ethical philosopher asks is fully possible 
only in a world where there is a divine thinker with all-enveloping demands.227 
 
I wish to exploit the implication that God`s non-existence implies non-existence of moral 
obligations in my argument below. I will argue that being a moral realist commits one to the 
assumption of God. Under this assumption, the epistemic weight of religious texts increases 
dramatically. The following is, however, no knock-out argument. It rests on some highly 
contentious assumptions, and although I will try to dispel some of the potential objections, it 
will convince only some of my readers. The unconvinced will find more force in the second 
argument.  
An outline of the argument: 
E1: Moral realism: there are objective moral truths. 
E2: The objective moral truths have a normative force. 
E3: The force of a moral truth can be normative only if it comes from an external 
authority. 
E4: That which is an (external) authority in relation to humans must itself be trans- or 
super-human, i.e. in some sense, higher in the ontological hierarchy. 
E5: This trans-human authority might plausibly be seen as the God of religious texts. 
E6: Recovering God as entailed in the theory of moral realism restores (for a moral 
realist) the epistemic authority of a religious text.  
1.1.1.1  Moral realism: there are objective moral truths 
(E1) is an assumption that has been implicit in the discussion already for some time (since 
section 4.2). Although the majority of philosophers are moral realists,228 moral anti-realism 
is not a position that is obviously inferior to that of moral realism. There are good reasons to 
be a moral anti-realist.229 (E1) explicitly stipulates the truth of moral realism, which 
immediately closes off the argument for an anti-realist. This, however, shouldn`t – as 
explained above – be seen as a weakness here. I lost a moral anti-realist already some time 
ago. In the context of grounding our practice of holding others accountable, free will is an 
 
227 William James, `The Moral philosopher and the Moral Life`, International Journal of Ethics, 1, 
no. 3 (1891), pp.330–354 (section V).  
228PhilPapers, 'The Philpapers Surveys', ed. by PhilPapers (2014). 
<http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl?affil=Target+faculty&areas0=0&areas_max=1&grain=coar
se> [accessed 21 March 2019]. 
229 Perhaps the most plausible objection to moral realism draws its strength from the huge popularity 
of the evolutionary paradigm. The evolutionary paradigm provides powerful conceptual tools to 
interpret the so-called objective moral facts as, in fact, contingent adaptive mechanisms that vary with 
varying stages of our evolutionary development.   
132 
 
issue only if the practice is motivated by desert/fairness, and that is a condition that a moral 
anti-realist cannot accept. 
1.1.1.2  The objective moral truths have a normative force 
(E2): The objective moral truths have a normative force. Richard Joyce argues that 
normativity of moral truths is a non-negotiable commitment.230 This should be 
uncontroversial. Morally right actions ought to be pursued, morally wrong actions ought to 
be avoided. Let me briefly deal with a possible, albeit a somewhat confused objection.  
Hume famously argued that one cannot derive imperative statements from factual 
statements, that is, one cannot derive claims about what ought to be the case from what is 
the case.231 Isn`t such a mistaken derivation what I am guilty of here? Don`t I first state there 
are moral facts, (E1), and then proceed to derive imperativness or normativity, (E2)? Well, 
not really. I agree with Hume: one can`t derive an `ought` from an `is`. I am not, however, 
deriving anything - I am stipulating. When the assumption of moral realism is introduced in 
(E1), facts232 come inseparably mashed with imperatives. The peculiar nature of moral facts 
is that they command. Once something is recognized as a moral fact, it must be, at the same 
time, recognized as an imperative; that is, its normative force cannot go unrecognized. Eric 
D`Arcy takes this last point as self-evident in the strict sense: "If someone says, 'X is good,' 
it is nonsense to agree that it is, and to ask whether it is something that should be desired and 
pursued".233 Thus, once the reader accepts that moral facts exist (as she should if worried 
about the fairness of our practice of holding others accountable in a world where alternative 
causal chains are impossible), she accepts the normative force that comes with them. That`s 
because (E1) entails (E2). 
1.1.1.3  The force of a moral truth can be normative only if it comes from an external 
authority 
(E3) is a crucial but, at the same time, rather controversial claim. The force of a moral truth 
is normative in the sense of it obliging an agent (who is confronted with it) to act in a certain 
way. Now, (E3) could be seen as combining two separate claims:  
i. The normative force of a moral truth is, in some sense, out there in the world. 
ii. Obligation entails authority. 
 
 
230 Richard Joyce, The Myth of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), ch.1. 
231 The argument is located in the last paragraph of David Hume`s A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 
III, Part I, Section I.  
232 Although the claim in (E1) is formulated in terms of moral truths, it could be equally well (i.e. 
salva veritate) formulated in terms of moral facts.  
233 Eric D'Arcy, Conscience and Its Right to Freedom (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961), p.53. 
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Most moral realists will be happy to endorse (i) while denying (ii). They will insist that the 
obliging force is intrinsic to a morally significant situation or, somehow, constituted234 by 
the situation. An agent employs her sense of justice to detect the obliging force and acts 
accordingly. There is no need to posit an obliging authority somewhere in this picture. This 
position will be popular with those who are both moral realists and atheists.  I appreciate the 
appeal and plausibility of the position: it is parsimonious, compatible with atheism and it 
seems to agree with the phenomenology of our moral experience. When involved in a 
morally significant situation, we perceive the obliging force as coming from within the 
situation, and not as something imposed on us by an authority. This is, I agree, a correct 
description of our moral experience. The question is whether the fact of such an experience 
implies that the source of the obliging force is to be found in that situation. It can be argued 
that it doesn`t. Consider the following simple analogy: A water tap above my kitchen sink is 
a place where my water comes from. At the same time, the tap is not the source of my water, 
which I am, at times and rather annoyingly, reminded of when the water supplier temporarily 
stops the supply for repairs or because of an emergency. Similarly, the morally significant 
situation might be where the obliging force is (spatiotemporally) located without the 
situation being its source.  
The possibility of interpreting a morally significant situation as a mere (spatiotemporal) 
location and not as a source of its obliging force represents an alternative that some may find 
attractive. Who and for what reasons? In principle, a moral non-realist should accept the 
(theoretical) distinction between a morally significant situation as a location and as a source 
of its obliging force as such a distinction is compatible with her (typical) endorsement of the 
is-ought gap. A moral non-realist can then appeal to the idea that as a mere location, a 
situation doesn`t intrinsically involve any obliging force. It would do so only as a source of 
it. And, of course, a moral non-realist will deny that situations can be such sources.  
What about a moral realist? There will be at least two groups of moral realists who 
might be happy to accept that a morally significant situation is a mere location and not a 
source of the obliging force.  
The first one is a group of Kantians. For a Kantian, the obliging force has its source in 
the autonomy of a rational agent and not in a morally significant situation. Thus a Kantian 
will find the distinction between a situation as a location and as a source of the obliging force 
 
234 A common strategy is to appeal to the theoretical notion of supervenience here. The notion of 
supervenience applied in ethics gives us something like the following necessary connection between 
natural facts and their moral properties: there cannot be any moral difference between two possible 
states of affairs or actions without there being some difference regarding the natural facts that 
constitute the respective states of affairs or actions. This claim is widely accepted and as such rarely 
argued for. An exception (regarding an attempt to argue for it) is Michael Smith `Does the Evaluative 
Supervene on the Natural?`, in Michael Smith, Ethics and the A Priori, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), pp.208–233. 
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useful as it allows her to explain certain phenomenological aspects of our moral experience 
– for instance, the impression that the obliging force is somehow in the situation - while 
retaining her claim that the actual source of it is in the autonomy of a rational agent.  
The second group consists of moral realists who – while insisting that the source of the 
obliging force lies in the morally significant situation – wish to have a `plan B` in reserve. 
Why should a moral realist of the second group wish to have a `plan B`? The answer has to 
do (again) with the distinction known as is-ought gap. The distinction is commonly 
formulated in terms of an implication: the fact that something is the case doesn`t imply that 
something ought to be the case. This could be paraphrased in the following way: the 
empirical facts constituting a situation never imply an obligation to act in a certain way. A 
moral non-realist sees this as posing a serious problem for a moral realist: if what is cannot 
imply a (moral) ought then in what sense can the oughts be understood as existing at all? 
And if there are no oughts out there then, perhaps, there are no objective moral facts out there 
either.   
A moral realist can dismiss this little argument here as inconsequential regarding her 
position in, roughly, the following way: True, there is no relation of implication between the 
factual statements and the imperative statements; that is, one cannot derive an `ought` from 
an `is`. However, a moral realist rejects the view that an `ought` is something that is 
essentially derived from something else. A moral realist sees `oughts` as fully given in the 
factuality of a situation. As such, the `oughts` are not derived but perceived or recognized.  
Now, it should be noticed that for a moral realist a lot is at stake here. If, somehow, her 
account of how exactly the `oughts` are fully given in the factuality of a situation is 
unconvincing, then the plausibility of moral realism as a whole will suffer. At this point, a 
moral realist might welcome the `plan B`, i.e. the theoretical benefits of the distinction 
between a situation as a location and as a source of the obliging force. The distinction will 
allow her to explain how an obliging force can be associated with a situation without the 
situation being a source of it. This move might help her to save the plausibility of moral 
realism. (The move comes at a price though. The moral realist either comes over to the 
Kantian camp235 or follows my argument at the end of which the source of the obliging force 
gets located in God.)  
The distinction between a situation being a mere (spatiotemporal) location and being a 
source of the obliging force is a crucial one. As argued above, it is a distinction that might 
be acceptable only for some philosophers: most moral non-realists won`t protest, I expect, 
and the two groups of moral realists too should find the distinction useful. The reader will 
remember that we have lost a moral non-realist already some time ago and therefore I shall, 
 
235 Which I shall try to dissuade her from below. 
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in the rest of the argument, address the two groups of moral realists only. Others, that is those 
who reject the distinction, can skip the rest of the discussion of the first argument and proceed 
to section 1.1.2 where the exposition of the second argument begins.  
1.1.1.3.1  A Kantian response 
Let`s assume then that it has been conceded that the source of the obliging force cannot be 
in the situation. Let`s also assume that (ii) is correct: obliging entails authority. Do those two 
assumptions give us (E3)? Not necessarily. It is possible to take a Kantian way and argue 
that the source of the obliging force is in the self-authoritative structure of agent`s autonomy. 
Kant argues that we all are autonomous rational beings capable of willing and doing the 
rational. This particular combination of being an autonomous plus rational plus agential 
being is what constitutes an obligation we have towards ourselves (and to others to the extent 
to that they are autonomous agents) to act rationally. (The details of how exactly Kant 
conceived of the obligation being constituted by that combination are controversial.236 Here 
I will assume, for the sake of the argument, that possessing autonomy can be plausibly 
understood as a source of obligation to act in certain ways.) In other words, being 
autonomous rational agents obliges us to conform our actions to rational principles of 
conduct that we (as rational beings) accept independently of desire. Kant then proceeds to 
formulate the ultimate rational principle that all autonomous rational agents are obliged to 
conform to in their actions. He calls this ultimate rational principle The Categorical 
Imperative. It reads as follows: `Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the 
same time will that it should become a universal law`.237  
Kant seems to assume that there is a connection between being obliged (as an 
autonomous being) to act rationally and the Categorical Imperative, such that we are 
similarly obliged to act as the Imperative dictates. I am unable to see how we can get from 
the law of an autonomous rational will (i.e. from the Kantian concept of autonomy) to the 
specifics of the Categorical Imperative. Here I am in total agreement with Thomas Hill who 
takes this transition `from an undeniable formal principle to a dubious substantive 
principle`238 to be illegitimate. Neither is this, however, the point I want to press. I have no 
reason to rule out that the transition is, in principle, possible and thus I prefer to challenge 
the Kantian response to (E3) at a different point.  
 
236 Perhaps the most promising attempt to reconstruct Kant`s argument in a way that would make 
things here clear and immune to some of the objections raised against it is Christine M. Korsgaard, 
The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), ch.2,4. 
237 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, James W. Ellington (trans.) (Hacket, 
1993 [1785]), p.30. 
238 Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant`s Moral Theory (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1992), p.122. 
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Once we ignore the afore-mentioned problems, we are able to lay the Kantian response 
down in roughly this way: As autonomous rational agents, we are obliged to act rationally. 
The ultimate principle of (practical) rationality is the Categorical Imperative. Thus, we are 
obliged to act as the Categorical Imperative dictates. An application of the Categorical 
Imperative identifies some actions as those an autonomous agent is obliged to pursue, others 
as those to be avoided. In this way, the obligation – that is, normativity – has its source in the 
autonomy of the agent and not, in some sense, outside of it. This is a moral theory, thus the 
domain that the Categorical Imperative helps us to navigate is the domain of moral truths. 
The normativity of those moral truths traces back to the autonomy of the agent facing them. 
So far so good. However, cracks start appearing once we turn our attention to an assumption 
behind this picture of moral normativity. The assumption here is that the structures of the 
moral and the rational domains are mutually isomorphic. That is, it is always morally right 
to do what the Categorical Imperative (as the ultimate principle of practical rationality) 
dictates, and it is never morally right what the Categorical Imperative doesn`t dictate.  
A Kantian about moral normativity must be committed to this assumption because 
should it be the case that either something is morally right despite not being identified as 
such by the Categorical Imperative or something is identified by the Categorical Imperative 
as morally right despite it clearly not being such, then it can`t be maintained that normativity 
associated with moral truths has its origins in agent`s autonomy. Once the alleged normative 
link starting in the autonomous agent and running via the Categorical Imperative towards the 
moral domain can be (in some cases) severed, it will have to be concluded that the moral 
truths possess their normative force independent of the agent`s autonomy.239 And severed it 
can be.  
First, let`s have a look at how the Categorical Imperative is meant to work. Suppose you 
wonder whether you ought or oughtn`t steal from another (to become an owner of something 
you desire). Now run the two possible answers through the decision procedure of the 
Categorical Imperative. The Categorical Imperative – being the ultimate principle of 
(practical) rationality – dictates to look for contradictions when a maxim is applied. Thus, 
we shall ask: does any of the two lead to a contradiction if universalized into a moral law as 
dictated by the Categorical Imperative? It looks like one of them does. Test the positive 
answer and imagine a world in which `you ought to steal from another` is made into a 
universal moral law. In such a world the concept of private property becomes incoherent. If 
 
239 There is a sense in which the normativity of the moral depends on autonomy. If normativity is 
understood as a force that obliges one to do something then, of course, it can do so only if one can be 
made obliged. A non-autonomous being – i.e. a being incapable of willing freely – cannot be made 
obliged. The moral has no normative force relative to a non-autonomous being. This, however, doesn`t 
translate into moral normativity having its source in the autonomous agent. Autonomy is a necessary 
condition for moral normativity, not its source. 
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stealing the property of another is right, then in what sense is that property private? Arguably, 
something is someone`s private property only if it is rightfully hers. But something cannot 
be rightfully someone`s in a world where it is, at the same time, right to take that property 
from the rightful owner. That`s a clear contradiction. Testing the negative answer won`t lead 
to a contradiction (I will leave it to the reader`s imagination to test this claim) which makes 
it the right answer.  
A similar case – discussed by Kant240 – would be wondering whether it is morally right 
or wrong to make a promise while having no intention of keeping it (in order to get needed 
money). Now, again, it looks like we run into a contradiction if we approve of such an action 
and subject it to the logic of the Categorical Imperative. In a world in which the right thing 
to do is to make a promise with no intention of honouring it, the very concept of promise 
becomes incoherent. The concept of promise is closely related to the concept of trust; they 
are part of the same transaction. The act of promising (something to someone) is successfully 
accomplished only when complemented by a related act of trusting (the promise). But in 
such a world, the logic of the maxim – the maxim that dictates that making false promises is 
the right thing to do – turns trusting into an irrational act. One cannot trust in such a world. 
And, consequently, one cannot successfully accomplish the act of promising.  
So far so clear. However, scenarios can be conceived of in which the application of the 
Categorical Imperative won`t, at least on the face of it, yield intuitively correct results. I will 
briefly consider two such scenarios. In one of them you are a doctor with a newly born child 
in your care. The child suffers from a rare disease that will require near constant medical 
attention for the rest of her life. You ask yourself: `Should I euthanase this child (now when 
she is still unconscious) so the NHS saves money for her treatment?`. In the other scenario 
you wonder: ` Should I become a politician to help steer the country off its disastrous political 
path?`.  
Regarding the first scenario, it would, clearly, be a morally wrong thing to euthanize the 
newborn. At the same time, I am quite unable to universalize it in some such way that it 
would lead to a contradiction. We can easily conceive of a society that approves of 
euthanizing incurably ill newborns on the grounds that their treatment would be too costly. 
Each year there would be certain percentage of newborns euthanized under those 
circumstances and the money thus saved would be spent on life saving operations for kids 
with good prospects of full recovery.  
Although, as admitted above, I can`t think of a contradiction resulting from a 
universalisation of the maxim that governs the first scenario, I don`t want to rush to 
 
240 See Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, James W. Ellington (trans.) 
(Hacket, 1993 [1785]), p.31. 
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conclusions here. Others might be able to uncover a contradiction here that I don`t see and 
save the reliability of the Categorical Imperative.241 There seem to be different ways of 
interpreting the concept of `contradiction` (involved in the application of the Categorical 
Imperative), which enable very creative ways of uncovering contradictions in 
universalisations of maxims that would, on the face of it, seem as hopeless targets of such 
uncovering.242 What I, instead, wish to point to here is this: Many similar scenarios that 
present this kind of challenge can be conceived of. A creative thinker will perhaps be able to 
find a way of recovering a contradiction in the universalisation of the relevant maxims in all 
of these scenarios. But the more scenarios like this we present as a challenge to the creative 
Kantian, and the more she successfully interprets them as leading to a contradiction, the more 
difficult it will become not to notice that in her quest to save the Categorical Imperative, it is 
mostly the logic of the Categorical Imperative and not our moral truths that gets adjusted. 
Always much more – if not all – of the adjusting activity will target the logic of the 
Categorical Imperative than our moral truths. This strongly suggests that our acquaintance 
with and commitment to certain basic moral truths comes before our acquaintance and 
commitment to anything like the Categorical Imperative. This (ontological) priority and 
independence of moral truths with respect to the Categorical Imperative doesn`t sit well with 
the claim that the normative force of moral truths traces back - via the Categorical Imperative 
– to the agent`s autonomy. More about it later. Let me turn to the other scenario now.  
Concerned about the rise of far-right sentiments in your country, you might wonder: ` 
Should I become a politician to help steer the country off its disastrous political path?`. That`s 
a perfectly understandable, self-directed question. Becoming a politician for the above-
mentioned reason is commendable. However, it becomes immediately obvious that when the 
relevant maxim is universalised it will result in a (practical) contradiction. A country in 
which everyone becomes a politician to battle the problems in the society will nearly 
immediately collapse as there won`t be any workforce available to sustain the functioning of 
non-political institutions. The problem then is this: intuitively, we would approve of someone 
 
241 Some could appeal to Kant`s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative that commands that 
one should always treat one`s own or other person`s humanity as not simply a means but always at 
the same time as an end. Such an appeal should, on the face of it, give a correct result, and save the 
newborn. There are two problems here though. First, the second formulation of the Imperative is much 
further removed from the plausible formalism of the law of autonomy and the first formulation of the 
Imperative. It is simply too morally laden and as such it itself requires a justification, which cannot, I 
believe, be given within the framework of Kant`s moral theory. Second, the notion of humanity 
appealed to in the second formulation is essentially connected to that of autonomy. It is unclear, 
however, to what extent a newborn possesses any autonomy and, consequently, any humanity. 
242 For an illuminating discussion of the different kinds of contradictions compatible with Kant`s 
discussion of the Categorical Imperative, see Christine Korsgaard, `Kant`s Formula of Universal 
Law`, Pacific Philosophical Quaterly, 66, no. 1-2 (1985), pp.24-47. 
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wanting to become a politician for altruistic reasons, yet the Categorical Imperative informs 
us that such an action would be immoral.  
Now, an obvious and perhaps even correct reply would be to point out that choosing a 
career path is not (even if motivated by altruistic considerations) a moral action. And if it is 
not a moral action then there is no moral value that the Categorical imperative can help us 
to determine. Let`s concede, for the sake of argument, that the reply is correct and the 
Categorical Imperative is not applicable here. The problem with this reply in the context of 
claiming that the normative force runs from the autonomous, rationally willing agent - via 
the application of the Categorical Imperative - towards the moral domain is this: Imagine 
you wish to determine whether a particular action would be morally right or wrong. You 
intend to apply the logic of the Categorical Imperative to accomplish that. You are aware of 
the constraints of application of the Imperative – it gives correct results only if applied in 
morally significant contexts. At this particular point, the question is: how do you know which 
contexts are morally significant and which aren`t? The Categorical Imperative won`t tell you 
that. Its correct application already presupposes that you are able to distinguish the contexts. 
This, if true, strongly suggests that our access to the realm of moral truths comes prior to and 
independently of the Categorical Imperative.  
Having taken a different path, we arrive at a very similar conclusion here to the one 
arrived at above when we discussed the scenario of a doctor wondering whether to euthanize 
an incurably ill infant: moral truths seem to be out there prior to and independent of the 
Categorical Imperative. If this is so then the normative force of the moral doesn`t trace back 
to an autonomous agent. If the normative force can be detected out there in the moral domain 
in those cases in which the connection between the autonomous agent and the moral domain 
cannot be established via the application of the Categorical Imperative, we have to conclude 
– for reasons of parsimony – that the normative force is coming from outside the agency.  
 
Let me conclude the discussion of (E3) by coming back to the quote by Richard Taylor. He 
says, among others, that `[T]he concept of moral obligation [is] unintelligible apart from the 
idea of God. The words remain but their meaning is gone` (see p. 130). At this point, I am 
not able to confirm that the intelligibility depends on the assumption of God; that will be 
argued for later. I believe that the intelligibility depends on the assumption of `higher-then-
human lawgiver`, and I see this as a default position. It entails the truth of (E3) because the 
concept of `higher-then-human lawgiver` refers to an authority. Kant`s moral theory – 
particularly his concept of autonomy – seems, on the face of it, to provide theoretical 
resources to challenge the default position as it promises to derive all normative force from 
the autonomously willing agent. If the bounding or normative force of duty (to do the morally 
right thing) can be construed as derived from the normative force of the Kantian autonomy, 
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then we should (as parsimony dictates) do without the assumption of a `higher-than-human 
lawgiver` (or God). However, closer scrutiny reveals that moral truths are – as far as their 
normativity is concerned - essentially independent of the agent`s autonomy and as such 
cannot be taken as deriving their normative force from it. This brings us back to (E3), that 
is, to the default position.  
1.1.1.4  That which is an (external) authority in relation to humans must itself be 
trans- or super-human, i.e. in some sense higher in the ontological hierarchy  
I suspect that (E4) is one of those claims that are difficult to argue for in virtue of it expressing 
a rather simple conceptual truth that is not easily broken into simpler, constitutive claims. 
Uncontroversially, `authority` refers to, among others, the power or right to oblige others to 
act in a certain way. Having this kind of power or right entails a hierarchy of some sort and 
the authority having a higher position in that hierarchy in some relevant sense. A normal 
mature human being can, in most circumstances, detect (via her sense of justice) the obliging 
force of a moral fact that she is confronted with. An (external) authority reaches to us through 
this obliging force. Now, once we posit humans as a whole as the subject of an obliging 
authority, we must conclude that such an authority must be trans- or super-human in some 
relevant, plausibly ontological, sense.  
1.1.1.5  This trans-human authority might plausibly be seen as the God of religious 
texts 
A being that is (a) ontologically superior to humans and (b) possesses the power to morally 
oblige all of the humankind is, plausibly, the God of religious texts.243 Now, while there 
might be other ontologically superior beings out there without them being God(s), it is 
somewhat difficult to see how our concept of God could survive placing the source of the 
morally obliging force into some other being. That would amount to saying that God is not 
the ultimate authority, because if He is not the ultimate authority regarding the moral then in 
what sense is he an authority at all?  And an authority He must be if He is the God.  
There is a well-known objection to the claim that God is the normative source of the 
moral. The objection has its origins in what has come to be known as the Euthyphro dilemma.  
In Euthyphro, one of Plato`s dialogues, Socrates asks Euthyphro: `Is the pious loved by the 
gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?`244 Now, although the 
original dilemma is about a relation between the pious and gods, it can easily be modified to 
be about a normative relation between the moral and God. One such modification was done 
by Leibniz: 
 
243 I will presume here that religious texts of various religions refer, ultimately, to the same God. (This, 
of course, presupposes Millianism about reference, which is fine with me.) 
244 Plato, Euthyphro, Benjamin Jowett (trans.) (Adelaide: Adelaide University Press, 2014), 10A 
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It is generally agreed that whatever God wills is good and just. But there remains the question 
whether it is good and just because God wills it or whether God wills it because it is good and 
just; in other words, whether justice and Goodness are arbitrary or whether they belong to the 
necessary and eternal truths about the nature of things.245 
 
The dilemma poses two problems for my argument. First, it shows that it is far from 
inconceivable to see the moral as being normatively independent from God (God being, in 
fact, in some sense a subject to the external normative force of the moral). Clearly, agreeing 
to this normative independence amounts to giving up (E4). I could, perhaps, insist that such 
a normative independence is not really conceivable and that the moral has its normative force 
in virtue of being willed by God. This reply, however, leads to the second problem: if the 
moral value of facts derives from God`s will, it follows that moral truths are arbitrary (as 
God could, surely, have willed wildly differing sets of moral truths). The reader will 
remember that the whole first argument has been predicated on the assumption of moral 
realism. Thus, the arbitrariness implied in my answer to the first problem clashes with the 
assumption of moral realism, which, of course, would collapse the whole argument. 
Now, the reader won`t be surprised to hear that each horn of the dilemma can be 
associated with a long list of advocates. Generally, philosophers who are rationalists and/or 
Platonists and/or realists about the moral will tend to defend the view that God issues 
commands because they are right.246 The divine command theorist or voluntarist, on the other 
hand, will insist that what makes something right is the act of God commanding it.247 As 
mentioned above, either horn of the dilemma seems to be incompatible with my argument: 
If God commands something because that something is right, I won`t be able to place the 
source of moral normativity in God. If, on the other hand, something is right because God 
commands it then it looks like I will have to give up moral realism (due to moral truths 
turning out to be arbitrary), that is, I will have to give up a key assumption of my argument.  
However, the Euthyphro dilemma is, thank God, a false one. It projects a dubious 
Platonist intuition about the realm of eidos onto the concept of God. According to Plato, that 
which is real is located in the world of its own, a world that is ontologically independent of 
gods. Within this Platonist framework, one is a moral realist only if she places the moral 
 
245 Gottfried Leibniz, "Reflections on the Common Concept of Justice", in Leroy Loemker, Leibniz: 
Philosophical Papers and Letters (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989 [1702(?)]), pp.561–573 (p.516). 
246 Philosophers endorsing the position are, for instance, Socrates, Averroes, Gabriel Vasques, Grotius, 
Leibniz, Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, Richard Price. Contemporary philosophers embracing this 
horn of the dilemma are Richard Swinburn – see his The Coherence of Theism (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1993), pp.209-215 – and Tim J. Mawson – see his "The Euthyphro Dilemma", Think, 7, no. 20 
(2008), pp.25–33. 
247 The list of philosophers supporting this position is similarly impressive to the one associated with 
the first horn of the dilemma. Some of the names on the list include Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, 
Martin Luther, John Calvin, Descartes, Thomas Hobbes and, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, 
Wittgenstein (I shall return to Wittgenstein below and be slightly more specific about his view).  
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truths into this realm of eidos. Placing them there is, at the same time, disconnecting them – 
in certain relevant sense discussed below – from God(s). However, this Platonist separation 
(and subordination) of God(s) from the world of eidos not only feels like a rather arbitrary 
constraint on God`s absoluteness in all aspects, it stands in clear contradiction to classical 
Judaeo-Christian theism. The classical Judeo-Christian theism would find such a 
(schizophrenic) split within the transcendental not only as seriously heretic but as deeply 
puzzling too. The Church Fathers, and others after them,248 took the moral to be part of God`s 
essence. Thus, God doesn`t subordinate Himself to anything external when willing the moral, 
neither is He being arbitrary about the content of His moral commands. The commands are 
externalizations of His essence, and as such they are necessary. Katherin A. Rogers writes: 
  
Anselm, like Augustine before him and Aquinas later, rejects both horns of the Euthyphro 
dilemma. God neither conforms to nor invents the moral order. Rather His very nature is the 
standard for value.249   
 
Once it is accepted – and accepted it should be, I believe – that the Euthyphro dilemma is a 
false one (because it relies on a very dubious and counterintuitive conception of God), I can 
go on claiming that the moral gets its normative force from God, who commands it. The 
claim doesn`t come at the cost of losing the moral realist. In the act of commanding the 
moral, God externalizes His own essence. God`s essence is real and necessary, and, in 
conceptual terms, it provides all that a moral realist requires.  
I am fully aware of being very sketchy about a very deep issue here. I would have to 
deviate considerably from the main line of my argument to hope to make (E5) more 
convincing against the challenge of the Euthyphro dilemma. And even a lengthy deviation 
wouldn`t guarantee a success. The nature of the issue calls for a theological discussion, which 
wouldn`t be perceived as particularly convincing by most contemporary philosophers. I will 
instead, in a last-ditch effort, appeal to an authority here. In a letter from December 1930 to 
Friedrich Waismann, Wittgenstein said the following: 
 
Schlick says that in theological ethics there are two interpretations of the Essence of the Good. 
On the shallow interpretation, the Good is good, in virtue of the fact that God wills it; on the 
deeper interpretation, God wills the good, because it is good. On my view, the first interpretation 
is the deeper: that is good which God commands. For this blocks off the road to any kind of 
explanation, `why` it is good; while the second interpretation is the shallow, rationalistic one, in 
that it behaves 'as though' that which is good could be given some further foundation.250 
 
 
248 Among them Thomas Aquinas, William James, Wittgenstein. 
249 Katherin A. Rogers, Anselm on Freedom (Oxford: OUP, 2008), p.8. 
250 Quoted in Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein`s Vienna (New York: Simon&Schuster, 
1973), p.194. 
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To those unconvinced by my sketchy dismissal of the Euthyphro dilemma and 
Wittgenstein`s view on the issue, I promise a different argument towards the epistemic 
significance of religious texts below (after the discussion of step E6). Let me turn to (E6) 
now. 
1.1.1.6  Recovering God as entailed in the theory of moral realism restores (for a 
moral realist) the epistemic authority of a religious text 
Let`s assume that moral realism implies the existence of God. How does this assumption 
affect the epistemic significance (regarding moral issues) of relevant religious texts?  
Consider, first, what the epistemic status of religious texts would be in a world without 
God. Arguably, with God out of the picture, the epistemic status of religious texts would 
derive from the epistemic status of its authors, that is, from the epistemic status of other 
human beings. I am unable to see how that would work.  First, we don`t have any evidence 
that the authors of religious texts possessed superhuman minds (or souls) that were so vastly 
superior to the rest of humanity in their (and future) time that the (moral) claims they made 
should be attributed a very special status: a status that is obliging the rest of humanity in 
virtue of it having been authored by a kind of superhumans. And even if we had some such 
evidence about the super-human status of the authors, we could either dismiss it as not 
superior enough (because not absolute) to sustain moral realism, or we could take it as 
sufficient to sustain moral realism and conclude that the epistemic status of religious texts 
(in matters regarding the moral) is satisfactorily high.251  
Second, the texts themselves rarely, if at all, contain any argument for their claims. If 
the epistemic status of the texts cannot be derived from the epistemic status of its authors 
and the claims are unargued for, then the status must be seen as extremely low, if any. Thus, 
it appears that in a world without God the religious texts can hardly be taken as an 
authoritative source of knowledge about the moral.  
Now, what if God does exist? Would it be a good reason to take religious texts seriously 
in matters of the moral? I think so. Our concept of God is given its content by, among other 
things, the relevant religious texts. Not taking the texts seriously amounts to accepting that 
we don`t really have a concept of God. At best, we only have an empty conceptual shell. Of 
course, this is possible. There is no way of silencing the sceptic here. We might be 
fundamentally wrong and confused about anything we believe to know about God. The 
relationship between God and man is tremendously complicated in virtue of man having been 
created as free, i.e. as able to deviate from paths approved of by God. The wicked ones might 
 
251 Although I don`t see how a lesser than absolute authority could oblige all of the mankind, someone 
might be able to give a plausible account. In that case, I would ground the epistemic status in the super 
status of that other, lesser than absolute, authority. The logic of my argument would stay unaffected.  
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have burnt the true, god-inspired texts replacing them with texts containing only lies. Thus, 
perhaps the only thing we know is that He is "that than which nothing greater can be 
conceived".252 But this cannot be taken as a default position. It is the position of a sceptic, 
which is a position that cannot be a default position because it is not a position at all: it is an 
absence of a position. The default position in the world in which we take God to exist is the 
one in which He revealed Himself in the texts of god-inspired authors: the religious texts. 
Casting doubts on that position is easy but it doesn`t have much force if not complemented 
by a plausible alternative. And I don`t think there is one.  
I don`t expect many will find the argument convincing. A Kantian will refuse to give 
up autonomy as the source of moral normativity, a Platonist will insist that true moral 
propositions inhabit a realm that is ontologically independent of God(s), and a sceptic will 
point out that the alleged connection between God and religious texts is just a myth. To them, 
I offer a different argument.  
1.1.2  The second argument 
Let me give you an outline of the argument first. The outline will be followed by a discussion 
of its individual steps. 
F1: The Rawlsian assumption: we have a sense of justice. 
F2: The sense of justice allows us to distinguish right from wrong. 
F3: Within the Christian paradigm, the New Testament is the foundational text 
regarding the moral realm. It has been long recognized as a text that is correct 
about moral facts. 
If we – beings with a sense of justice capable of distinguishing right from wrong – recognize 
the New Testament as a text that is correct about moral facts, then we should conclude: 
F4: The New Testament is correct about moral facts. 
1.1.2.1  The Rawlsian assumption: we have a sense of justice 
In section 4.6.2.1, I have briefly discussed Rawls` concept of a sense of justice. Let`s assume 
there is no internal incoherence in the concept itself. Still, what reasons do we have to accept 
that we do, as a matter of fact, possess some such capacity that the concept of a sense of 
justice refers to? To answer the question, I will briefly sum up Rawls` argument here, and 
offer a supporting consideration of my own.  
 
252 Saint Anselm, Proslogion, M.J. Charlesworth (trans.) (London: University of Notre Dam Press: 
1979), ch.2. 
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Rawls starts off his essay `The Sense of Justice` with Rousseau`s claim `that the sense 
of justice [is] the natural outcome of our primitive affections`.253 Rawls proceeds to `set out 
a psychological  construction to illustrate the way in which Rousseau`s thesis might be 
true`.254 The construction draws heavily on Jean Piaget`s work, The Moral Judgement of the 
Child.255 At the heart of the construction, as I understand it, is the following psychological 
observation. In normal circumstances, parents love their child. In time, the child develops 
`an equal love for the parent[s]`.256 The relation of love towards one`s parents gives rise to a 
capacity to feel guilt after violating the precepts or injunctions issued by the parents. The 
child feels guilty because she recognizes and experiences the violation `as a breach of the 
relation of love and trust with the authoritative person`.257 The feeling of guilt towards the 
loved parents is painful and the child seeks reconciliation and restoration of the previous 
relation. The child is able to achieve this reconciliation and restoration only if she is able to 
apply to herself the external (that is, in this case, coming from the parents) standards of 
criticism. This ability to apply to herself the external standards of criticism constitutes the 
grounds for, later in life, being able to form co-operative relationships of love and trust with 
others; `the participants [in a co-operative partnership] are bound by ties of friendship and 
mutual trust, and rely on one another to do their part`.258 All this is possible only because the 
participants have a deep and formative experience of loving and trusting the other (initially, 
the parents) and an ability to conform to external (and universal) standards of cooperation. 
Such cooperation sustains the friendship and trust among the participants only if everyone 
`fulfil[s] their duty of fair play`.259 The duty of fair play requires each participant to develop 
a `sense` for fairness, that is: a sense of justice. 
The crucial point to notice here is that a sense of justice is a capacity whose 
developmental emergence is fundamentally grounded in our hardwired need to form a loving 
and trusting relationship with our parents. To form such a relationship with our parents is, as 
a matter of fact, how we are as species psychologically constituted. Of course, the 
psychological reconstruction (offered by Piaget and Rawls) of how this psychological 
constitution of ours develops into the sense of justice can be questioned. Still, it does seem 
to agree with the common knowledge of how children develop the social skills of interacting 
and cooperating with others, and as such represents a plausible account of how we come to 
possess something like a sense of justice.   
 
253 Rawls, `The Sense of Justice`, p.281. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgement of the Child (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 
1932). 
256 Rawls, `The Sense of Justice`, p.287. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid., p.289. 
259 Ibid. 
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To those who find the reconstruction implausible, I offer the following alternative 
consideration. Suppose you are a moral realist who, for some reason, doesn`t believe that we 
possess anything like a sense of justice. As such, you will face a rather problematic dilemma. 
There are moral facts or truths out there, but we either don`t have any access to them, or we 
have only a rational access to them. The former would be a rather unattractive implication. 
Somehow, we know there are moral facts, but we don`t know what they are. I am unable to 
see why anyone would want to be a moral realist and a moral agnostic at the same time. One 
of the points, I take it, of being a moral realist is to be able to search for and formulate true 
moral propositions. Being an agnostic moral realist is a bit like being a horse-riding instructor 
on a planet with no horses. What about taking the Kantian path claiming that we do have 
access to moral truths but this access is not of a perceptual but of a rational kind? The answer 
to this question depends on whether one believes (or not) that the moral and the rational are 
structurally isomorphic. That is, it depends on whether one believes that a competent 
application of the Categorical Imperative (or some such universal rational principle) always 
yields a morally right answer. Above (section 1.1.1.3.1), I argue that the Categorical 
Imperative is a rather unreliable pathfinder in the realm of the moral. Our ability to spot the 
unreliability should be understood as an evidence of us having a different – presumably a 
perceptual260 – access to the moral realm. Thus, the Kantian position is – despite being an 
attractive one - unsustainable.  
1.1.2.2  The sense of justice allows us to distinguish right from wrong 
Above (section 4.6.2.1, p. 105), a `sense of justice` is described as `a capacity of persons to 
detect whether a state of affairs is or isn`t just/fair`. Now, although I believe that what is 
being predicated about the sense of justice in (F2) is interchangeable with how it gets defined 
above on p. 7, this is not something that is immediately obvious. The issue here is whether 
being able to detect whether a state of affairs is just/fair is the same as being able to 
distinguish right from wrong. (Or, at least, the issue is whether the ability to detect 
fairness/justice entails the ability to distinguish right from wrong.)  
 
260 The reader might remember that in section 4.6.2.1, I talk about moral truths as truths that are not 
`empirical` in nature and as such they are ` not given in perception`. In this section, however, I describe 
our access to moral truths explicitly as `perceptual`. This apparent contradiction can be explained 
away in the following way. In section 4.6.2.1, my point was that moral truths or facts are not sense 
data in the same way as the sense data that we acquire via our five basic senses: touch, sight, hearing, 
smell and taste. Moral truths are not something that we have access to via those five basic senses; and 
it is in this sense that moral truths are not given in perception. The concept of perception can, however, 
be applied in a broader context, i.e. in a context that goes beyond the five basic senses. This broader 
context is a context which takes (various kinds of) intuition to be a perceptual capacity of ours even 
though this capacity cannot be – in any obvious way – associated with any of the five senses. The 
notion of the sense of justice refers to a capacity that is perceptual in this broader sense, that is, to a 
capacity that is essentially intuitive.   
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There are some transparent cases where the interchangeability is uncontroversial. `To 
execute an innocent person is wrong` seems to mean the same as `to execute an innocent 
person is unfair`. But what about the following pair of moral statements: `to refuse to jump 
into a pond to save a drowning child is wrong` and ` to refuse to jump into a pond to save a 
drowning child is unfair`? Surely, the latter doesn`t sound right. Agreed, it doesn`t sound 
right. 
I offer the following as a way out. Above (p. 105), I define fairness in terms of moral 
equilibrium. More specifically, I define something as (being) fair as that something (being) 
in moral equilibrium.261 I take it as uncontroversial that: it is wrong when the moral 
equilibrium is disrupted; i.e. it is wrong when something is unfair. The question now, of 
course, is whether the situation in which one refuses to jump into a pond to save a drowning 
child constitutes a situation in which the moral equilibrium is disrupted. If it does, then it is 
wrong because it is unfair; and vice versa, because things become unfair only due to a 
wrongness taking place. So, what is the answer to the question?  
The notion of a moral equilibrium is suitably abstract and accommodating. As such, it 
can be used to express a moral evaluation of, I believe, any morally significant situation. In 
the case of a person who refuses to save a drowning child we could, for instance, say 
something like the following: Things are in moral equilibrium if one helps (within certain 
constraints regarding the availability of means and the potential danger to oneself associated 
with helping) a person in distress. Refusing to save a drowning child is refusing to help a 
person in distress. Consequently, the moral equilibrium gets disrupted.  
There is, however, an issue here I have to briefly deal with. I treat the proposition that 
`things are in moral equilibrium if one helps a person in distress` as implying that `one ought 
to, morally, help a person in distress`.262 There is a familiar objection to this kind of 
implication. Some acts are claimed to be such that they would be good to do, but not wrong 
not to do. Such acts are called supererogatory.263 Consider the following:  
 
The core of a nuclear reactor is melting. A team of emergency technicians has to be deployed 
to perform an emergency shut down to prevent a radioactive contamination of a densely 
populated area. Unavoidably, the team will be exposed to lethal levels of radioactivity.  
 
 
261 See footnote 176. 
262 From `things are in moral equilibrium if one helps a person in distress` I conclude that not helping 
a person in distress results in `the moral equilibrium get[ting] disrupted`. Disrupting the moral 
equilibrium is wrong, and we are obliged (ought to) avoid doing wrong things. Thus, one ought to, 
morally, help a person in distress.  
263 The concept of a supererogatory act was first introduced and discussed by James O. Urmson in his 
"Saints and Heroes", in Abraham I. Melden (ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1958). 
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Clearly, it is a (extremely) good thing to shut down the reactor, yet it doesn`t feel correct to 
say that the team of technicians is morally obliged to sacrifice their lives in the act of saving 
lives of others. Thus, should a member of the team refuse to participate in the emergency 
operation, it would feel inappropriate to accuse him of doing a wrong thing.  
Now, helping a person in distress might be seen as, in principle, a similar supererogatory 
act: it is good to do it (things are in moral equilibrium), but not wrong not to do it. The 
implication here bearing on (F2) would be the following: if helping a person in distress 
qualifies as a supererogatory act and supererogatory acts are non-obligatory (i.e. it is not 
wrong not to do them) then the moral equilibrium doesn`t get disrupted (i.e. things don`t get 
unfair). At the same time, it has been agreed that refusing to save a drowning child is wrong. 
This might suggest that right-wrong and fair-unfair are not interchangeable notions after all. 
And if they are not interchangeable, I cannot translate Rawls` `sense of justice`, which is 
meant to be about a capacity to detect what is and isn`t fair, into a capacity to distinguish 
right from wrong.  
I am somewhat sceptical regarding the notion of a supererogatory act and I don`t think 
that there are any uncontroversially supererogatory acts. But here is not the place to discuss 
it. I will assume, for the sake of the argument, that the case of the emergency technicians 
dispatched to shut down a faulty nuclear reactor is a clear case of a supererogatory act. The 
case is, at the same time, importantly different from the case of a refusal to save a drowning 
child. The action of the emergency technicians involves sacrificing their lives, which is 
something that saving a drowning child doesn`t involve. Not only doesn`t saving a drowning 
child involve a sacrifice of one`s life, it doesn`t involve a sacrifice of any kind apart from, 
perhaps, something like getting your clothes wet or arriving late for a meeting. Peter Singer, 
in a similar context, proposes the following moral principle:  
 
[I]f it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing 
anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it.264 
 
Singer treats the principle as uncontroversial and so shall I. According to Singer, and 
common sense, a human life counts as something morally significant. Thus, sacrificing it 
violates the explicit condition of the principle.  
Employing Singer`s principle will let us draw a clear separation line between the case 
of emergency technicians and the case of a drowning child. The technicians find themselves 
in a situation that involves sacrificing their lives. This violates the explicit condition of 
Singer`s principle. It follows that the technicians are not obliged to perform the action. The 
 
264 Peter Singer, `Famine, Affluence and Morality`, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, no. 1 (1972), 
pp.229-243 (p.231). 
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case of a drowning child, on the other hand, doesn`t involve sacrificing anything morally 
significant and, therefore, one is obligated to jump into the pond and save the child.  
Now, there are two crucial points here: Firstly, and less importantly, the case of a 
drowning child clearly involves a moral obligation to do so, which means it would be wrong 
to refuse to do it. As such the case of a drowning child is not a case of a supererogatory act. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the fact that the supererogatory case of the emergency 
technicians doesn`t involve a moral obligation indicates that right and wrong are used in a 
non-moral sense here. The overwhelming majority of moral realists believe that moral facts 
are obliging.265 Therefore most of my readers (remember: I have lost a moral non-realist 
above266 when tying the relevance of the problem of free will for a moral theorist with the 
notion of fairness/moral equilibrium; which is unacceptable for a moral non-realist) will be 
happy to accept that if a situation has no obliging force then it is not open to descriptions in 
terms of moral rights and wrongs.267    
Let me sum up the discussion of (F2). Rawls` notion of a sense of justice refers to a 
capacity to detect what is fair and unfair. In (F2), I modify the notion as referring to a capacity 
to distinguish right from wrong. This modification faces an objection. The objection deploys 
the concept of a supererogatory act: an act that is good to do but not wrong not to do. The 
possibility of a supererogatory act is meant to imply that the notions of right and wrong are 
not logical opposites. That is a problem for my modification in (F2) because the notions of 
fair and unfair are logical opposites. This would mean that the notions right – wrong and fair 
– unfair are not interchangeable and that the sense of justice as a capacity to detect whether 
a state of affairs is or isn`t fair cannot be modified into a sense of justice as a capacity to 
distinguish right from wrong. I employ a simple argument to counter the objection: The 
moral is obligating. Supererogatory acts are not obligating, that is, they are not moral acts. 
Therefore, right and wrong must, when used to describe a supererogatory act, be understood 
as non-moral notions. This fully neutralizes the objection. The rights and wrongs of a 
supererogatory act are not the rights and wrongs of a morally significant situation. Thus, that 
which applies to the former doesn`t necessarily apply to the latter. 
 
265 Notable exceptions are Michael Smith – see his The Moral Problem (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1994) – and Peter Railton – see his `Moral Realism`, Philosophical Review, 95, no. 2 (1986), pp.163–
207. 
266 See Chapter 4; especially sections 4.5.3.3 to 4.7. 
267 The reader might have noticed that when discussing the scenario of the emergency technicians 
above, I used the expression `good` instead of `right`. Thus, I said that `it is a good thing to shut down 
the reactor` and not `it is a right thing to shut down the reactor`. Just like this, without a context, it, 
perhaps, feels ok to say both good and right. However, once we formulate it as related to an agent 
then it won`t feel so. Compare: `The emergency technicians did a (extremely) good thing when they, 
sacrificing their lives, shut down the reactor to save the nearby city` and `The emergency technicians 
did the right thing when they, sacrificing their lives, shut down the reactor to save the nearby city`. 
Also, notice that the very definition of a supererogatory act is given in terms of good-ness and not of 
right-ness. All this strongly suggests that supererogatory acts are not morally significant acts.   
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1.1.2.3  Within the Christian paradigm, the New Testament is the foundational text 
regarding the moral realm. It has been long recognized as a text that is correct about 
moral facts 
There is something I need to get out of the way first. So far, I have been addressing all moral 
realists. My strategy has been to show how the commitment to moral realism, when 
combined with certain plausible assumptions, implies that a moral realist should take the 
moral message of the New Testament seriously. (F3), however, introduces a rather 
significant restriction. It places the argument within the confines of ` the Christian paradigm`, 
which is a step that seems to come at the cost of losing all the non-Christian moral realists. 
There are three things I wish to say in response.  
First, I concede that with (F3) I am losing a non-Christian moral realist. It is not a huge 
loss though. I write within the tradition of Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy. Most of my 
readers will be Christians in the broad sense of having grown up within and having 
internalized Christian culture. 
Second, even though I concede I have lost a non-Christian moral realist, I have done so 
only because keeping the argument all-inclusive with respect to different religions and 
cultures would require a rather lengthy argument and a deviation from the main argument - 
a deviation that I don`t wish to waste any time with here. I am, however, convinced that the 
argument could be further developed so as to be all-inclusive. Such a development would 
employ a broadly Millianistic strategy and argue that the relevant moral and religious texts 
of different religions refer – via differing descriptions - to the same moral facts.  
Third, there are some significant differences regarding the accepted moral truths across 
different cultures and religions. Not uncommonly, the moral truths accepted by different 
cultures and religions will contradict each other. Thus, for instance, a Hindu man is 
committing no sin when using contraception while a traditional Jew is. This particular 
example of differing moral attitudes towards contraception is no minor issue. It is, ultimately, 
about whether it is right or wrong to interfere with the natural order of things to prevent a 
new human being to be born. The fact of contradicting moral truths (across different cultures 
and religions) poses a problem for a moral realist. The problem has a form of the following 
dilemma: either some of the cultures and/or religions got some of their (often fundamental) 
moral facts wrong or, somehow, the world is such that two moral claims can both be true and 
contradict each other. The latter is off-putting and unacceptable. The former, clearly, is not 
such a crazy position as the latter one, yet it is a rather unattractive one all the same. One of 
the implications of this position would be, for instance, that those cultures or religions that 
got some of their moral facts wrong (or just got more of them wrong compared to other 
cultures and religions) are morally inferior to those cultures and religions that got the facts 
right. Another problematic implication would relate to the status of our sense of justice. It is, 
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as explained above, a capacity to distinguish right from wrong; i.e. the sense of justice is a 
capacity to get the moral facts right. The capacity is meant to be a universal human capacity. 
What would explain a culture or religion, that is, a large number of people (often hundreds 
of millions), getting some of their moral facts wrong for many centuries? How could their 
sense of justice have been collectively malfunctioning for so long?  
My point here is this: True, having placed the discussion within the confines of the 
Christian paradigm, I have lost a non-Christian moral realist. However, this placement of the 
discussion within the confines of a religion is not something I impose onto my reader (a 
moral realist) because my argument requires it. It is, rather, something that follows from the 
problems implicit in moral realism itself. Whenever it comes to the discussion of specific 
moral claims, a moral realist has to choose one of the (empirically) available moral 
frameworks (has to place the discussion within one of them) to evaluate the claims because, 
unfortunately, there are more of them and they, to an extent, contradict each other.  
Now, back to (F3): Within the Christian paradigm, the New Testament is the 
foundational text regarding the moral realm. It has been long recognized as a text that is 
correct about moral facts. (F3) consists of two related claims. Both are, I believe, fairly 
uncontroversial. Undeniably, the New Testament is the foundational text of Christianity. 
Within the paradigm of Christianity, the New Testament provides moral guidelines268 for its 
followers. Imitatio Christi is the ultimate moral ideal. Similarly undeniable is the fact that 
the New Testament has been long recognized as a text that is correct about moral facts. By 
`recognized` I don`t mean a simple `acknowledgement` of a fact; by `recognized` I refer to 
a deeper kind of acquaintance with and acceptance of the moral truths that the New 
Testament contains. The depth of the acquaintance and acceptance ranges from a relatively 
shallow internalization of the truths that is common among secular Christians to a very deep, 
experiential kind of acquaintance found among devout Christians. For a devout Christian, 
the moral veracity of the New Testament is not just cognized, it is experienced. A secular 
Christian doesn`t, perhaps, have the same (direct) experiential connection to the moral facts 
of the New Testament, yet she will reliably recognize the truth of the facts if confronted with 
them. There is a simple way to test the plausibility of this last claim. The reader of mine who 
is a secular Christian (and chances are that such is the majority of my readers) can test their 
moral intuition (that is, deploy their sense of justice) against the moral narrative of the New 
Testament. More specifically, the secular reader is invited to morally challenge the actions 
of Christ as described in the New Testament. How does it sound to say something like ` Christ 
was morally wrong to do…`? Can you see yourself sincerely endorsing some such 
 
268 The moral guidelines in the New Testament are mostly implicit in the sense of being the `morals` 
of a story. A Christian is obliged to make his life an imitatio Christi in the sense of living within the 
framework of those `morals`.   
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proposition? I don`t expect you can. Even a secular Christian will find it extremely hard, if 
not impossible, to imagine predicating a morally wrong action about Christ and mean it. In 
this sense, even a secular Christian recognizes the New Testament as a text that is correct 
about moral facts.  
Now, what I am saying here could be explained away as being just a semantic issue and 
not a perceptual one (i.e. not one that is about the sense of justice). `Christ` as a symbol or 
concept refers to, among others, something like `the ultimate moral goodness`. Thus, 
predicating a morally wrong action about Christ yields a more or less straightforward 
contradiction; and it is a recognition of this contradiction – and not our acquaintance with 
and acceptance of moral truths in the New Testament – that makes it impossible to be serious 
(or not confused) when predicating a morally wrong action about Christ.  
This is a valid point and one that, to a great extent, explains what`s going on when one 
tries to associate Christ with moral wrongness. This is, however, also a point that might 
obscure the fact that the issue goes somewhat deeper here. True, we cannot associate Christ 
with moral wrongness because `Christ` means, amongst other things, something like `the 
ultimate moral goodness`. However, and importantly, this meaning hasn`t been stipulated. 
`Christ` has come to mean this due to referring to someone who has been presented (in the 
New Testament stories) as the agent in actions that people, historically, recognized as 
morally deep and right.269 Thus, at the core, we have the same fact here as the one at the core 
 
269 This last point might strike some of my readers as contradicting one of the crucial claims in the 
first argument. There I argue that a moral fact always presents itself to us together with an obliging 
force, and that this obliging force originates in God. Christ is God which should mean, following the 
logic of the first argument, that the reader recognizes the message in the New Testament as morally 
right (or true) only after he has already recognized Christ (the agent of the actions described there) as 
God. In the second argument, however, the direction of explanation gets reversed. There I seem to 
imply that Christ is recognized as God (as `God` because only God is `the ultimate moral goodness`) 
because he is the agent in stories all of which people have recognized as describing morally right 
actions. We have, admittedly, a bit of a contradiction here. I don`t intend to provide a successful 
resolution of it here, which is mainly because I don`t need to somehow combine both arguments (the 
first one and the second one) to be able to conclude that a moral realist has to take foundational 
religious texts seriously. Each of the arguments alone, once accepted, yields the conclusion. Thus, any 
contradiction between the two is non-consequential here. Still, let me, very briefly, gesture towards a 
strategy to resolve the contradiction. The problem is, roughly, this: It seems to be correct to say both 
that we take (someone called) Christ as God because he did things (and only things) that we recognize 
as morally right and that we recognize certain things as morally right only after having established 
they were done (or commanded) by Christ (who is God). Now, I believe it could be argued that the 
two recognitions come together and gradually. The first followers of Christ had some indicators that 
Christ might be of a divine essence (it had been prophesied that a Messiah would come; Christ 
performed a few miracles; He explicitly introduced himself as the Son of God, etc.). At the same time, 
he both preached and did things that struck (i.e. they were quasi-recognised by) his followers as 
potentially conveying deep and important moral truths. At the beginning all was extremely ambiguous. 
He could have been a false prophet. But gradually what he preached and how he acted worked together 
with who He claimed to be. The more what He said and did was recognized as morally right, the more 
His divinity was recognized and vice versa: the more His divinity was recognized, the more what He 
said and did was recognized as morally right. And, gradually, with this interrelated double recognition 
growing, the obliging force of the perceived moral truths too was growing.   
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of the second claim in (F3): With our (universally human) sense of justice we recognize 
(perceive) the correctness of moral truths contained in the New Testament.  
1.1.2.4  The New Testament is correct about moral facts 
(F4): The New Testament is correct about moral facts. I move from having a recognition of 
correctness of something, (F3), to that something being correct, (F4). However, it is not 
obvious that the move is valid. True, ` to recognize` is a factive verb and as such it is normally 
taken to mean something like `to arrive at a true belief` (about what is the case). When you 
say, `Among the things scattered on the floor, John has recognized his wife`s car keys`, what 
you imply is that the keys John has identified as belonging to his wife indeed are his wife`s. 
The problem is that it might turn out, as it often does, that you haven`t recognized anything 
after all. Thus, it sounds perfectly normal to say something like: `I recognized Mary in the 
crowd but when I got closer, I realized I was wrong`.  
The important bit to notice here is this: when a speaker uses a factive verb, she indicates 
a commitment to the truth of the embedded proposition. This commitment of a speaker to the 
truth of the embedded proposition doesn`t, however, necessarily translate into that 
proposition being actually true. If it did, we could just make propositions true by making 
such commitments. And that`s absurd.  
Now, this possibility of mis-recognizing things then casts a shadow of doubt on the 
move from (F3) to (F4). Or so it seems. How serious an objection is this? Not very, I believe. 
It is just a version of a familiar sceptical challenge. It seems to be an inescapable predicament 
of our perceptual-cum-cognitive relation to the world that we can, and often do, hold wrong 
beliefs about the world. A sceptic likes to draw far-reaching and radical conclusions from 
this inescapable predicament. She will insist that we can`t really know what the world is like 
– or what is really the case out there in the world – beyond the veil of perception. 
Analogously, a sceptic will insist that you cannot know what the world is like beyond your 
recognition and therefore you cannot conclude anything about the state of the world from 
having a recognition of it.270  
Of course, the sceptic is wrong here as she infers too much from the possibility (and/or 
actual occurrence) of a perceptual and/or cognitive error. The mere possibility (and/or actual 
occurrence) of a perceptual and/or cognitive error in no way implies that our perceptual-cum-
cognitive relation to the world actually is such that we can`t and don`t know what the case 
is out there in the world. It is one thing to say that we sometimes (or often) err about the 
world and entirely another to say that error is intrinsic to our perceptual-cum-cognitive 
interaction with the world. The latter simply doesn`t follow from the former. Thus, when I 
 
270 Recall: `having a recognition` of something is understood here as something like `being committed 
to the truth of the propositional content of a perception` of something. 
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perceive a tree out there, I have an extremely good reason to believe that there really is a tree 
out there. I might be wrong as I might be hallucinating the tree. However, the default position 
is that perceiving the tree implies its existence, therefore that`s what I will believe until 
confronted with convincing reasons that I have, in fact, hallucinated the tree. Similarly, the 
default position regarding our sense of justice is that it is a perceptual capacity of ours that, 
on the whole, connects us reliably with the moral realm. We can be and often are mistaken 
about moral facts, but we have no reason to believe that error about the moral is intrinsic to 
our perceptual access to the moral domain.  
I shall conclude that there is no serious reason to reject the move from (F3) to (F4). 
1.1.3  An issue with recognizing moral truths 
There is a little issue here that needs to be briefly addressed before we can move on to the 
actual discussion of the above quoted passage from the New Testament.  
I have promised to `extract [philosophical] reasons` from the quoted passage. Now, one 
might wonder why, or in what sense, I need to do any extracting at all. In this chapter, I 
argue, ultimately, that the kind of holding others responsible that requires grounding in the 
free will assumption is a kind of performance which is morally wrong. I seek to find support 
for this claim in the text of the New Testament. At the same time, I argue that we have, more 
or less, straightforward access to the moral truths of the New Testament. So, in what sense 
do I need to process the text theoretically to get to its moral truths? Can`t I just refer to the 
relevant passage and let the reader recognize/perceive the truth(s) for themselves? In fact, 
doesn`t the very need to do any extracting imply that (F2) cannot be correct, i.e. that it cannot 
be correct that we have a sense of justice that gives us a (in principle reliable) access to moral 
truths? The answer to these questions is relatively uncomplicated.  
We have the ability to recognize/perceive all those moral truths that the New Testament 
is specific about. These specific moral truths combine with other moral or non-moral truths, 
which yields new moral truths. These new moral truths become available to us to be 
recognized as moral truths only after the combining that yields the truths has taken place. 
Prior to the combining they are not recognizable/perceivable in the text. I will stick with the 
story of the stoning of an adulteress to illustrate how it works.  
The specifics of the story are about adultery as a sin, stoning as a punishment and the 
moral standing of those who gathered to stone the poor woman. We read the story and our 
sense of justice recognizes what Christ did in the story as morally right. We picture the poor 
woman who succumbed to temptation about to be stoned by a group of men some of whom 
might have done the same or even worse. We immediately recognize the striking unfairness 
of the situation. It feels obviously unfair to have those other sinners stone the woman to 
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death. The moral truth that we have a straight recognition of here is: it is wrong/unfair if a 
sinner stones an adulteress. Now, one might wonder whether the truth of the claim is 
preserved when, for instance, `stoning` gets substituted by `whipping`, or when an 
`adulteress` gets substituted by a `thief`. The story talks specifically about `stoning` and 
`adultery` and makes no mention of whipping or theft. Could it be that if it was a thief about 
to be whipped then the floggers` moral standing wouldn`t matter at all?  
I think we have a good reason to believe that the story extends to other (probably all) 
sins and kinds of punishment. Due to limited space here, I will show only how to extend the 
story to apply to all sins, not just adultery (a similar strategy could be then used to extend the 
story to all punishments, not just whipping). In the story, Christ encourages those `without 
sin […] to throw a stone at her`. It is clear that He doesn`t talk about a specific sin but about 
sinning generally. It is not that only those who haven`t committed the sin of, for instance, 
adultery can throw the stone. This fact strongly suggests that it is not the specific nature of a 
given sin (adultery in our case) that compromises the moral standing but rather the shared 
property of all sins – their moral wrongness – that does the compromising.  
An interesting and important point here is that this implies a (perhaps somewhat 
surprising) asymmetry. Arguably, adultery is (or at least was, at the time of the New 
Testament) a more serious sin then the sin of lying. Christ`s encouragement doesn`t 
discriminate among sins, therefore even those who committed the rather innocuous sin of 
lying are morally compromised to throw a stone even though their target is a (perhaps much) 
bigger sinner.  
We can conclude two things from Christ`s encouragement. First, He talks about moral 
standing and not about a particular sin. Second, He implies that any symmetry in moral 
standing between the punished and the one punishing is irrelevant. Now, against the 
background of these two conclusions, try to imagine that somehow the story is only about 
the sin of adultery and doesn`t extend to other sins. If this was the case, then we would have 
to ask what exactly it is about adultery (that other sins lack) that calls for the punishing one 
to be of an uncompromised moral standing. It can`t have anything to do with the seriousness 
of the sin of adultery and its relation to the level of corruption that the moral standing of the 
punishing one might have sustained because, as concluded above, it is not about symmetry: 
even the least serious sin counts as sufficiently corrupting. Thus, it would have to be 
something about the very nature of adultery (and adultery only) that calls for a totally 
uncompromised moral standing of anyone wishing to punish it. Trying to figure out how this 
could even begin to be approached borders on the unintelligible. Once we know that (a) it 
plays no role exactly which sins have compromised the standing of the punishing one and 
(b) it is not about symmetry between the sins of the punished and the punishing one, we are 
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able to direct our attention to a general relation (and away from the specifics of a particular 
sin) and conclude that the story applies not only to adultery but other sins too.  
To sum up, one of the moral truths directly available to us in one of the stories in the 
New Testament is something like this: it is wrong/unfair if a sinner stones an adulteress. 
However, once we correctly combine this particular moral truth with some other relevant 
aspects of the story, we are able to generalize and extend it to be not only about adultery but 
about other sins too. This is an example of a way of extracting moral truths from a religious 
text. And such extracting is in no tension with the fact that we – as beings equipped with a 
sense of justice – have (a kind of) perceptual access to moral truths. Now, back to the actual 
discussion of the story of the adulteress.       
1.2  The story of an adulteress and the moral standing of man 
For some time already, the assumption has been that my reader is a moral realist. To avoid 
certain unnecessary complications, I have put a (innocent) constraint on the assumed position 
of moral realism here: I address a (broadly) Christian moral realist. Now, if I am right to 
claim (F4), i.e. if I am right to claim that the New Testament is correct about moral facts, 
then the reader (a Christian moral realist) must treat it as a serious source of moral 
knowledge. Above, I have promised to extract from the New Testament story of an adulteress 
reasons to believe that being a human comes essentially with having a deeply compromised 
moral standing. The reader will have remembered that the idea motivating this promise is to 
show that theorizing about free will in the context of justifying our practice of holding others 
responsible is pointless because the practice is irremediably unjustifiable due to its involving, 
inescapably, a holder with fundamentally compromised moral standing. So, what is it in the 
New Testament story of an adulteress that suggests that being a human comes with 
essentially compromised moral standing?  
At the end of the discussion of the second argument, I deal with an objection, which 
involves arguing that the moral truth of the New Testament story of an adulteress is 
generalizable as something like this: punishing a sinner is morally wrong if done by a person 
whose moral standing is compromised. This is a very plausible and natural understanding of 
the story. But how do we get from here to the claim that a fundamentally compromised moral 
standing is essential to being a human? What in the story and in the broader context of the 
New Testament could support such a radical claim? The key to answering those questions 
lies in that part of the story where Christ joins the others in refusing to throw a stone at the 
adulteress saying: "Neither do I condemn you. Go your way, and from now on do not sin 
again."  Now, consider the following simple argument: 
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M1: Principle (P): punishing a sinner is morally wrong if done by a person whose 
moral standing is compromised. 
M2: (P) applies to Christ: Christ`s moral standing is compromised 
M3: Christ is an archetypal human. This implies that whatever limitations can be 
predicated about Him will apply to all men. 
Conclusion: 
M4: The moral standing of all men is essentially compromised.  
1.2.1  Principle (P): punishing a sinner is morally wrong if done by a person whose 
moral standing is compromised 
(M1) is a very natural and widely agreed upon reading of the story of an adulteress. 
Importantly, there doesn`t seem to be any reason to object to this reading. It seems 
sufficiently clear that that`s the moral message of the story. Also, it is in full accord with 
what our sense of justice tells us is morally right and wrong here. We have a well-established 
notion of hypocrisy which refers to a moral truth that is analogous to (M1).  
1.2.2  (P) applies to Christ: Christ`s moral standing is compromised 
Christ is confronted with a sinner in the context of punishing her. And, as we know, he fails 
to punish her. He doesn’t say anything that would indicate that he sees any problem with the 
punishment itself. Neither does He doubt that the woman indeed has sinned: `[D]o not sin 
again`, He instructs her. More importantly, Christ explicitly ties the punishment to the moral 
standing of anyone getting ready to inflict the punishment: `Let anyone among you who is 
without sin be the first to throw a stone at her`. All this strongly suggests that (P) applies to 
Christ, i.e. that Christ himself has had His moral standing compromised.  
1.2.3  Christ is an archetypal human. This implies that whatever limitations can be 
predicated about Him will apply to all men 
 (M3) consists of two related claims. The latter claim is an implication of the former one; an 
implication that is rather straightforward once the truth of the former claim is established and 
understood. So, is it correct to say that Christ is an archetypal human? And what does it even 
mean to say something like this?  
Two things are predicated about Christ here: being a human and being archetypal. 
Regarding the first of the two, let me simply brush away any doubts about Christ being a 
human. In the New Testament, He refers to Himself as `the Son of man` (see for instance, 
Mathew 8:20, Mark 10:32-34, Luke 6:5). For centuries, the Christological perspective on 
this self-reference of Christ as the Son of man has been seen as a counterpart to that of Son 
of God and just as Son of God affirms the divinity of Jesus, Son of man affirms His humanity. 
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Historically, there were differing and briefly influential teachings about Christ`s essence that, 
in some way or other, denied His humanity (such as Docetism, Apollinarianism or 
Eutychianism) but they have been denounced as serious heresies and abandoned. Moreover, 
and importantly, a moral realist who accepts the New Testament as a serious source of moral 
knowledge should reject any doubts regarding Christ`s humanity. She should do so because 
if Christ wasn`t a human then His life, acts and choices are not relevant to us humans. This 
would imply that the New Testament is, at best, a serious source of irrelevant (for us) moral 
knowledge; an implication that is, for all practical purposes, indistinguishable from denying 
that the New Testament can teach us anything at all about the moral.  
Now, what about the claim that Christ is an archetypal human? In what sense is this 
correct to claim? To be able to answer the questions, I need to be a bit more specific regarding 
the notion of archetype (and archetypal). Let me distinguish two readings of the notion here: 
a philosophically light one and a philosophically heavy one. The latter implies a 
philosophical theory while the former doesn`t. To say, `They live in an archetypal country 
village` is to say something like ` They live in a typical example of a country village` or ` They 
live in a country village that looks very much like what the country villages originally looked 
like`. There is, clearly, no philosophy going on here. To describe a country village as 
archetypal is just saying either that there are many other very similar country villages or/and 
that it is a well-preserved example of what country villages used to look like. That`s the 
philosophically light reading of the notion.  
The philosophically heavy reading can be found in Plato`s dialogues.271 Plato doesn`t 
use the word `archetype`, that is, he doesn`t use the Greek form of it - `arkhetupon`. Instead, 
he uses the term eidos which, nevertheless, captures precisely the heavy reading of the notion 
of archetype. In Plato`s metaphysics, eidos refers to the original forms or (non-physical) 
essences of all things, to those first `blueprints` of everything that comes to exist in our 
spatiotemporal world. The word archetype comes from the above mentioned `arkhetupon`, 
which is a compound word formed of `arkhe` - meaning beginning, origin, first place – and 
`tupos` - meaning a model. `Arkhetupon` then refers to the first or original model (of 
something), which is analogous to what Plato`s eidos refers to. The heavy (or Platonic) 
reading of archetype/archetypal then refers to the non-physical essence that individuates 
kinds of things that exist.  
Now, I claim that if Christ is an archetypal human then it implies that whatever 
limitations can be predicated about Him will apply to all men. Clearly, this implication 
cannot be sustained on the light reading of archetypal. On the light reading, the claim that 
 
271 The locus classicus is Plato`s Allegory of the Cave in his Republic. See Plato, Republic, 
Benjamin Jowett (trans.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 514a-520a. 
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Christ is an archetypal human would mean something like: Christ is a good example of what 
most men look and behave like, or what most men used to look or behave like. The 
implication, however, is about all man. We need something much more robust, something 
that brings necessity into the picture. And here the heavy reading comes to mind. The heavy 
(or Platonic) reading of archetype/archetypal takes us to essences, that is to what is 
necessarily the case about all humans. The heavy reading gives us the implication we need.  
At this point, two questions arise. First, does anything like an archetype or essence of 
human exist at all? And, second, is it correct to say that Christ is or exemplifies such an 
archetype? It is quite tempting to go full Carl Jung here and show, deploying the conceptual 
machinery of his psychological theory, how, as a matter of fact, the complex cluster of 
properties (and the way they relate to each other) associated with Christ perfectly matches 
with those that Jung calls (the archetype of) the Self. `The archetype of the Self` refers to 
something like the objective or collective essence of man, and Jung himself argues that 
`Christ exemplifies [it]`.272 The crucial point here – and one that answers the first question - 
is that the overall logic of Jung`s theory allows him to plausibly claim that his concept of 
(the archetype of) the Self is an empirical concept and not (merely) a metaphysical one (as 
in the case of Plato`s eidos). And, of course, being able to say that (the archetype of) the Self 
is an empirical concept amounts to being able to say that the Self (i.e. the archetype or 
essence of human) does exist. Thus, within the framework of Jung`s theory, it would be 
possible and plausible to give an affirmative answer to both questions.  
I will not take the Jungian path here though. I have two reasons for not taking it. First, 
I can`t afford to let (M3) depend on something so complicated as is Jung`s theory of 
archetypes (and his reasons for taking them as empirically real). The scope of the chapter 
simply wouldn`t accommodate the lengthy exposition of Jung`s theory that such dependence 
would require. Second, and more importantly, I believe that there is an easier and more 
straightforward way to convince the reader that that there is a (sufficiently robust) sense in 
which essences or archetypes can be said to exist and that Christ exemplifies one of them.  
Above, I have established that my reader – a broadly Christian moral realist – must treat 
the New Testament (that is, the story of Christ) as a serious source of moral knowledge. 
Taking the story of Christ seriously means taking it as prescribing what one ought to do, or 
how one ought to live. But how does it happen that a story of a particular individual – Christ 
– extends its normative force to (the generalizing) one? In virtue of what is Christ`s story 
universalizable in this way? Let`s call that in virtue of which Christ`s story is universalizable 
simply (and rather unimaginatively) x. Now, for our purposes here, there is no need at all to 
 
272 Carl Gustav Jung, Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self (Collected Works of C. G. 
Jung), Richard F. C. Hull (trans.) (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), § 70. 
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go into the metaphysics of x, i.e. there is no need to evoke Plato`s or Jung`s theories. It 
suffices to realize and accept that there must be some such x for the story of Christ to extend 
its normative force to all people. My reader – a broadly Christian moral realist – accepts the 
fact of the extension of the normative force and therefore must assume x. Clearly, the logic 
behind x sustains the implication that whatever limitations can be predicated about Christ 
will apply to all men; and that`s what was needed.  
A few words about the implication in (M3). At this point it should be clear what is meant 
by saying that Christ is an archetypal human. And if this is clear than it should be equally 
clear that this description of Christ implies that whatever limitations can be predicated about 
Him will apply to all men. Notice, however, that the implication is correct only if we talk 
about limitations. If we drop this from the implication, we get an implausible version of it: 
(if Christ is an archetypal human then) whatever […] can be predicated about Christ will 
apply to all men. This version is implausible because Christ is not only the Son of man but 
also the Son of God, meaning He also exemplifies an essence (a divine one) that transcends 
the merely human one. Thus, there will be many properties attributable to Him that won`t be 
attributable to humans. The relation between the human and the divine in Christ is that of the 
limited and the unlimited. Hence the need to insert `limitations` into the implication. 
1.2.4  The moral standing of all men is essentially compromised 
(M3) says that whatever limitations can be predicated about Christ will apply to all men. 
(M2) says it can be predicated about Christ that His moral standing is compromised. (M4) 
follows straightforwardly from (M2) and (M3) once it is accepted that having one`s moral 
standing compromised counts as a limitation. The notion of limitation as used in (M3) means 
something like a `limitation to perfection`. Thus the relevant part of (M3) could be 
paraphrased as `whatever imperfections can be predicated about Christ […]` without 
affecting the logic of the argument. I don`t expect any objections to the claim that having 
one`s moral standing compromised is an imperfection.  
1.2.5  An issue with the argument 
There is an issue here regarding the argument as a whole that calls for a brief discussion. 
Those of my readers who are as much as casually acquainted with the theological views of 
St. Augustine will recall his influential and (in)famous doctrine of original sin. According to 
the doctrine, Adam`s sin in Eden has got inherited by all men. All men are born morally 
corrupted. As a result of Adam`s primal sin, man is essentially morally corrupted regardless 
of whether he has ever sinned as an individual. That sounds exactly like the conclusion in 
(M4). The reader might wonder then why, instead of going through the hassle of formulating 
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a new argument, I haven`t just made use of St. Augustine`s doctrine of original sin. There 
are two reasons I haven`t done so. 
First, St. Augustine`s arguments behind the doctrine are too theological to figure in a 
philosophical thesis. The arguments are too theological in the sense of being inextricably 
embedded in the conceptual matrix of the speculations of the Church Fathers. The Church 
Fathers were deeply religious thinkers and the intuitions grounding their concepts were 
fundamentally shaped by their strong faith. To those lacking this strong religious faith (which 
is majority of my readers, I suppose), the arguments of the Church Fathers (with St. 
Augustine being one of them) will feel bafflingly unconvincing. Have a look at one of St. 
Augustine`s arguments behind the doctrine. The argument273 can be structured in, roughly, 
the following way: 
i. The sacrament of baptism is crucial for salvation of one`s soul. 
ii. There is no alternative to baptism when it comes to the salvation of one`s soul. 
iii. If there was an alternative, then it would mean that Christ had died in vain. 
iv. It is undisputed that infants – who couldn`t, yet, have sinned and who don`t even 
have a capacity to do so – need to be baptised. 
v. Conclusion: man is born a sinner.  
The argument might be valid, but its explicit and implicit assumptions are way too 
constrained by a prior commitment to a complex theological doctrine. To a reader who is 
without such a commitment, the argument has no force.  
Second, St. Augustine`s (and other Church Fathers`) understanding of the notion of sin 
is importantly different from how it is commonly understood. For St. Augustine and other 
Church Fathers, a sin is fundamentally a relational concept. It refers to `a culpable 
misrelation to God and the world`.274 According to St. Augustine, the misrelation to God 
consists in replacing love of God with self-love.275 Thus, when St. Augustine argues that 
each man inherits the primal sin of Adam and as such is born sinful, what he means is that 
each man inherits a misrelation, or is born misrelated, to God. Now, being essentially sinful 
in the sense of being essentially misrelated to God is a state that has nothing to do with being 
essentially sinful in a sense that morally disqualifies one from blaming and/or punishing 
others. Test your intuition on the following scenario:  
 
 
273 The argument is discussed in more detail in Jesse Couenhoven, `St. Augustine`s Doctrine of 
Original Sin`, Augustinian Studies, 36, no. 2 (2005), pp.359-396 (pp.361-362). 
274 Couenhoven, `St. Augustine`s Doctrine of Original Sin`, p.360. 
275  Some such claim is implicit in St. Augustin`s debate with Pelagians. See his On Grace and Free 
Will (GLH Publishing, 2017), especially chapter 33.  
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Your friend has been caught cheating on his wife. The friend and his wife argue. She is hurt 
and angry, ` You are disgusting! I feel deeply embarrassed to have married someone so weak, 
cowardly and callous!`. Your friend will have none of it, `Who are you to talk to me like 
this?! You are so misrelated to God! You have no right, you hypocrite!`.  
 
Surely, it feels very odd to question one`s moral standing – to call one a hypocrite – on the 
grounds of one`s misrelation to God. It feels too weak a ground at best and just an irrelevant 
one at worst. This probably explains why nowhere in his writings does St. Augustine himself 
draw any conclusions regarding the moral status of a blamer/punisher from his doctrine of 
original sin. The doctrine simply doesn`t support any such conclusions. If it did, it would be 
impossible, for a thinker of St. Augustine`s stature, to miss it.  
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